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Abstract 
 
This thesis aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability. The principle of diplomatic inviolability is generally regarded by 
international law scholars as one of the oldest established principles of international law. 
The concept of inviolability in contemporary international law contains two distinct 
aspects: in terms of the duty of the receiving State, the first aspect involves the negative 
duty of not taking any enforcement action against the inviolable diplomatic premises, 
diplomatic agents or the diplomatic property, while the second aspect requires the 
positive duty to protect these premises, personnel and property. The contemporary legal 
regime governing the principle of diplomatic inviolability can be seen through the core 
provisions stipulated in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961.  
Several controversies can be identified when the authorities of the receiving State face 
dilemmas of deciding whether the principle of diplomatic inviolability or other norms of 
international law shall prevail. The dilemmas reveal the conflicts between the principle 
of diplomatic inviolability and other norms of international law, such as the protection 
of national security, public safety and human life. In the era of fragmentation of 
international law, it is not easy for either the authorities of the receiving State or 
international law scholars to settle the controversies with any straightforward solutions, 
for the reason that the precedence of diplomatic inviolability would inevitably 
compromise other norms and vice versa. 
The thesis examines the concept and theoretical basis of the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability, explores the historical evolution of the principle, analyses the 
contemporary legal regime of the principle and the controversies involving the conflicts 
between the principle and other norms of international law. Finally, the thesis critically 
reviews the various traditional solutions and proposes several alternative solutions to 
settle the controversies. 
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Introduction  
It is widely recognised by international law scholars that diplomatic law, like the law of 
treaties and the law of war, is certainly one of the oldest branches of public international 
law, the origins and practices of which can be traced back to antiquity. For example, 
Barker points out that ‘[t]he roots of diplomatic law lie buried in ancient history, 
making it one of the oldest branches of international law’,1 while the latest edition of 
Oppenheim’s International Law also makes a similar statement, which suggests that the 
law of diplomacy itself is ‘as old as history’.2 Among all the rules and principles in 
diplomatic law, it is generally agreed that the principle of diplomatic inviolability is the 
most important one, which can be justly titled as one of the underlying principles of 
diplomatic law and international law.
3
 In fact, the personal inviolability of diplomatic 
agents — one of the most important categories of the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability — is generally recognised by international law scholars as ‘the oldest 
established and the most universally recognised’ principle. 4  That being said, the 
question may be asked as to why the principle of diplomatic inviolability is still 
important in today’s international law and, indeed, whether it is worth a research project 
at all? The author of this thesis believes that the value of undertaking a research project 
on the principle of diplomatic inviolability can be reflected in the following three points. 
                                                 
 
1
 JC Barker, The Abuse of Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities: A Necessary Evil? (Dartmouth 1996) 
14. 
2
 R Jennings and A Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law (9th edn Longman 1996) vol 1, 1053. 
3
 ‘Codification of the International Law Relating to Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities, 
Memorandum prepared by the secretariat’ in YILC [1956] vol II, 161, para 233-234. 
4
 I Roberts (ed), Satow’s Diplomatic Practice (6th edn, OUP 2009) para 9.2. See also E Denza, 
Diplomatic Law: Commentary on the Vienna Convention on the Diplomatic Relations (3rd edn, OUP 
2008) 256. 
 2 
 
First and foremost, the principle of diplomat inviolability is faced with great challenges 
nowadays. The disappointing reality is that even though the inviolability of diplomatic 
missions and the inviolability of diplomatic personnel are well recognised and generally 
observed by all States, attacks on inviolable diplomatic premises and diplomatic 
personnel are not unusual in contemporary international affairs. For instance, in 
September 2012, a series of anti-US demonstrations broke out almost simultaneously 
outside United States embassies and consulates in numerous North African and Middle 
Eastern countries as a retaliatory protest against the release and circulation of an anti-
Islamic film via the internet a few months previously.
5
 These demonstrations reached 
their peak when the US consulate in Benghazi, Libya was fiercely assaulted by local 
demonstrators, resulting in the unfortunate death of the US ambassador to Libya, John 
Christopher Stevens.
6
 Probably, this wave of barbarism reminds international law 
scholars of the Tehran Hostages Crisis
7
and evidences the fact that the position of 
diplomats has not improved over the last three decades even after this important 
decision of the International Court of Justice.
 
As these incidents revealed, it can be 
acknowledged that the principle of diplomatic inviolability is still of vital importance 
and relevant in contemporary international law.  
                                                 
 
5
 ‘Protesters attack U.S. diplomatic compounds in Egypt, Libya’ (CNN News, 12 September 2012) 
<http://edition.cnn.com/2012/09/11/world/meast/egpyt-us-embassy-protests/index.html>; ‘Yemen 
protesters storm US embassy - as it happened’ (The Guardian, 13 September 2012) < 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/middle-east-live/2012/sep/13/libya-attack-us-ambassador-aftermath-
live>; ‘Two dead as protesters attack U.S. embassy in Tunisia’ (Reuters, 14 September 2012) 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/14/us-protests-tunisia-school-idUSBRE88D18020120914> all 
accessed 29 June 2014. See also ‘Q&A: Anti-Islam film’ BBC News (20 September 2012) < 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-19606155> accessed 29 June 2014. 
6
 ‘US confirms its Libya ambassador killed in Benghazi’ (BBC News, 12 September 2012) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-19570254> accessed 29 June 2014. 
7
 I Buffard and S Wittich, ‘United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran Case (United States of 
America v Iran)’ in R Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2nd 
edn, OUP 2012) vol X, 543. See also LS Frey and ML Frey, The History of Diplomatic Immunity (Ohio 
State University Press 1998) 515-525. 
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Secondly, it has been recognised that contemporary international law also faces new 
challenges, especially with regard to the phenomenon of fragmentation of international 
law. 
8
 As Pauwelyn points out,  
Fragmentation of international law, and the questions of co-ordination and conflict 
that it raises as between norms and between institutions, is a reality.
9
  
The impact of the fragmentation of international law on the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability lies in the emergence of certain conflicts between this principle and other 
norms of international law. Although some of the conflicts can be traced back to the 
‘Classical Periods’ of international law in the seventeenth and eighteen century, it was 
not until the establishment of the United Nations, and probably with the rise of 
international human rights law, that the conflicts became debated issues among 
academics. Even though the core rules of the principle of diplomatic inviolability have 
been systematically codified in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961,
10
 
the principle of diplomatic inviolability is not itself immune from the impact of the 
fragmentation of international law. For example, during the 1980s, several international 
law scholars challenged the principle of diplomatic inviolability by claiming that the 
inviolability of diplomatic premises should be overwhelmed by other norms of 
international law such as the necessity to protect human life.
11
 Thus, it is sensible to 
argue that the rules attached to the principle of diplomatic inviolability need to be 
reassessed and systematically researched so as to keep pace with developments in other 
                                                 
 
8
 ‘Conclusions of the work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties 
arising from the diversification and expansion of international law’ in A Pronto and M Wood (eds), The 
International Law Commission 1999-2009 (OUP 2010) vol IV, 614.  
9
 J Pauwelyn, ‘Fragmentation of International Law’ in R Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2012) vol IV, 219, para 41. 
10
 500 UNTS 95 (adopted 18 April 1961, entered into force 24 April 1964). Hereafter referred to as ‘the 
VCDR’. As of June 2014, there are 190 State parties to this convention. 
11
 For detailed discussion and arguments by various scholars, see Chapter 5. 
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areas of international law so as to confront the new challenges brought by the impact of 
the fragmentation of international law.
12
 
Third, it is frustrating to admit that as of today, there is no single academic work of 
diplomatic law (or international law) that specifically focuses on the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability. As a matter of fact, during the first two decades after the 
adoption and entry into force of the VCDR, there was a peak of discussion on the issue 
of diplomatic privileges and immunities and a batch of monographs were published on 
the theme of diplomatic law.
13
 However, most of these publications only provide 
introductory analysis of the provision of VCDR, and do not pay enough attention to the 
theoretical and practical issues of diplomatic privileges and immunities. It was not until 
the publication of Barker’s The Abuse of Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities: A 
Necessary Evil?
14
 in 1996 that a systematic review of one specific issues of diplomatic 
law was provided. The only two monographs on diplomatic law published in recent 
years are Barker’s The Protection of Diplomatic Personnel15 in 2006 and Denza’s third 
edition of Diplomatic Law
16
 in 2008. In 2009, a new edition of the classic work of 
Satow’s Diplomatic Practice, edited by Sir Ivor Roberts was published, though this 
                                                 
 
12
 It is worth noting that the notion of ‘fragmentation of international law’ is highly contested among 
international law scholars. Leading scholars such as Koskenniemi and Pauwelyn are proponents of the 
notion while Simma is suspicious of the notion. See B Simma, ‘Universality of International Law from 
the Perspective of a Practitioner’ (2009) 20 EJIL 265, 270. 
13
 These monographs include: CE Wilson, Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities (The University of 
Arizona Press 1967); M Hardy, Modern Diplomatic Law (Manchester University Press 1968); GEDNE 
Silva, Diplomacy in International Law (Sijthoff 1972); E Denza, Diplomatic Law: Commentary on the 
Vienna Convention on the Diplomatic Relations (1st edn, Oceana 1976),  B Sen, A Diplomat’s Handbook 
of International Law and Practice (3rd edn, Martinus Nijhoff 1988) ; L Dembinski, The Modern Law of 
Diplomacy (Martinus Nijhoff 1988); GV McClanahan, Diplomatic Immunity: Principles, Practices, 
Problems (Hurst & Company 1989), to list but a few.  
14
 Barker (n 1). 
15
 JC Barker, The Protection of Diplomatic Personnel (Ashgate 2006). 
16
 Denza (n 4). 
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work is not limited to the theme of diplomatic law. It can be seen that none of these 
works focuses on the principle of diplomatic inviolability,
17
 or on the new challenges 
faced by the principle. Considering the significance of the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability and its relevance in contemporary international law, the author of this 
thesis believes that a dedicated research of the principle of diplomatic inviolability may 
fill in the gap in the research on diplomatic law and contribute to the literature of 
diplomatic, and, indeed, international law. 
The aim and tasks of the thesis 
The two major tasks of this thesis are:  to carry out a comprehensive examination of the 
theory and practice of the principle of diplomatic inviolability, and to critically analyse 
the legal issues (mainly the controversies) arising from the conflicts between the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability and other norms of international law. The aim of 
the thesis is to find out whether there is any feasible and satisfactory solution that can 
settle the controversies, and to analyse whether the proposed solutions can provide the 
authorities of the receiving State with some practical measures to tackle the dilemmas 
they faced in certain scenarios.  
The scope of the thesis 
As will be discussed in chapter 1 of the thesis, the principle of diplomatic inviolability 
actually contains three categories: the inviolability of diplomatic premises, the 
inviolability of diplomatic personnel and the inviolability of diplomatic property. 
Accordingly, the thesis will discuss all three categories, although the emphasis will be 
placed on the inviolability of diplomatic premises as this category is generally 
                                                 
 
17
 The only notable research that related to the principle of diplomatic inviolability is Barker’s Protection 
of Diplomatic Personnel. However, as the title suggests, the theme of that book is confined to the 
protection aspect of the principle, and the scope is limited to the inviolability of diplomatic personnel.  
 6 
 
recognised as ‘one of the most fundamental rules of diplomatic law’.18 The author of 
this thesis considers the justification to discuss all three categories instead of merely 
dealing with one category, because of the following three reasons. First, the three 
categories share the most significant feature of the principle of diplomatic inviolability: 
they all reflect the two distinct aspects of inviolability: the immunity from any 
interference and enforcement from the authorities of the receiving State, and the special 
protection by the receiving State.
19
 Secondly, the examination of all three categories 
provides a more comprehensive understanding of the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability. As has been pointed out above, there are few academic works of 
diplomatic law providing a comprehensive analysis of all three categories of the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability. This thesis will attempt to fill this gap in the 
literature. Thirdly, as will be discussed in Chapter 2, the historical evolution of the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability illustrates how, and in which order, these three 
categories gradually come into existence. Indeed, the three categories are not isolated 
from each other and so, by exploring all three categories, it will be possible to 
understand their interrelationship.  
It is worth noting that this thesis will limit the scope of discussion to diplomatic 
inviolability in a narrow sense. Neither consular inviolability nor the inviolability 
related to ad hoc diplomats nor the inviolability related to representatives to 
international organisations will be covered. After all, contemporary diplomacy varies in 
forms and each form has its distinctive features.
20
 Thus, the author considers that it will 
be impractical for this research project to analyse all forms of inviolability (diplomatic, 
consular, ad hoc, international organisations) in a single piece of work. 
                                                 
 
18
 J d'Aspremont, ‘Premises of Diplomatic Missions’ in R Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia 
of Public International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2012) vol VIII, 413, para 1. 
19
 See Chapter 1, section 1.1.1 where the two aspects will be discussed in detail. 
20
 See M Hardy, Modern Diplomatic Law (Manchester University Press 1968) 2-4. 
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Methodology 
The author of this thesis considers that legal positivism is the best available legal 
methodology for carrying out this research project. Legal positivism, as is pointed out 
by Ratner and Slaughter,  
[S]ummarizes a range of theories that focus upon describing the law as it is, backed 
up by effective sanctions, with reference to formal criteria, independently of moral 
or ethical consideration.
21
  
Indeed, the classic perspective of legal positivism asserts that a system of legal rules is 
regarded as ‘an “objective” reality and needs to be distinguished from law “as it should 
be.”’22 As Hart pointed out, proponents of legal positivism ‘constantly insisted on the 
need to distinguish, firmly and with the maximum of clarity, law as it is from law as it 
ought to be.’23 Accordingly, legal positivism requires that subjective factors such as 
social context and morality are deemed as extra-legal and therefore must not affect the 
examination of legal rules. That being said, it is worth noting that ‘[r]elying on a 
positivist conception of law does not necessarily imply subscribing to the view that 
there is only one correct answer to any legal problem’. 24  Remarkably, in the 
Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf Case, the ICJ pointed out that: 
                                                 
 
21
 SA Ratner and AM Slaughter, ‘Appraising the Methods of International Law: A Prospectus for 
Readers’ (1999) 93 AJIL 291, 293. 
22
 AJ Paulus and B Simma, ‘The Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights Abuses in Internal 
Conflicts – A Positivist View’ (1999) 93 AJIL 302, 304. 
23
 HLA Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’ (1958) 71 Harvard Law Review 593, 
594. 
24
 Paulus and Simma (n 22) 307. 
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[W]hen applying positive international law, the court may choose among several 
possible interpretations of the law the one which appears, in the light of the 
circumstances of the case, to be the closest to the requirements of justice.
25
 
As will be revealed in Chapter 5 of this thesis, the above statement can well illustrate 
the ICJ’s interpretation of one specific aspect of the principle of diplomatic inviolability 
— the inviolability of diplomatic agents. In the profound judgement of the Tehran 
Hostages Case, the Court commented that: 
The observance of [the principle of diplomatic inviolability] does not mean ... that 
a diplomatic agent ... may not, on occasion, be briefly arrested ... in order to 
prevent the commission of the particular crime.
26
  
Indeed, this is a form of what Paulus and Simma described as ‘modern positivism’. 
According to Paulus and Simma, ‘[M]odern positivism is able to adapt to new 
developments in international affairs, even if sometimes at the cost of the beauty of 
traditional theory — namely, its clarity and rigidity.’27 Nevertheless, such understanding 
does not mean that modern legal positivism succumbs to the influx of extra-legal factors, 
nor does it suggest that well-accepted treaty provisions and established rules of 
customary international law are susceptible to new challenges ranging from human right 
outcry to practical concerns of State officials, for the reason that 
[T]he lawyer’s role is not to facilitate the decision maker's dilemma between law 
and politics (and, occasionally, between law and morals), but to clarify the legal 
side of things.
28
   
                                                 
 
25
 Case concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia v Libya) [1982] ICJ Rep 18,  para 71. 
26
 Case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v 
Iran) [1980] ICJ Rep 3, para 86. For details, see Chapter 5, section 5.2.2 (b). 
27
 Paulus and Simma (n 22) 307. 
28
 Ibid. 
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And so, the essence of legal positivism in contemporary international legal research still 
lies in the identification and clarification of certain rules of international law, without 
significantly undermining their original purpose and functions. Legal positivism, as 
Ratner and Slaughter pointed out, ‘remains the lingua franca of most international 
lawyers’,29 and the author of this thesis holds the same opinion.  
Based on the above understanding of legal positivism, the author of this thesis decides 
that the chief research method adopted for this thesis is doctrinal research. Indeed, 
doctrinal research follows the legal philosophy of legal positivism and materialises legal 
positivism in actual application. This method focuses on the critical examination of 
legislation and case law, as well as identifying and analysing legal issues based on the 
examination and interpretation of both primary and secondary sources.
30
 In essence, this 
research method requires ‘a critical analysis of the existing literature to inform the 
researcher of “what is known and not known” about the topic’,31 and fulfill the task of 
identifying the law ‘as it is’. 
The author of this thesis considers that adopting doctrinal research as the chief method 
for the critical analysis of the principle of diplomatic inviolability is appropriate, for the 
following three reasons. First, it is said that the doctrinal research method is ‘normally a 
two-part process involving both locating the sources of the law and then interpreting 
and analysing the text’.32 One of the tasks of this thesis is to explore and examine the 
specific rules of the principle of diplomatic inviolability. Indeed, a detailed examination 
of the specific rules of the principle of diplomatic inviolability is the starting point to the 
                                                 
 
29
 Ratner and Slaughter (n 21) 293. 
30
 T Hutchinson, ‘Doctrinal Research’ in D Watkins and M Burton (eds), Research Methods in Law 
(Routledge 2013) 11-12. 
31
 Ibid 13. 
32
 Ibid. 
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further discussion of the theoretical and practical issues related to the principle. 
Accordingly, the analysis and interpretation of specific provisions in the VCDR is 
essential to the current research. Thus, the adoption of doctrinal method is well suited to 
the close examination of the text of the VCDR, as well as to the legal discussion around 
the drafting process of the VCDR, and interpretation of specific legal terms.  
Secondly, it is said that the doctrinal research demands researchers to ‘fit new material 
into the existing legal framework’, as well as integrating new factual situations ‘with the 
relevant law and underlying legal principles applicable to a legal area’.33 In this thesis, 
the author will not only review the principle of diplomatic inviolability but will also 
analyse other legal principles and doctrines of international law, such as the doctrine of 
self-defence. In addition, other norms of international law that are closely related to the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability, such as the protection of national security and the 
significant influence of international human rights law, will also be analysed. The 
impact of other norms of international law on the principle of diplomatic inviolability 
will be thoroughly discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.  
Thirdly, it has been pointed out that doctrinal research is ‘well suited to advocacy and 
finding solutions to legal problems’.34 Since one of the aims of this thesis is to figure 
out solutions to the various controversies related to the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability, it is appropriate to adopt the doctrinal research.  
Admittedly, doctrinal research method does have its limitations. As Westerman once 
pointed out, ‘the legal system itself functions as a theoretical framework that selects 
facts and highlights them as legally relevant ones’.35 And so, Hutchinson commented 
                                                 
 
33
 Ibid. 
34
 Ibid 28. 
35
 P Westerman, ‘Open or Autonomous? The Debate on Legal Methodology as a Reflection of the Debate 
on Law’ in M van Hoecke (ed), Methodologies of Legal Research Which Kind of Method for What Kind 
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that ‘the [doctrinal] researcher’s view is narrowly confined within the box labelled “law” 
and not concerned with the effects of the law in the world external to the black letter 
box.’36 To overcome such limitations, the author of this thesis will endeavour to analyse 
the theme of the research within the scope of public international law, rather than 
merely reflect the so-called ‘insider’s view’ of diplomatic law. As was pointed out 
above, when analysing the principle of diplomatic inviolability, other relevant 
international law doctrines and norms will also be discussed so as to critically analyse 
the applicability of the principle of diplomatic inviolability in various contexts and 
interpret specific provisions of the VCDR and other relevant international conventions. 
Hopefully, the successful adoption of the doctrinal research method will not only 
effectively complete the task of identifying what the specific rules of the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability are and how to interpret them into various contexts, but also 
achieve the goal of balancing established norms of diplomatic law and newly developed 
norms such as the protection of human rights and human life. 
Organisation of the thesis 
In addition to the current Introduction and the final Conclusion, the thesis will be 
arranged in three parts and organised in seven chapters. Chapters 1 and 2 form the first 
part of the thesis, which provides a detailed examination of various fundamental 
questions related to the theme of the thesis. Chapter 1 will focus on the elaboration of 
the concept, sources, and scope, as well as the theoretical basis of the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability. Chapter 2 will explore the origins of the principle and then 
analyses the historical evolution of the principle in chronological order, from ancient 
times to the modern day.  
                                                                                                                                               
 
of Discipline? (Hart Publishing 2011) 91. 
36
 Hutchinson (n 30) 15. Emphasis added. 
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Chapters 3 and 4 form the second part of the thesis, which provides a comprehensive 
review of the contemporary regime of the principle of diplomatic inviolability, mainly 
based on related provisions stipulated in the VCDR. In Chapter 3, all of the provisions 
related to the principle of diplomatic inviolability that are expressly stipulated in the 
VCDR will be carefully analysed, while in Chapter 4, State responsibility arising from 
the breach of the international obligations of the principle of diplomatic inviolability by 
the receiving State will be analysed.  
Chapter 5 to Chapter 7 form the third part of the thesis, which deal with the 
controversies arising from the conflicts between the principle of diplomatic inviolability 
and other norms of international law in various kinds of scenarios, as well as possible 
solutions to the controversies. Chapter 5 will focus on the controversies involve the 
conflicts between the principle of diplomatic inviolability and the protection of national 
security, public safety and human life, while Chapter 6 will focus on the controversies 
involve the conflicts between the principle of diplomatic inviolability and the respect of 
the right to demonstrate and the right of expression. The dilemmas faced by the 
authorities of the receiving State in controversial scenarios will also be analysed. In 
Chapter 7, traditional solutions proposed by scholars, as well as alternative solutions 
will be discussed. Both the merits and shortcomings of these solutions will be evaluated 
in detail.  
Finally, the Conclusion will provide a general summary of the analysis of the thesis. 
Last but not least, in this final section, an outlook for the future of the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability will be provided, which will serve as the ultimate findings of 
the thesis. 
 13 
 
The citation style 
The author of this thesis adopts Oxford Standard for the Citation of Legal Authorities 
(OSCOLA) (4th edition) as the citation style.
37
                                                 
 
37
 http://www.law.ox.ac.uk/publications/oscola.php. 
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Chapter 1    The Theoretical Foundations of the 
Principle of Diplomatic Inviolability 
The theme of this research is the principle of diplomatic inviolability. At first glance, 
the phrase ‘diplomatic inviolability’ seems to be self-explanatory: ‘the application of the 
concept of inviolability into diplomatic law’. However, to provide an exact definition of 
such a term is by no means easy. This paradox can be seen through the very fact that as 
of today, it is extremely difficult to find an exact and specific definition of the term 
‘diplomatic inviolability’ (or simply ‘inviolability’) in most of the published 
dictionaries of international law, or dictionaries of law.
1
 Just as Mann incisively points 
out, ‘The definition of the term has in the past provoked little discussion.’2 In addition, 
in most academic works of diplomatic law, the term ‘diplomatic inviolability’ is usually 
shadowed by the ubiquitous term of ‘diplomatic privileges and immunities’, and 
therefore lacks a clear and unambiguous usage of its own.  Nevertheless, it is 
                                                 
 
1
 For example, both edition of the authoritative Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law 
(1st edn, North Holland 1981; 2nd edn, OUP 2012) contains no entry of ‘diplomatic inviolability’. 
Similarly, the latest edition of Oxford’s A Dictionary of Law (7th edn, OUP 2009) and Longman 
Dictionary of Law (7th edn, Longman 2007) contain no entry of ‘diplomatic inviolability’. Although 
Parry & Grant’s Encyclopaedic Dictionary of International Law  does contain an entry of ‘inviolability’, 
it actually quotes the description of the content and scope of the principle of diplomatic inviolability from 
an early edition of Satow’s Guide to Diplomatic Practice (5th edn, Longman 1979) which offers no 
specific meaning of the term. Apart from those law dictionaries mentioned above,  in the latest edition of 
A Dictionary of Diplomacy, the entry ‘diplomatic inviolability’ is cross-referenced to the entry of 
‘diplomatic privileges and immunities’, which actually provides a description of the content and scope of 
the principle of diplomatic inviolability instead of a specific definition of the term. See JP Grant and JC 
Barker (eds), Parry & Grant’s Encyclopaedic Dictionary of International Law (3rd edn, OUP 2009) 313; 
GR Berridge and L Lloyd, A Dictionary of Diplomacy (3rd edn, Palgrave Macmillan 2012) 105, 110-112. 
2
 FA Mann, ‘”Inviolability” and Other Problems of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations’ in 
FA Mann, Further Studies in International Law(OUP 1990) 326.  
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acknowledged that most academic authorities of diplomatic law do recognise that 
‘diplomatic inviolability’ is a distinct principle of diplomatic law.3 Therefore, this first 
chapter will aim to delve into the meaning of the concept of ‘diplomatic inviolability’ 
first, and then proceed to analyse some fundamental theoretical questions regarding the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability, such as its nature, sources and scope. Finally, the 
more significant issue — the theoretical basis of the principle of diplomatic inviolability 
will be explored in detail. 
1.1 The Concept and Nature of the Principle of Diplomatic 
Inviolability 
1.1.1 The Concept of ‘Diplomatic Inviolability’ 
The concept of ‘diplomatic inviolability’ is based on the concept of ‘inviolability’ 
which derived from the core word ‘inviolable’. As a matter of fact, the word ‘inviolable’ 
first appeared during the fifteenth century from the Latin word ‘inviolabilis’ which 
means ‘sacrosanct’, or ‘imperishable’.4 Indeed, unlike many other words that originated 
from Latin or Middle English, the literal meaning of the word ‘inviolable’ has not been 
changed over the past several centuries. Nowadays, the literal meaning of ‘inviolable’ is 
lucidly defined in some of the most authoritative English language dictionaries as 
follows: 
                                                 
 
3
 For example, see CE Wilson, Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities (The University of Arizona Press 
1967) 46-47; B Sen, A Diplomat’s Handbook of International Law and Practice (3rd edn, Martinus 
Nijhoff 1988) 107; SE Nahlik, ‘Development of Diplomatic Law: Selected Problems’, (1990) 222 Recueil 
Des Cours 187, 248. 
4
 See ‘Inviolable’ (Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online) <http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/inviolable> accessed 5 June 2014; ‘Inviolabilis’ (Latin Dictionary Online) 
<http://www.latin-dictionary.org/inviolabilis> accessed 2 July 2014. Indeed, the concept of inviolability 
can be traced back to ancient times but the specific term only came into existence in the fifteenth century. 
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1) [something] that must be respected and not attacked or destroyed;
5
 
2)  [an inviolable right, law, principle etc is] extremely important and should be 
treated with respect and not broken or removed.
6
 
Thus, based on the literal meaning of the word ‘inviolable’, its noun form ‘inviolability’ 
can be properly defined as ‘the status that something is considered as sacrosanct so that 
it must not be attacked or bothered with, and it should be treated with due respect’. 
Whereas the literal meaning of the word ‘inviolability’ is self-explanatory and quite 
easily understood, the concept of inviolability as applied into the context of diplomatic 
law is much more complicated. As of today, an exact and perfect definition of 
‘inviolability’ in the context of diplomatic law still does not exist, though a concise 
description of the concept of ‘inviolability’ can be found in one of the authoritative and 
most cited works of diplomatic law, Satow’s Guide to Diplomatic Practice: 
The term ‘inviolability’ has two distinct aspects in modern international law. The 
first is immunity from any legal process or action by the law enforcement officers 
of the receiving State. The second aspect ... is the duty of protection laid on the 
receiving State.
7
 
Another more elaborated description of the concept of ‘inviolability’ can be found in the 
definitive commentary work of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961, 
that is,  Denza’s Diplomatic Law, which provides: 
Inviolability in modern international law is a status accorded to premises, persons, 
or property physically present in the territory of a sovereign State but not subject to 
                                                 
 
5
 ‘Inviolable’, Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English (6th edn, OUP 2000) 932. 
6
 ‘Inviolable’, Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English (4th edn, Pearson Education Limited 2003) 
857. 
7
 I Roberts (ed), Satow's Diplomatic Practice (6th edn, OUP 2009) para 8.11, 8.14 and 9.3.  
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its jurisdiction in the ordinary way. [First], [t]he sovereign State—under the Vienna 
Convention the receiving State—is under a duty to abstain from exercising any 
sovereign rights, in particular law enforcement rights, in respect of inviolable 
premises, persons, or property. [Second], [t]he receiving State is also under a 
positive duty to protect inviolable premises, persons, or property from physical 
invasion or interference with their functioning and from impairment of their 
dignity.
8
 
Although both of the above descriptions use the term ‘inviolability’, it is worth pointing 
out that it is more precise to use ‘diplomatic inviolability’ to denote the meaning of 
inviolability that applied in diplomatic law, as used in the authoritative A Dictionary of 
Diplomacy.
9
  
Analysing the above descriptions of the term ‘diplomatic inviolability’, it can be 
summarised that the concept of ‘diplomatic inviolability’ contains two distinct aspects. 
The first aspect, as described in both Satow’s Guide and Denza’s Diplomatic Law, 
expresses essentially the same meaning: a legal status of being immune ‘from all 
interference, whether under colour of law or right or otherwise’ 10 from the receiving 
                                                 
 
8
 E Denza, Diplomatic Law: Commentary on the Vienna Convention on the Diplomatic Relations (3rd 
edn, OUP 2008) 135.  
9
 Berridge and Lloyd (n 1) 74. Throughout this thesis the term ‘inviolability’ and ‘diplomatic 
inviolability’ will be used interchangeably. However, it is noteworthy that within the realm of public 
international law, the term ‘inviolability’ may have other usages in addition to its application in the 
context of diplomatic law. For instance, it may be used in a ‘less technical sense’ to ‘describe the nature 
of some core human rights’. See the entry of ‘inviolability’ in Grant and Barker (n 1) 313-314, which 
marks two distinct usage of the term ‘inviolability’ in modern international law: ‘inviolability’ in a 
‘technical sense and applicable to diplomatic law’ and in ‘a less technical sense’ (ie, in international 
human rights law). 
10
 Parry’s words, cited from 7 British Digest of International Law 700, as cited in Mann (n 2) 326. 
Similarly, Calvo expresses that inviolability ‘is a quality, or status, which renders any person vested with 
it immune against any form of constraint or proceedings’. See C Calvo, Le Droit international theorique 
et pratoque vol VIII (5th edn, Arthur Rousseau 1896) 296, as cited in ‘Codification of the International 
Law Relating to Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities, Memorandum prepared by the Secretariat’, 
YILC [1956] vol II, 161, para 233. 
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State. In essence, it is a status of immunity from any kind of interference and 
enforcement, which suggests that there is a passive duty of the receiving State not to 
take actions against the inviolable persons or things. It can also be inferred that no 
physical harm can be inflicted upon such inviolable persons and things; neither can their 
dignity be harmed. Notably, this aspect is similar to the literal meaning of the word 
‘inviolability’ mentioned above. Indeed, both the literal meaning of the word 
‘inviolability’ and the first aspect of the concept of ‘diplomatic inviolability’ denotes a 
sacrosanct status that is conferred upon certain things which immune them from any 
kinds of interference or harm, or in terms of the receiving States, a kind of voluntary 
restraint from taking actions against something sacrosanct. 
While the first aspect of the concept of ‘diplomatic inviolability’ is similar to the literal 
meaning of the word ‘inviolability’, it is by no means the same case in relation to the 
second aspect of the term ‘diplomatic inviolability’ described above, that is, the status 
of being positively protected by the receiving State. Indeed, at a first glance, it seems 
that neither the literal meaning of the word ‘inviolability’ nor its root word ‘inviolable’ 
denote any reference to a kind of duty of protection laid upon the receiving State, let 
alone a positive duty. However, a further close examination of the essence of the first 
aspect of the concept of ‘diplomatic inviolability’ reveals that, though the literal 
meaning of the word ‘inviolability’ does not directly suggest that there exists a kind of 
duty, it can be inferred from the first aspect of the concept of ‘diplomatic inviolability’. 
Since the first aspect requires a passive duty for the receiving State to refrain from 
harassing the diplomatic premises and diplomatic agents, it is a natural inference that 
any kind of harassment from private individuals of the receiving State should also be 
prevented. After all, without the positive duty of protection from the receiving State, 
both the diplomatic premises and diplomatic agents will easily be harassed by private 
individuals of the receiving State, and usually they will fall in victims of radicals of 
various kinds, such as political extremists, demonstrators, or even individual criminals. 
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Indeed, Vattel, arguably the first academic  to suggest that the status of being positively 
protected by the receiving State should be incorporated into the concept of diplomatic 
inviolability,
 11
 incisively pointed out that ‘If their person is not protected from violence 
of every kind, the right of maintaining embassies becomes of doubtful value and can 
hardly be exercised with success’, and that the duty of protecting foreign citizens who 
happen to be in that State is ‘due in a higher degree to a foreign minister’.12 This 
conclusion seems to be fairly natural according to Vattel, for the reason that ‘the 
sovereign should protect every man who happens to be in his States, whether citizen or 
alien, and protect him secure from all violence’. 13 Since a public minister represents the 
character of his sovereign, it is only natural and quite understandable that he enjoys a 
much higher protection than normal citizens and aliens. Therefore, Vattel asserted that, 
‘It is particularly the duty of the sovereign to whom a minister is sent to afford security 
to the person of the minister’.14  
It is also worth noting that the above analysis of the two aspects of the concept of 
‘diplomatic inviolability’ contains one important inference: the first aspect of the 
concept of ‘diplomatic inviolability’ — the status of being legally immune from all 
kinds of interference by the receiving State is generally considered as the core element 
of the concept, and therefore may be properly viewed as the inherent aspect of the 
concept. The second aspect of the concept of ‘diplomatic inviolability’ — the status of 
being positively protected by the receiving State is generally considered as a corollary 
of the first aspect, and it may be properly viewed as derivative. Such a conclusion 
suggests a twofold relationship between the first and second aspect of the concept of 
                                                 
 
11
 JC Barker, The Protection of Diplomatic Personnel (Ashgate 2006) 46. 
12
 E de Vattel, The Law of Nations (CG Fenwick tr, first published 1758, Oceana 1964) 371. 
13
 Ibid. The term ‘foreign minister’ here refers to the modern term of ‘diplomatic agents’. 
14
 Ibid.  
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‘diplomatic inviolability’. In terms of the sending State, the first aspect is of most 
significance. It serves as an aegis for its diplomatic premises, diplomatic personnel and 
diplomatic property against any kind of interference from the receiving State. The 
second aspect serves as a further strengthening, which provides further insurance of the 
inviolable status. In terms of the receiving State, the negative duty of refraining from 
any interference is the principal duty, while the positive duty of protection is an 
ancillary one. This does not mean that the duty of protection is less important than the 
passive duty of not interfering. It merely reflects the different necessity when the 
receiving State applies the concept of diplomatic inviolability into practice. In a word, 
both the first and second aspects are indispensable to the concept of ‘diplomatic 
inviolability’, and both should be incorporated to the definition of ‘diplomatic 
inviolability’. 
To sum up, a proposed definition of the concept of ‘diplomatic inviolability’ can be 
expressed as: A legal status conferred upon certain things and personnel of the sending 
State, which not only grants them being immune from any kinds of interference or harm 
by the receiving State but also requires being positively protected by that State. 
1.1.2 The Nature and Concept of the Principle of Diplomatic Inviolability 
It is important to note that the aforementioned concept of diplomatic inviolability 
merely denotes an abstract legal status. It is only through specific rules that the abstract 
legal status of diplomatic inviolability can be achieved in practice. In legal terminology, 
it is generally acceptable that the word ‘principle’ is a suitable term for referring to 
something ‘inherent in or developed from a particular body of law’.15 Such a principle is 
used to describe ‘a binding legal statement which describes obligations of conduct or 
obligations to achieve an objective’16. As to the principle of diplomatic inviolability, the 
                                                 
 
15
 R Wolfrum, ‘General International Law (Principles, Rules and Standards)’ in R Wolfrum (ed), The 
Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (OUP 2012) vol IV, 344, para 7. 
16
 Ibid para 6. 
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use of the term ‘principle’ denotes those rules which constitute a particular legal source 
of the application of diplomatic inviolability, so as to make it clear the extent to which 
certain people and things from the sending State enjoy an inviolable status, as well as 
specifying the extent to which certain obligations should be observed by the receiving 
State. And so, the term ‘principle of diplomatic inviolability’ can be properly defined as: 
A set of core legal rules that deal with the application of the concept of diplomatic 
inviolability. Admittedly, the term ‘principle of diplomatic inviolability’ has been 
widely mentioned in academic writings,
17
 as well as various law reports and public 
documents.
18
  
To consider ‘diplomatic inviolability’ as a legal principle has two important 
implications. First, it acknowledges that the rules concerning diplomatic inviolability 
are the most essential ones that underlie the infrastructure of modern diplomatic law. As 
Fauchille points out, ‘[T]he whole subject [of diplomatic law] is dominated by the 
principle of inviolability ... This is the fundamental principle ...’19 Similarly, Barker 
points out that, ‘[I]t is true to say that diplomatic inviolability is the cornerstone of 
modern diplomatic privileges and immunities’.20 Silva also remarks that ‘inviolability is 
the fundamental principle from which all diplomatic privileges and immunities have 
been derived’.21 Indeed, this aspect can also be reflected by the very fact that the rules 
                                                 
 
17
 For example, see note 3 above.  See also MN Shaw, International Law (6th edn, CUP 2008) 764; L 
Dembinski, The Modern Law of Diplomacy (Martinus Nijhoff 1988) 191; M Hardy, Modern Diplomatic 
Law (Manchester University Press 1968) 51; GEDNE Silva, Diplomacy in International Law (Sijthoff 
1972) 89, 91 and 97; Denza (n 8) 257; Nahlik (n 3) 248-250.  More often than not, the term is stated as 
‘principle of inviolability’ in those academic works of diplomatic law.  
18
 For instance, see EC Surette, ‘Applicability of Diplomatic Immunity Under Vienna Convention and 
Diplomatic Relations Act’ (2005) 1 ALR Fed 2d 351, Section I. §2, para 4. 
19
 P Fauchille, Traité de Droit International Public (8th edn, Arthur Rousseau 1926) vol I, 60, as cited in  
‘Codification of the International Law Relating to Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities, Memorandum 
prepared by the Secretariat’ (n 10) 161, para 233. 
20
 Barker (n 11) 2. 
21
 Silva (n 17) 91. 
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pertaining diplomatic inviolability form many of the core articles in the VCDR.
22
 
Secondly, to consider ‘diplomatic inviolability’ as a principle suggests that the rules 
concerning diplomatic inviolability occupy a fairly significant position in the realm of 
public international law. For one thing, the principle of diplomatic inviolability is 
among the ‘oldest known principle of international law altogether’.23 In addition, it can 
also be supported by the very fact that the rules concerning diplomatic inviolability 
frequently became the focus of official or private attempts at the codification of 
international law since the 19th century,
24
 and, not surprisingly, after the establishment 
of the International Law Commission, these rules became a priority topic for drafting.
25
  
Although the significance of the principle of diplomatic inviolability is well agreed 
among academics of international law, its nature is still at issue. For instance, some 
scholars claim that diplomatic inviolability is actually a kind of diplomatic privilege;
26
 
some others assert that diplomatic inviolability is better to be regarded as a sub-category 
of diplomatic immunity.
27
 Such divergence actually originates from the academic 
debate on the different meanings between the word ‘privilege’ and ‘immunity’. During 
the discussion of ILC’s Draft Articles on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities, 
                                                 
 
22
 To be specific, Article 22 stipulates the inviolability of diplomatic premises; Article 24 stipulates the 
inviolability of diplomatic archives; Article 27 stipulates the inviolability of diplomatic correspondence; 
Article 29 stipulates the inviolability of diplomatic agents; Article 30 stipulates the inviolability of 
residence and property of diplomatic agents; and finally, Article 37 stipulates the inviolability of other 
personnel such as the members of the family of the diplomatic agents as well as administrative and 
technical staff. 
23
 Nahlik (n 3) 248. See also Silva (n 17) 89. 
24
 For details of these codification attempts, see Chapter 2, section 2.2.4. 
25
 UNGA Res 685 (VII) (5 December 1952). 
26
 Nahlik (n 3) Chapter II in which he puts the analysis of the principle of diplomatic inviolability under 
the title of ‘Privileges’. See also Vattel (n 12) 375, where he expressly says that ‘inviolability…is not [an 
ambassador’s] only privilege’.  
27  
For instance, see ‘Codification of the International Law Relating to Diplomatic Intercourse and 
Immunities, Memorandum prepared by the Secretariat’ (n 10) 161, para 231. 
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Verdross held the opinion that ‘it would be preferable to speak of “diplomatic privileges” 
only’, for the reason that ‘immunities were included in those privileges’.28 However, 
most of the other members of the ILC preferred to keep the difference between 
privileges and immunities. For instance, Bartos 
recalled that there had been a prolonged discussion of the difference between 
privileges and immunities during the drafting of the Convention on the Privileges 
and Immunities of the United Nations. It had been decided to maintain a distinction 
between them, on the ground that immunities generally had a legal basis, whereas 
only some privileges were based on law, the others being a matter of courtesy.
29
 
According to Silva, the word ‘privileges’ has ‘an over-all meaning embracing all the 
inviolabilities, immunities and exemptions’.30 Indeed, both diplomatic inviolability and 
diplomatic immunity are a kind of extraordinary status conferred upon the people and 
things of the sending State,
31
 thus make them a kind of ‘privilege’ per se. However, the 
distinction between the usage of ‘diplomatic privileges’ and ‘diplomatic immunities’ 
was maintained by the ILC,
32
 which leaves the terms available for use today.  
Although it is now less debatable that ‘diplomatic inviolability’ can be subsumed into 
the ubiquitous category of ‘diplomatic privileges and immunities’, it is worth noting that 
                                                 
 
28
 YILC [1957] vol I, 52, para 4. 
29
 Ibid, para 11. 
30
 As cited in Silva (n 17) 89 at which Silva thinks personally that such a suggestion ‘should have been 
accepted’.  
31
 LT Lee and J Quigley, Consular Law and Practice (3rd edn, OUP 2008) 341. 
32
 For instance, it is suggested that ‘immunities generally had a legal basis, whereas only certain 
privileges were based on law’. See ibid. See also Satow’s classic distinction between these two terms, in 
Roberts (n 7) para 9.1 in which he says ‘in general a privilege denotes some substantive exemption from 
laws and regulations…whereas an immunity does not imply any exemption from substantive law but 
confers a procedural protection from the enforcement process’. Therefore, the so-called ‘droit de 
chapelle’ and the exemption of local taxations can only be regarded as a kind of diplomatic privilege, not 
diplomatic immunity’. 
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a distinction between ‘diplomatic inviolability’ and ‘diplomatic immunity’ is helpful for 
legal considerations. The distinction between ‘inviolability’ and ‘immunity’ can be 
explained with the following four points. First, as it has been pointed out earlier, both 
diplomatic inviolability and diplomatic immunity can be regarded as a kind of privilege 
per se. However, the emphasis of these two privileges is remarkably different. During 
the aforementioned discussion of the difference between ‘diplomatic privileges’ and 
‘diplomatic immunities’ in the ILC, the Chairman, Zourek pointed out that: 
The term ‘immunity’ had been associated since the Middle Ages with the idea of 
exemption from local jurisdiction. Privileges, or prerogatives, were something 
different. They were prerogatives based on international law, customary or written, 
and gave the diplomatic agents positive rights which other inhabitants of the 
receiving State did not possess.
33
 
Since diplomatic inviolability can be regarded as a kind of privilege, it is not difficult to 
identify the difference based on Zourek’s comment. For example, the second aspect of 
diplomatic inviolability requires the special protection of diplomatic premises, agents 
and property by the receiving State. Such protection indicates not only a kind of 
‘positive right’ of relevant persons, premises or property of the sending State, but also 
indicates a duty on the receiving State. And so, inviolability can easily be distinguished 
from the immunity from jurisdiction of local courts in this aspect. Secondly, it is 
recognisable that according to Article 32 of the VCDR, diplomatic immunity
34
 can be 
waived by the sending State either voluntarily or upon request from the receiving State. 
On the contrary, there is no provision mentioning or suggesting the possibility of waiver 
of diplomatic inviolability. Admittedly, if the head of a diplomatic mission provides the 
necessary consent to the authorities of the receiving State, he or she essentially does 
‘waive’ the first aspect of inviolability. However, it is almost inconceivable that the 
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 To be specific, here diplomatic immunity includes both the immunity from jurisdiction and immunity 
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second aspect of inviolability, ie, the protection aspect would ever be voluntarily 
waived. Thirdly, it can be recognised that diplomatic inviolability normally requires the 
immediate reaction by the authorities of the receiving State, while diplomatic immunity 
usually deals with the less urgent issue of procedure in front of a local court. Fourthly, 
even from a linguistic perspective, the two terms are different from one another.
35
 
Therefore, it is quite clear that the maintenance of the different usage of ‘diplomatic 
inviolability’ and ‘diplomatic immunity’ is not only necessary but also of significant 
value. Interestingly, though the distinction between ‘diplomatic privileges’ and 
‘diplomatic immunities’ were elaborated during the discussion in the ILC, there was no 
detailed discussion on the distinction between ‘diplomatic inviolability’ and ‘diplomatic 
immunity’ in either the ILC or at the Vienna Conference. 
1.2 The Sources and Scope of the Principle of Diplomatic Inviolability 
1.2.1 The Sources of the Principle of Diplomatic Inviolability  
In legal terminology the word ‘source’ may denote two meanings: ‘it may refer to either 
the historical, ethical, social, or other bases for a legal rule, or it may refer to legal rules 
as such’.36 In the context of this thesis, the former one will be discussed in Sections 1.3 
and 2.1, while the latter one will be discussed in the following paragraphs. 
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 ‘Immunity’ indicates ‘the fact not being affected by ... something unpleasant’. See ‘Immunity’ in 
Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English (n 6) 979.  For the dictionary definition of ‘inviolability’, 
see n 5 and  n 6 above. In French, the word ‘inviolabilité’ not only means ‘immunity’ but also has the 
meaning of ‘sacredness’, while the French word ‘immunité’ has the same meaning in English. 
Interestingly, in Chinese, the meaning of the term “不可侵犯”(inviolability) is totally different from 
“豁免” (immunity). The former means ‘not to be attacked’ while the latter means ‘free from tax or 
servitude’. See “不可侵犯” (在线新华词典) <http://xh.5156edu.com/html5/145063.html >; “豁免” 
(在线新华词典) < http://xh.5156edu.com/html5/263326.html > accessed 30 June 2014. The Japanese 
translations of these two terms, “不可侵” and “免除” are also similar to the Chinese meanings. 
36
 R Wolfrum, ‘Sources of International Law’ in R Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law (OUP 2012) vol IX, 299,  para 1.  
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According to the traditional point of view, the sources of international law can be 
identified in Article 38.1 of the Statute of International Court of Justice,
37
 where the 
article lists five major sources of international law: treaty, international custom, general 
principles of law, and, as subsidiary sources of law, judicial decisions and legal writings. 
Since the principle of diplomatic inviolability is an underlying principle of diplomatic 
law and public international law, it is understandable that its source can also be 
identified within the aforementioned five sources of international law in Article 38.1 of 
the ICJ Statute, which will be discussed in turn as follows: 
First of all, considering that the principle of diplomatic inviolability is one of the oldest 
established principles of diplomatic law, it is well understandable that customary 
international law is the most important source of the principle. Indeed, the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability has been recognised and observed as binding by almost all 
States for so long a time that the principle has become the quintessence of customary 
international law.
38
 As will be pointed out in the next Chapter, the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability gradually evolves through history, and during that process, 
customary international law plays a significant role. In fact, most, if not all of the 
specific rules of the principle of diplomatic inviolability in contemporary legal regime 
under the VCDR are well-established customary international law rules long before the 
adoption of the VCDR. Notably, the Preamble to the VCDR also confirms that ‘people 
of all nations from ancient times have recognized the status of diplomatic agents’. Here 
the ‘status’ actually refers to the inviolable status of diplomatic agents. Admittedly, with 
the adoption of the VCDR, most customary international law rules of the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability have been codified into treaty law. However, the remaining 
significance and relevance of customary international law as one of the major sources of 
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 Hereafter referred as the ‘ICJ Statute’. 
38
 Denza (n 8) 256-257. So also Chapter 2 for the historical evolution of the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability. 
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the principle of diplomatic inviolability should not be underestimated. Indeed, the 
Preamble to the VCDR expressly mentions that: 
 [T]he rules of customary international law should continue to govern questions not 
expressly regulated by the provision of the present Convention’.39 
In addition to customary international law, it can be recognised that the rules of 
principle of diplomatic inviolability have been well stipulated in various multilateral 
international conventions to which a substantial number of States are parties, and 
undoubtedly, the VCDR is the most important treaty law source of the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability.
40
 The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes 
Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents 1973
41
 also 
makes it clear that the inviolability of diplomatic agents is of vital importance.
42
 Thus, 
these multilateral conventions form another important source of the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability. 
Supplement to the above two major sources, certain general principles of law may also 
be regarded as a source of the principle of diplomatic inviolability. For example, there is 
a well-known general principle of law that ‘the breach of an engagement involves an 
obligation to make reparation in an adequate form’. 43  This principle is especially 
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 See the fifth paragraph of the Preamble. 
40
 That being said, it is worth noting that before the adoption of the VCDR, there were many treaties 
expressly stipulated relevant rules of the principle of diplomatic inviolability, such as the bilateral treaties 
between China and European States during the second half of the nineteenth century. See the 
‘Introductory Comment of the Harvard Research Draft Convention on Diplomatic Privileges and 
Immunities’ (1932) 26 AJIL Sup 15, 26, 30-31. Notably, Article 14 of the Havana Convention on 
Diplomatic Officers 1928 also specifically stipulated the principle of diplomatic inviolability. 
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 1035 UNTS 107 (adopted 14 December 1973, entered into force 20 February 1977). Hereafter the ‘IPP 
Convention’ 
42
 Preamble and Article 2.3 of the IPP Convention. 
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 Chorzow Factory Case (German v Poland), PCIJ Series A, No. 9 (1927) para 55. 
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remarkable in cases concerning a breach of the principle of diplomatic inviolability. 
Thus, after the infamous NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in May 
1998, the US government paid compensation of $28 million to the Chinese government 
for the damage of its embassy.
44
 Indeed, this specific general principle of law 
emphasizes the inviolable status of diplomatic premises and diplomatic personnel. 
Fourthly, judicial decisions from international courts and tribunals concerning breaches 
of the principle of diplomatic inviolability can be regarded as another indispensable, 
albeit subsidiary, source of the principle of diplomatic inviolability. The most 
conspicuous cases in contemporary times are the Tehran Hostages Case
45
 and the 
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo Cases.
46
 These two ICJ cases reiterate 
the significance of the principle of inviolability, and the judgements themselves can 
provide evidence of the existence of customary international law and will be considered 
in more depth later in this thesis.
 
 
Last but not least, writings of leading diplomatic law scholars may also be regarded as a 
valuable subsidiary source of the principle of diplomatic inviolability. During the so-
called Classical Periods of the seventeenth and eighteenth century, writings of eminent 
legal authorities such as Grotius, Bynkershoek and Vattel played a significant role in the 
development of the principle of diplomatic inviolability.
47
 For instance, Young has once 
argues that ‘In Vattel the customary law has developed as far as it was ever to do 
unaided’. 48  Admittedly, thanks to the codification of diplomatic law since the late 
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 Denza (n 8) 166.  
45 Case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v 
Iran) [1980] ICJ Rep 3. 
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 Case concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v 
Uganda) [2005] ICJ Rep 168. 
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 See Chapter 2, section 2.2.3. 
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 E Young, ‘The Development of the Law of Diplomatic Relations’ (1964) 40 BYIL 141,164. 
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nineteenth century, the influence of legal authorities has been gradually declining. 
However, even nowadays, the writings of eminent scholars of diplomatic law such as 
the work of Denza still provide valuable opinions on the theory and practice of the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability. It is proper to assert that the writings of eminent 
international law scholars may continue to serve as an important supplementary source 
of the principle of diplomatic inviolability in the future. 
1.2.2 The scope of the principle of diplomatic inviolability 
Based on relevant articles in the VCDR, as well as customary international law and 
writings of diplomatic law scholars, it can be briefly summarised here that the material 
scope of the principle of diplomatic inviolability under contemporary diplomatic law 
covers mainly three categories.
49
 The first category deals with the inviolability of 
diplomatic premises. This obviously includes the inviolability of the premises of a 
diplomatic mission and the inviolability of private residence of a diplomatic agent.
50
 
The second category deals with the inviolability of diplomatic property, which includes 
the official archives of diplomatic missions, as well as diplomatic correspondence such 
as diplomatic mail and the diplomatic bag.
51
 This category also includes personal 
property of diplomatic agents.
52
 The third category is the personal inviolability 
conferred upon a certain group of people who are termed as ‘diplomatic personnel and 
their families’. To be specific, this category includes the personal inviolability of 
diplomatic agents as defined under Article 1(e) of the VCDR, the personal inviolability 
of their family members as per Article 37.1, the personal inviolability of certain junior 
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 See Fauchille’s excellent summary, as cited in ‘Codification of the International Law Relating to 
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staff and their family members as per Article 37.2, and finally, under the VCDR, the 
personal inviolability of a diplomatic courier.
53
 
It is worth noting that the above order of the three categories in the VCDR is not as the 
same order of how the principle of diplomatic inviolability developed historically. As a 
matter of fact, it was the personal inviolability of diplomatic agents that was first 
established as a core element of the principle of diplomatic inviolability. Then, during 
the Renaissance, when resident embassies began to emerge as a systematic practice, the 
inviolability of diplomatic premises and diplomatic property began to be incorporated 
into the component of the principle of diplomatic inviolability. As Vattel incisively 
points out: 
All the reasons which demand his personal independence and inviolability concur 
thus in securing the immunity of his house.
54
 
A detailed survey of the historical evolution of the principle of diplomatic inviolability 
will be provided in the next chapter whereas the analysis of the stipulation of the 
contemporary legal regime of the principle of diplomatic inviolability will be elaborated 
in Chapter 3. 
1.3 The Theoretical Basis of the Principle of Diplomatic Inviolability 
The importance of the theoretical basis
55
 of diplomatic privileges and immunities has 
been emphasized by almost all eminent writers of diplomatic law ever since the 
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 Article 27.5 of the VCDR. See also Article 16 of ‘Draft Articles on the Status of the Diplomatic 
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 The theoretical basis of the principle of diplomatic inviolability should be distinguished from the 
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‘Classical Periods’ of the seventeenth and eighteenth century. 56  According to one 
commentator, ‘at least a dozen juristic theories have been advanced to justify the 
extension of diplomatic privileges and immunities’. 57  However, it is now well 
recognised by scholars that three theories may be the most plausible theoretical basis for 
diplomatic privileges and immunities.
58
 They are the theory of ‘representative 
character’,59 the theory of ‘exterritoriality’60 and the theory of ‘functional necessity’. 
Although all of these three theories can be used as the theoretical basis for the general 
aspects of diplomatic privileges and immunities, in this thesis, the focus will limited to 
their usage as the theoretical basis for the principle of diplomatic inviolability. After all, 
the principle of diplomatic inviolability is one of the core concepts among the 
ubiquitous term of ‘diplomatic privileges and immunities’, and therefore, it is natural 
and justified that the theoretical basis for diplomatic privileges and immunities can be 
used effectively to provide explanations for the juridical foundations of the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability.
61
 In the following subsections, the above mentioned three 
theories will be analysed in turn. 
                                                                                                                                               
 
inviolability, see Chapter 2, section 2.1. 
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 For example, see H Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (FW Kelsey tr, first published 1625, Oceana 1964) 
Book II, Chapter XVIII; C van Bynkershoek, De Foro Legatorum (GJ Laing tr, first published 1946, 
Oceana 1964) Chapter V; See also Vattel (n 12) Book IV, Chapter VII (especially in section 92).  
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 Wilson (n 3) 1. 
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 Ibid. See also M Ogdon, Bases of Diplomatic Immunity (John Byrne & Company 1936) 62. 
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 This theory is also known as the theory of ‘personal representation’. See Wilson (n 3) 1. 
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 Sometimes ‘exterritoriality’ is spelt as ‘extraterritoriality’. See Roberts (n 7) para 8.3. 
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 It can be argued that the theoretical basis for the principle of diplomatic inviolability may actually be 
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1.3.1 The Theory of ‘Representative Character’ as a Theoretical Basis of the 
Principle of Diplomatic Inviolability  
The theory of ‘representative character’ is arguably the oldest among the three major 
theories of diplomatic law.
62
 According to the traditional explanation of this theory, the 
diplomatic agent is regarded as the personification of the sovereign from whom he is 
sent.
63
 In its modern form, it means the diplomatic mission, as well as the diplomatic 
agent, personifies the sending State.
64
 Although the theory can be used to explain the 
legal basis for diplomatic privileges and immunities in general, a close examination of 
the historical evolution of the principle of diplomatic inviolability reveals that this 
theory has a very strong link with the principle of diplomatic inviolability, and personal 
inviolability in particular. In Ogdon’s words, ‘[t]he inviolability of the person of a 
diplomatic representative has been widely held to be derivable from and determinable 
by the respect due to [sic] the sovereign sending the agent’.65 Indeed, evidence of the 
practice of this theory can be traced back to ancient India and ancient Greece, and 
during the Middle Ages the actual practice of this theory had already been widely 
recognised in the canon law.
66
 Nevertheless, it was during the Classical periods of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century that the theory as a legal basis of the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability had been established and refined, thanks to several eminent 
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writers on diplomatic law.
67
 In the first place, Grotius in his chapter ‘On the Right of 
Legation’ contended that 
[T]he safety of ambassadors is placed on an extremely precarious footing if they 
are under obligation to render account of their acts to any other than the one by 
whom they are sent … Ambassadors as if by a kind of fiction are considered to 
represent those who sent them.
68
  
Grotius’s argument was limited to the first aspect of diplomatic inviolability, that is, the 
immunity from being interfered with by the authorities of the receiving State. It seems 
that Grotius failed to provide any concrete reason for why ambassadors need positive 
protection by the receiving State. Actually, it was the theorists of the eighteen century 
that consummated the explanation. In De Foro Legatorum, Bynkershoek incisively 
points out that: 
[I]t seems as if it must be said that their sanctity bestows on ambassadors 
protection from offensive word or deed, because they are the representatives 
everywhere of their prince.
69
 
More importantly, Vattel provided an elaborated analysis on how the theory of 
representative character provides a legal basis for diplomatic inviolability. In the first 
place, he focused on the second aspect of diplomatic inviolability by pointing out the 
very reason why there exists a positive protection of ambassador: 
The respect which is due to sovereigns should reflect upon their representatives, 
and particularly upon an ambassador, as representing the person of his master in 
the highest degree…It is particularly the duty of the sovereign to whom  a minister 
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is sent to afford security to the person of the minister. To receive a minister in his 
representative capacity is equivalent to promising to give him the most particular 
protection and to see that he enjoys all possible safety.
70
 
Vattel then went on to argue that the theory of ‘representative character’ provided a 
legal basis for the first aspect of diplomatic inviolability by emphasizing the legal 
consequence of disregarding the inviolable status of a public minister: 
[If an act of violence] is committed against a public minister it becomes a crime of 
State and an offense against the Law of Nations, and the right to pardon …belongs 
to the sovereign who has been offended in the person of his minister.
71
 
Therefore, by analysing the two aspects of diplomatic inviolability, Vattel expressly 
explained how the theory of ‘representative character’ provides a solid legal basis for 
the personal inviolability of diplomatic agents. 
Finally, with regard to the inviolability of diplomatic premises and diplomatic property, 
the theory of ‘representative character’ can still be invoked as a basis for such 
inviolability. It can be argued that the inviolability of diplomatic premises and property 
is the natural extension or derivation of the inviolability of personal inviolability of 
diplomatic agents. According to Vattel: 
The ambassador’s house should be safe from all insult, and should be specially 
protected by the laws of the State and by the Law of Nations; to insult it is to 
commit a crime against the State and against all Nations.
72
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1.3.2 The Theory of ‘Exterritoriality’ as a Legal Basis of the Principle of 
Diplomatic Inviolability 
A second explanation of the legal basis of the principle of diplomatic inviolability 
comes from the theory of ‘exterritoriality’. As a matter of fact, the theory of 
‘exterritoriality’ emerged as a major theory of diplomatic law at almost the same time as 
the theory of ‘representative character’.73 According to the explanation of this theory, a 
diplomatic agent is by a kind of fiction treated as if he still lived in the sending State 
and thus regarded as if he was outside the territory of the State to which he is accredited. 
Similarly, the diplomatic premises are treated as a kind of enclave as if they were 
located outside the territory of the receiving State.
74
  According to Grotius, the 
individual usually wrongly credited as the originator of this theory:
75
 
[A]mbassadors were held to be outside of the limits of the country to which they 
were accredited. For this reason they are not subject to the municipal law of the 
State with which they are living.
76
 
With regard to the issue of why diplomatic agents enjoy the status of inviolability, 
Grotius argued that due to their extraterritorial status, ambassadors can only be sent 
back to the receiving State for punishment even though an atrocious crime was 
committed. This conclusion obviously precludes the possibility of punishing or taking 
forcible measures against ambassadors. Therefore, the personal inviolability of 
ambassadors should be strictly observed. Just as Grotius asserted,  
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Everywhere, in fact, we find the mention of … the inviolability of ambassadors, the 
law of nations which is to be observed with reference to ambassadors … is that 
they be free from violence’.77  
Indeed, just as Adair concluded: 
[T]hroughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, so far as can be discovered, 
no ambassador was ever put to death, nor even subjected to any very prolonged 
imprisonment for crimes committed.
78
  
Whereas Grotius had never expressly mentioned that exterritoriality may render the 
inviolable status of diplomatic premises,
79
 it was state practice during the sixteenth and 
seventeenth century that actually confirmed such inviolability. In the wake of claiming 
absolute state sovereignty since the sixteenth century, the practice of granting inviolable 
status to the diplomatic premises emerged from the theory of ‘exterritoriality’ and 
gradually be established as an accepted practice,
80
 and ultimately became accepted as 
customary international law in the eighteenth century.
81
 Thus, according to Vattel, ‘in 
all ordinary cases the ambassador’s house, like his person, is regarded as being outside 
the territory [of the receiving State]’.82 
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A final aspect is the inviolability of diplomatic property. The reason why the personal 
property of diplomatic agents is inviolable under the theory of ‘exterritoriality’ was 
provided by Ogdon. He asserted that the inviolable status of the personal property of the 
ambassador can be directly traced to the theory of ‘exterritoriality’, for the reason that 
‘the personal effects were sometimes regarded as belonging to, or being closely 
associated with the domicile of the owner’.83 According to the theory of ‘exterritoriality’ 
the ambassador himself is regarded as being outside the territory of the receiving State, 
therefore, as a natural result, the ambassador’s personal property should be ‘exempt 
from the seizure in the State to which he was accredited’.84 
1.3.3 The Theory of ‘Functional Necessity’ as a Legal Basis of the Principle of 
Diplomatic Inviolability 
The theory of ‘functional necessity’ is arguably the most plausible theory among the 
three major theories of diplomatic law.
85
 According to this theory, diplomatic agents are 
granted with certain privileges and immunities so that they are able to perform their 
diplomatic functions properly and effectively.
86
 Indeed, it has been pointed out by 
Barker as well as Wilson that the practice of observing the inviolability of diplomatic 
agents based on necessity predated the rise of resident embassy.
87
 Nevertheless, it was 
during the seventeenth and eighteenth century that the theory was gradually refined as 
an influential theoretical basis of the principle diplomatic inviolability. The rationale 
can be explained from the following aspects:  
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Firstly of all, the theory of ‘functional necessity’ can easily explain the personal 
inviolability of diplomatic agents. It is argued by various authorities that without 
personal inviolability, an ambassador can hardly perform his diplomatic function 
effectively. The reason was elaborated by Grotius:  
[T]he safety of ambassadors is placed on an extremely precarious footing if they 
are under obligation to render account of their acts to any other than the one by 
whom they are sent. For since the views of those who send the ambassadors are 
generally different from the views of those who receive them, and often directly 
opposed, it is scarcely possible that in every case something may not be said 
against an ambassador which shall present the appearance of a crime.
88
 
Moreover, Bynkershoek argued that if the ambassador was punished for his delinquency, 
‘and even though he has not been guilty of any crime, you expose him in unlimited 
degree to accusation of all sorts’. 89 Consequently, the whole good of the embassy’ will 
be endangered. More expressly, it was Vattel who ardently emphasized the significance 
of the personal inviolability as an indispensable necessity to carry out diplomatic 
functions: 
[Ambassadors and other public ministers] can not [sic] accomplish the object of 
their appointment unless they are endowed with all the prerogatives necessary to 
perform the duties of their charge safely, freely, faithfully and successfully … [I]f 
an ambassador could be indicted for ordinary misdemeanours, and criminally 
prosecuted, imprisoned, and punished…it would often happen that he would have 
neither the power, nor the time, nor the freedom of mind which the affairs of his 
sovereign required.
90
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Secondly, the theory of ‘functional necessity’ can conveniently be used as a justification 
of the inviolability of diplomatic premises. Since diplomatic premises are the places 
where a diplomatic mission is located as well as where the diplomatic agents usually 
live, if these places are not inviolable, then they will be easily be harassed by the 
authorities of the receiving State, and consequently the ordinary work of the mission as 
well as the diplomatic agents will be severely hampered. In a word, the inviolability of 
diplomatic premises is quite essential for both the diplomatic mission and the 
diplomatic agents to carry out their ordinary functions. Thus, according to Vattel: 
The independence of the ambassador would be very imperfect and his inviolability 
very insecure if the house in which he dwells did not enjoy a complete immunity, 
and if it was not inaccessible to the ordinary officers of justice. The ambassador 
could be troubled under a thousand pretexts, his secrets might be discovered by a 
search of his papers, and his person exposed to insult.
91
 
Thirdly, the theory of ‘functional necessity’ is a convincing theory to explain the 
inviolability of diplomatic properties. It is conceivable that if the property of a 
diplomatic agent can be easily searched or seized by authorities of the receiving State, 
then the diplomatic agent may not effectively make use of those things that are essential 
to his daily work. Thus, Grotius had asserted that  
[T]he movable goods of an ambassador ... cannot be seized as security, or in 
payment of debt or by order of the court, or, as some claim, by the hand of the king. 
For an ambassador ought to be free from all compulsion – such compulsion as 
                                                                                                                                               
 
inviolability of diplomats. After all, usually the arrest of the concerning ambassador is the prerequisite 
before attending the legal proceedings. 
91
 Ibid 394. 
 40 
 
affects things of which he has need as well as that which touches his person – in 
order that he may have full security.
92
 
Obviously, the above reason can be conveniently applied also to the property of 
diplomatic mission. If the official archives, correspondence and means of transport do 
not enjoy inviolable status, then whether the diplomatic mission can fully make use of 
these things to carry out their respective functions will be quite dubious. 
Last but not least, the theory of ‘functional necessity’ can sufficiently explain why 
diplomatic agents and diplomatic premises require positive protection. Undoubtedly, 
without the special protection, neither the diplomatic premises nor the diplomatic agents 
can be secure enough from various kinds of harassment or assault from which their 
normal diplomatic functions will be greatly disturbed or even paralysed. As a matter of 
fact, it was Vattel who first mentioned the necessity positively to protect diplomatic 
agents in order to ensure the right of embassy.
93
 Vattel especially emphasized the link 
between the protection of diplomatic agents and the diplomatic functions: 
[A]mbassadors and other ministers should be put in a position of perfect safety and 
inviolability; for if their person is not protected from violence of every kind, the 
right of maintaining embassies becomes of doubtful value and can hardly be 
exercised with success.
94
 
For the same reason, Vattel pointed out that the diplomatic premises should also be 
specially protected.
95
 
                                                 
 
92
 Grotius (n 56) 448. 
93
 Barker, The Protection of Diplomatic Personnel (n 11) 46. 
94
 Vattel (n 12) 371. 
95
 Ibid 394. 
 41 
 
1.3.4 Reflections on the Theoretical Basis of the Principle of Diplomatic 
Inviolability 
The above three subsections illustrate how the three major theories of diplomatic law 
provide the theoretical basis for the principle of diplomatic inviolability. Though all 
three theories were developed and refined during the Classical Periods of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century, and as a result, ‘Diplomatic inviolability in all its 
aspects can be justified under all three theories of diplomatic law’,96 it is worth noting 
that in modern times, their continuing influence on the theory and practice of the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability varies.  
First of all, it is recognised that the theoretical value of the theory of ‘exterritoriality’ 
has been largely downplayed in modern times. As it has been pointed out in the above 
subsection, the theory of ‘exterritoriality’ had its heyday in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth century and greatly influenced the general recognition of the inviolability of 
diplomatic premises. However, its weakness had been noted even during the Classical 
Periods.
97
 The dubious fiction of the theory had become more and more untenable and 
challenged by scholars,
98
 while at the meantime, the state practice after the eighteenth 
century had become less and less consistent with the theory except in Far East.
99
 Finally, 
in the twentieth century, the theory of exterritoriality was discarded as a legal basis of 
diplomatic law
100
 which also means it can no longer serve as an independent theoretical 
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basis of the principle of diplomatic inviolability. Thus, it is not surprising that the 
Preamble to the VCDR does not mention the theory of ‘exterritoriality’ at all.101 
The problem with the theory of ‘exterritoriality’ lies in the dubious origin of this theory 
as well as the controversial practice of the theory. With regard to the former point, 
Barker has argued that ‘[the theory] was never intended to provide a theoretical basis for 
diplomatic privileges and immunities’.102 Indeed, it was Grotius that has usually been 
credited as the ‘architect’ of this theory. However, it is usually neglected by scholars 
that Grotius himself actually deduced the fiction of ‘exterritoriality’ from that of the 
‘representative character’.103 Moreover, a close examination of the relevant texts from 
Grotius, Bynkershoek and Vattel reveals that theorists of the Classical Periods mainly 
used the theory of ‘exterritoriality’ in an essentially descriptive manner, and it was the 
theory of  ‘representative character’ that these theorists actually replied on as a legal 
basis to explain the  principle of diplomatic inviolability.
104
 With regard to the latter 
point, the extreme practice of the theory, that is, the so-called ‘franchise du quartier’ 
has never become customary international law. Therefore, as Diena, the Rapporteur of 
the Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law of the 
League of Nations commented, ‘exterritoriality is a fiction which has no foundation 
either in law or in fact’.105 
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Admittedly, the historical value of ‘exterritoriality’ as a theoretical basis of the principle 
of diplomatic inviolability should not be totally overlooked. Just as Adair pointed out, it 
would be regrettable if  the word ‘exterritoriality’ were to be driven from the lexicon of 
international law’ leading to the ‘complete oblivion of the honorable part it played in 
the international life of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries’.106 Similarly, Barker 
also argued that ‘there can be little doubt that the development of inviolability as an 
essential element of diplomatic law owes much to the influence of the exterritoriality 
theory’.107 It can be justly concluded that the theory of ‘exterritoriality’, while it cannot 
be regarded as an independent theoretical basis of the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability any more, may still be of great value when examining its evolution. 
Secondly, with regard to the theory of ‘representative character’, it is without doubt that 
unlike the theory of ‘exterritoriality’, the theory of ‘representative character’ still has 
certain significance in modern theory and practice of the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability. Admittedly, the theory had been less supported during nineteenth century 
and early twentieth century due to the growing influence of the theory of ‘functional 
necessity’ as a mainstream theory of diplomatic law.108 Moreover, its inherit weakness 
is also obvious, for it cannot provide convincible justification for the inviolability and 
other privileges and immunities of, for example, minor diplomatic staff and their 
families.
109
 However, with the rise of democratic nations, especially the great increase 
in number of independent sovereign States after the Second World War, the theory has 
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regained its influence for the reason that newly independent States are usually more 
sensitive of the ‘representative character’ nature of their diplomatic missions and 
diplomatic agents. Therefore, the theory was not rejected but retained its influence as a 
theoretical basis of diplomatic inviolability and other diplomatic privileges and 
immunities. This was actually confirmed in the 1958 Draft Articles on Diplomatic 
Intercourse and Immunities.
110
 During the discussion at the Vienna Diplomatic 
Conference the Soviet delegate Tunkin formally proposed the insertion of the words ‘as 
representative of States’ into the fourth paragraph of the Preamble, since the theory of 
‘representative character’ had been mentioned along with the theory of ‘functional 
necessity’ in the aforementioned ILC’s  Commentary on the 1958 Draft Articles.111 His 
proposal was adopted. In the final text of the VCDR, the Preamble expressly mentions 
that ‘the purpose of such privileges and immunities is … to ensure the efficient 
performance of the functions of diplomatic missions as representing States’. 112 
Moreover, the provisions of inviolability of diplomatic premises and personal 
inviolability of diplomatic agents all include reference to the idea of ‘their dignity’ – an 
obvious reminder of the theory of ‘representative character’.  
Finally, with regard to the theory of ‘functional necessity’, it is undoubtedly true that 
modern practice definitively accepts this theory as the primary, if not sole, theoretical 
basis of diplomatic law. The theory of ‘functional necessity’ gained more and more 
support from scholars of international law since Vattel’s time and it finally became the 
primary theoretical basis of diplomatic law in the late nineteenth century and early 
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twentieth century.
113
 The reason behind such change can be briefly summarised as 
follows: First of all, among the three major theories of diplomatic law, only the theory 
of ‘functional necessity’ can fully explain the rationale of diplomatic privileges and 
immunities, and this is especially the case with regard to diplomatic inviolability, as 
discussed in the above subsection. Secondly, State practice since the late nineteenth 
century had turned to restrict excessive diplomatic privileges and immunities.
114
 These 
States were unwilling to concede too much on the issue of diplomatic privileges and 
immunities, and so, the theory of ‘functional necessity’ was suitable to be used as a 
solution to the excessive immunities, especially the immunities of those junior staff and 
family members. Last but not least, with the rise of more democratic States in the late 
nineteenth century, only the theory of ‘functional necessity’ was not affected by this 
political change. The other two theories suffered from this change; the theory of 
‘functional necessity’ was reinforced by it. For democratic States, ‘functional necessity’ 
is simply the best justification allowing them to support the regime of diplomatic 
privileges and immunities, and this was confirmed in the League of Nations’ work on 
the codification of diplomatic law as well as other region or private codifications of 
diplomatic law.
115
  
More importantly, the VCDR expressly reflects the theory of ‘function necessity’ as the 
most correct theoretical basis of the principle of diplomatic inviolability. Above all, the 
Preamble to the Convention expressly mentions that ‘the purpose of such privileges and 
immunities is not to benefit individuals but to ensure the efficient performance of the 
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functions of diplomatic missions’.116 This is most clearly evidenced by the fact that 
relevant articles provide full diplomatic inviolability to those diplomatic staff charged 
with important diplomatic functions, whereas service staff and private servants, in 
contrast to the historical position, may not entitled to diplomatic inviolability at all.
117
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Chapter 2    The Historical Evolution of the 
Principle of Diplomatic Inviolability 
It is widely recognised by the leading authorities that the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability is ‘certainly the oldest established rule of diplomatic law’.1 Indeed, this 
claim is justly supported by abundant archaeological evidences as well as numerous 
ancient classics in which diplomatic practices of ancient civilizations were faithfully 
recorded.
2
 That evidence reveals the fact that cases concerning the practice of the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability can be found among almost all the civilisations 
throughout the ancient world, though the practices were not always consistent and the 
justification of the principle was fairly metaphysical.
3
 
Admittedly, the specific rules concerning the principle of diplomatic inviolability were 
rather vague and primitive at best during ancient times, yet the evolution of the history 
of diplomacy has proved that the principle of diplomatic inviolability did evolve with 
the development of diplomacy – from ancient times to present days. Actually, from the 
beginning of ancient diplomacy in the Near East around 3500 BC
 4
  until the 
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Renaissance in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability had undergone slight yet notable changes in accordance with the 
development of diplomatic history. Nevertheless, the core spirit of the principle remains, 
with new contents and interpretations added from time to time.
5
 Then, it was during the 
so-called ‘Classical Periods’ from the seventeenth to the eighteenth centuries that the 
formal rules regarding the principle of diplomatic inviolability become concrete, with 
various theoretical explanations supporting the well establishment of such a principle.
6
 
From then on, the principle of diplomatic inviolability has gradually become a solid rule 
in customary international law and, over the last four hundred years, the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability has been widely recognised by all the States in the international 
community. Finally, it was in the twentieth century that the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability was systematically codified and, ultimately, crystallized in the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961. 
In order to understand the reason why the principle of diplomatic inviolability is so 
widely recognised by modern sovereign States and how this vital principle developed 
from its primitive form in ancient times to the concrete treaty provisions in present days, 
an examination of the historical evolution of the principle of diplomatic inviolability is 
both essential and of great significance. Accordingly, this chapter will carry out a brief 
survey of the historical evolution of the principle of inviolability from ancient times to 
the present day. In addition to the investigations into the origins of the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability and its ensuing practice, the gradual development of the 
theoretical basis of the principle will also be highlighted. Moreover, this chapter will 
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reveal the distinct features of the evolution of the principle of diplomatic inviolability 
during each historical period.  
2.1 The Origin of the Principle of Diplomatic Inviolability 
In order to explore the entire historical evolution of the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability, some preliminary questions regarding the origin of the principle may 
attract immediate concern. For example, when and how did the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability come into existence? How can the principle of diplomatic inviolability 
become so important that even in ancient times when the law of nations was in its 
primitive form, the notion of diplomatic inviolability had already been known to almost 
all civilizations? Without such essential knowledge about the origin of the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability, it is not easy for anyone fully to understand the gradual 
evolution of such a vital principle of diplomatic law. Thus, a general discussion on the 
origin of the principle of diplomatic inviolability is necessary before the detailed 
exploration into the historical evolution of the principle.  
Admittedly, as of today, there is still no conclusive explanation to the origin of the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability. However, some speculations do provide reasonable 
explanations, among which are the speculations of ‘State hospitality’, ‘religious sanctity’ 
and ‘necessity for diplomatic contacts’. 
2.1.1  The speculation of ‘State hospitality’ 
One of the speculations on the origin of the principle of diplomatic inviolability is that 
the principle derived from the custom of ‘hospitality’ and then became institutionalised 
by the States as a diplomatic principle. According to this speculation, the custom of 
private hospitality -- that is ‘one family or household extending hospitality to a traveller 
from abroad’7 so as to alleviate the possible danger faced by the foreign strangers might 
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be considered as a primitive form of the principle of diplomatic inviolability. As a 
reputable scholar once claimed, ‘[l]aw begins everywhere with custom’.8 Indeed, the 
custom of hospitality itself was widely practiced during ancient times and its 
significance is conceivable. For instance, Bederman incisively points out that: 
In a world of imperfect and dangerous communications and means of transport, 
where even modest distances posed incredible obstacles and difficulties for 
travellers, hospitality was more than a merely desirable institution of personal 
favour.
9
 
It is no doubt that at its very beginning, the practice of ‘customary hospitality’ involved 
only private acts of separate households. However, as time went by, the significance of 
this custom might have been well appreciated by ancient rulers. They might have 
discovered the practical value of institutionalising such a private custom into a national 
diplomatic principle, for the reason that they found such positive protection of foreign 
envoys would not only make diplomatic contact between States more feasible and 
smooth but also benefit or even ensure the safety of their own envoys in a reciprocal 
manner. Therefore, it was predictable that the hospitality from local private hosts 
gradually became the necessary protection of the emissary from foreign countries after 
it ‘became institutionalized and ritualized into patterns of State practice’.10 Although it 
may be too speculative to say that such ‘necessary protection’ of foreign emissaries may 
infer any positive obligation of the host State to guarantee the safety of foreign envoys 
in every aspect (for example, to dispatch enough safeguards to secure the safety of the 
envoy all day around until the emissary leave the territory), it is conceivable that some 
essential protection such as to prevent danger from marauders as well as the agents of 
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third countries should be ensured.
11
 Admittedly, such protection only reflects the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability in its primitive form, however, in theory the 
speculation that the principle of diplomatic inviolability might derive from the ancient 
custom of hospitality is not purely unreasonable.
12
  
2.1.2  The speculation of ‘religious sanctity’ 
It is usually claimed that in ancient times, religion played an indispensable role in the 
development of legal rules.
13
 This was exactly the case with regard to the early 
development of diplomatic law.
14
 Based on this notion, a second speculation which may 
be termed the speculation of religious sanctity, can be considered as an explanation for 
the origin of the principle of diplomatic inviolability. According to this speculation, the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability was rooted in religious beliefs instead of secular 
concerns. To be specific, this speculation has two assertions which are based on ancient 
religious beliefs: first, the envoys have divine status which is stipulated according to 
their religion; secondly, failure to respect the divine status of the envoy will definitely 
lead to the punishment by the god. In short, it was the divine status of the envoys and 
the fear of religious sanctions that led ancient States to confer inviolability on foreign 
envoys.
15
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As a matter of fact, the divine status of envoys can find some direct references in 
ancient classics. For example, Sir Harold Nicolson points out that in the famous 
Homeric poems, ‘heralds were regarded as possessing special sanctity conferred upon 
them, not by Hermes only, but by Zeus himself’.16 Considering that ‘[a]ncient religions 
worshipped national gods’, 17  Bederman argues that ‘[t]he very fact of receiving a 
foreign nation’s ambassadors was seen as an acceptance of an alien religion and its 
national gods’.18 The natural conclusion of this fact is that any harmful acts inflicted on 
foreign envoys would be deemed as profanation to the god, and undoubtedly, such 
harmful acts would be punished by god. As Frey and Frey suggest, ‘[h]arming a herald 
violated divine law, for all power and all authority emanated from the gods. Sanctions 
would inevitably follow’. 19  Furthermore, the religious sanctity of envoys was 
sometimes reinforced by formal treaties made between ancient States. For instance, in 
ancient Greece, there was established a custom that the protection of envoys was usually 
contained in the relevant treaties or in the agreement of truce between Greek city 
States.
20
 Considering that the Greeks, like most ancient civilization at that period 
regarded their god as the guarantor of their treaties or agreements, it is conceivable that 
once stated in such treaties and agreements, the inviolability of envoys was guaranteed 
by their gods. Breaking such agreement would lead to punishment from god.  
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2.1.3  The speculation of ‘necessity for diplomatic contacts’  
Apart from those two speculations about the origin of the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability mentioned above, there is a third and perhaps more influential one which 
may be titled the speculation of ‘necessity for diplomatic contacts’. Indeed, according to 
many scholars, this speculation seems to be the most plausible explanation as to the 
origin of the principle of diplomatic inviolability. According to this speculation, the 
raison d'être of the principle of diplomatic inviolability originated from the 
indispensability of assuring the successful negotiation between two polities, which also 
suggests that the origin of this principle was inextricable with the origin of ancient 
diplomacy itself. 
Nicolson is one of the proponents of this speculation. In one of his acclaimed works he 
emphasises the significant influence of the principle of diplomatic inviolability on the 
origins of primitive diplomacy when he describes what he believes as the very first 
diplomatic activities between anthropoid apes: 
It must soon have been realised that no negotiation could reach a satisfactory 
conclusion if the emissaries of either party were murdered on arrival. Thus the first 
principle to become firmly established was that of diplomatic immunity.
21
 
Although here Nicolson uses the term ‘diplomatic immunity’, in the context of this 
quote, what Nicolson actually meant was diplomatic inviolability. He argues that the 
successful negotiation between two tribes rested on the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability. According to Nicolson, such principle is significant because it is the basis 
of negotiation. Without such inviolability, even the personal safety of the emissaries 
would have been in question, even before the ensuing negotiation. He thus infers that 
the principle of diplomatic inviolability is the ‘first’ principle ‘to be firmly established’ 
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and it forms the basis of any diplomatic relations.
22
 Commenting on Nicolson’s 
speculation, Barker argues that ‘while [his] speculations cannot be proven, they are 
certainly not unreasonable’. 23  In fact, Nicolson’s speculation does find several 
archaeological, anthropological and documentary evidences which make it become not 
purely speculation. According to the excellent summary by Numelin, the rules of 
personal inviolability of messengers and envoys were well recognised among primitive 
societies such as the aborigines in South Australia, as well as many other primitive 
tribes in Oceania, India and Africa.
24
 
In addition to Nicolson, many other scholars support the idea that the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability is indispensable to the birth of ancient diplomacy. For instance, 
Professor Bederman points out that ‘[t]he international law of diplomats and diplomatic 
protection was fundamental, because without it the simplest forms of 
negotiation…would be impossible’.25 Although Bederman does not expressly mention 
what are the specific rules of the so-called ‘international law of diplomats’, in the pages 
that follow his assertion, it is obvious that what he is referring to are the rules of 
diplomatic inviolability.
26
 Similarly, Frey and Frey provide another incisive comment as 
follows: 
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Necessity forced most cultures to accord envoys basic protections, for only then 
was intercourse between people possible. Without such protections, no 
international system…could exist.27  
More recently, the International Court of Justice declared in the Tehran Hostages Case 
that: 
There is no more fundamental prerequisite for the conduct of relations between 
States than the inviolability of diplomatic envoys and embassies.
28
 
Indeed, the assertion of the ICJ in the Tehran Hostages Case is evidence that supports 
the ‘necessity for diplomatic contacts’ speculation as the most plausible explanation to 
the origin of the principle of diplomatic inviolability, not only because the ICJ’s status 
as an interpretative institution of international law, but also due to the very fact that the 
above assertion of the ICJ reflects the essence of diplomacy, that is the ultimate 
necessity of making mutual contact between States on the basis of reciprocity. 
Furthermore, compared with the other two speculations, the ‘necessity for diplomatic 
contacts’ is much more practical, and it reflects the reality of how diplomacy actually 
began. Therefore, it is suggested that the speculation of ‘necessity of diplomacy’ may be 
justly regarded as the most plausible explanation of the origin of the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability.  
That being said, it must be borne in mind that all these three speculations serve as 
probable explanations to the origin of the principle of diplomatic inviolability. Indeed, 
theoretically the ‘necessity for diplomatic contacts’ may be viewed as the forebear of 
the modern theory of ‘functional necessity’ which has been expressly stipulated in the 
VCDR as one of the justification for granting diplomatic privileges and immunities. 
Likewise, the possible link between the speculation of ‘religious sanctity’ and the later 
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developed theory of ‘representative character’ should not be overlooked, either. 
Moreover, even the less plausible speculation of ‘State hospitality’ may explain the duty 
of positive protection to some extent. To sum up, all three speculations provide 
reasonable explanations for the origin of the principle of diplomatic inviolability and 
reflect realities of ancient civilisations to some extent. Thus, their theoretical value 
should not be underestimated.  
2.2 The Evolution of the Principle of Diplomatic Inviolability 
It has already been pointed out at the beginning of this chapter that the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability is well recognised as one of the oldest rules of diplomatic law. 
A possible corollary of this assertion is: since diplomatic law itself has quite a long 
history and, if the speculation of ‘ultimate necessity for diplomacy’ is justified, (ie, ‘the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability derived from the necessity for making diplomatic 
contact between ancient States’), then it can be concluded that the evolution of the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability might actually begin with the birth of ancient 
diplomacy itself. Accordingly, it can also be suggested that the evolution of the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability probably kept pace with the evolution of diplomacy, 
for the reason that ‘through the ages diplomatic motivations and methods have, at least 
apparently, changed’.29 Indeed, as Frey and Frey point out, ‘[t]he rules and conventions 
governing diplomatic immunity have thus been historically shaped and conditioned and 
continue to evolve’.30 Hence, in order to investigate how the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability evolved with the development of diplomacy, this section will focus on the 
evolution of the practice of the principle of diplomatic inviolability during four distinct 
periods in the course of the development of diplomacy, namely ancient times, the 
Middle Ages, the Renaissance and Classical Periods and modern times. These four 
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periods cover almost the entirety of diplomatic history, and so the practice of the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability of each of these periods can be systematically 
reviewed. 
2.2.1 Ancient times 
It is often said that the earliest records of systematic diplomatic practice are those of 
Ancient Greece.
31
 However, it is worth noting first that some rudimentary diplomatic 
activities among some civilizations in the Near East happened long before the heyday of 
Ancient Greece,
32
 and some of these ‘rudimentary’ diplomatic activities revealed that an 
early form of the principle of diplomatic inviolability had already been practiced among 
some of these ancient civilizations. It can be seen from several documentary records that 
some civilizations in the Near East expressly recognised the inviolability of envoys 
based on religious reasons.
33
 Failure of observance of this principle would lead to 
various sanctions, ranging from the punishment of those condemned individuals, to the 
waging of war against the nation which defied that principle.
34
 For example, it is 
depicted in the Old Testament that when King David was informed that his ambassadors 
were seriously insulted by the King of Ammon, he got infuriated and a war was 
immediately declared by the Israelis.
35
 This anecdote reveals that attacking an envoy’s 
dignity was considered as a violation of the principle of diplomatic inviolability, and 
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such blatant violation was definitely intolerable. Another example which vividly depicts 
the sanction that resulted from the defiance of the principle of diplomatic inviolability 
can be found in the Amarna Letters: when a caravan of a Babylonian emissary was 
accidentally assaulted by the Egyptians, the Babylonian made a vigorous protest to the 
Pharaoh and asked the Egyptians to investigate the incident as well as to punish the 
perpetrators. In addition, they also asked the Egyptian to make compensation to them, 
or the diplomatic relations between them would be severed.
36
 
Although these early practices of the principle of diplomatic inviolability among Middle 
and Near East civilizations are worthy of appreciation, it is obvious that such practices 
were by no means consistent or systematic. For instance, in ancient Babylon, although 
the inviolability of envoys was generally respected and an envoy usually enjoyed ‘swift, 
unhindered passage’ and necessary protection from marauders, there was no 
compulsory rule regarding a third State granting inviolability for the envoys transiting 
their territories.
37
 Besides, it is revealed that the principle of diplomatic inviolability 
was in no sense insurmountable by domestic laws or customs. In fact, in ancient 
Babylon, an envoy might be punished physically and detained if he or she was found 
liable for a criminal offence, even though ‘strong customary rules barred a host State’s 
actual injury or prolonged detention of an envoy’.38 More shockingly, in ancient Egypt, 
envoys were overtly considered as a kind of hostage and might be killed on some 
occasions.
39
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Compared with the rudimentary practice of the principle of diplomatic inviolability in 
ancient Near East, evidently the practice in Ancient Greece and later in Ancient Rome 
was much more systematic and elaborate. Indeed, it was from the rise of Ancient Greece 
that an era of systematic diplomacy began.
40
 Diplomatic activities between the Greek 
city-States were quite frequent during its classical age (750-350 BC)
 41
, especially after 
the middle of the sixth century BC.
42
  The Greeks, like those early civilizations in the 
Near East, practised the principle of diplomatic inviolability mainly based on religious 
reasons.
43
 As a result, the differential treatment between heralds (who occupy religious 
status) and normal envoys (eg, political envoys such as orators) is a distinctive 
characteristic of the practice of the principle of diplomatic inviolability in Ancient 
Greece. According to the practice of the Ancient Greeks, heralds were always inviolable 
due to their divine status, whereas normal envoys only enjoyed ‘fundamental personal 
integrity’, which means they could be arrested or detained for political reasons.44 It is 
therefore unsurprising that an envoy would usually need a herald to make arrangements 
in advance so as to secure their inviolable status, especially when the emissary was 
dispatched to a city where the situation was uncertain or possible danger could be 
foreseen.
45
 With regard to the status of an envoy transiting through a third State, it was 
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quite clear that in Ancient Greece, there was no customary rule demanding a third State 
to respect the inviolability of envoys passing through its territory, not mentioning 
envoys from hostile States.
46
 This was quite similar to the practice of the Near East 
civilizations. 
Compared with the theory and practice of the Ancient Greeks, perhaps a more elaborate 
system of practising the principle of diplomatic inviolability can be seen from the 
diplomatic activity of the Ancient Romans. As Frey and Frey suggest, the Roman’s 
practice of the principle of diplomatic inviolability was a twofold mechanism, ‘dictated 
by political necessity and reinforced by religious sanction’.47 Religiously, the sacred 
status of the fetials
48
 confirmed the supposed divine origin of envoys. In addition, the 
fetial law was based upon the oaths of fetials that were made to gods such as Jupiter and 
Janus.
49
 As Barker points out, these oaths were crucial to the practice of the inviolability 
of envoys since at that time, the god Jupiter was not only the god of the Romans but 
also worshiped by many other tribes. It was this kind of ‘shared belief system’ that 
actually enhanced the adherence of the principle of diplomatic inviolability among 
Romans and other tribes or city-States.
50
 This was also one of the reasons that the 
Roman, unlike the Greeks, treated all other as equal once these races ‘were incorporated 
into the empire’. 51  Secularly, the Romans considered that envoys were the 
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‘personification of the sending nation’,52 a more noteworthy theoretical progress than 
the Greeks. Any attack on either the personal safety or the dignity of an ambassador 
would also be regarded as a violation of the ius gentium. Therefore, as Frey and Frey 
cited from Polybius, ‘an attempt to instigate an attack on the Roman envoys “most 
flagrantly” violated “the laws of gods and man”’,53 and ‘even an insult to an envoy 
could mean war’.54 Finally, those who violated the principle of diplomatic inviolability 
were subjected to extradition and punishment.
55
 
Despite the abovementioned elaborate mechanism of practising the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability, it is undeniable that the practice of ancient Romans still had its 
limitations. First, like most of the ancient civilisations, the Romans did not grant 
inviolability to envoys who came from an enemy States.
56
 In fact, the Romans ‘did not 
show…mercy to the envoys of belligerent powers encountered during their travels’, 
though they were ‘remarkably scrupulous’ about the treating of enemy envoys. 57 
Secondly, although the ancient Romans did make progress with regard to the practice of 
the principle of diplomatic inviolability, such advances were quite limited. The 
theoretical basis for the principle of diplomatic inviolability still mainly rested on the 
two pillars of religion and secularism developed by the Greeks, although, like their 
Greek predecessors, it was the religious aspect that occupied a more influential place 
than secular considerations such as reciprocity. Thirdly, even though the Romans 
initially regarded other States as equal, and ‘in such an environment, Rome could not 
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but realize the importance of safeguarding diplomatic interchange’58 and continued to 
adhere the fetial law which stipulated the inviolability of diplomats, when it finally 
expanded into a hegemonic empire, the soil for developing a more elaborate system for 
the practice of the principle of diplomatic inviolability was inevitably missing. 
Consequently, as Barker comments, ‘the further development of Roman law in this area 
was rather limited’.59  
Finally, apart from the above mentioned ancient civilizations, two oriental civilizations 
are also worth mentioning. In Ancient India and China the practice of the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability can also be traced back at least as far as antiquity. It was 
recorded in Chinese classics such as Ch’un Ch’iu60 and Tso Chuan61 that during the 
Ch’un Ch’iu period (770 BC-476 BC), there existed customary rules recognising the 
personal inviolability of envoys, as well as the principle of safe passage of envoys.
62
 In 
addition, the murder of envoys was regarded as ‘a grave affront’. 63 Unfortunately, just 
like the expansion of the Roman Empire, when Ancient China was unified by the Ch’in 
Empire in the third century BC, the conditions for active diplomatic intercourse between 
small equal sovereignties was undermined and eventually destroyed, which resulted in 
the termination of the practice of the principle of diplomatic inviolability.
64
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In Ancient India, the inviolability of envoys was generally recognised in many classics 
such as the Mahabharata, Ramayana and Arthasatra, to list a few.
65
 For example, it 
was stated in the Arthasatra that ‘even the lowest born [envoys] are immune from 
killing’.66 However, it is also worth-noting that in ancient India, the actual scope of the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability was limited to the immunity of envoys from being 
killed, just like in some other ancient civilizations. Beyond killing, it was suggested in 
some of these Indian classics, that envoys could be ‘branded, maimed, disfigured, or 
detained’. 67  Such facts undoubtedly reveal that the practice of the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability in ancient India was rather rudimentary compared with that of 
ancient Greece and ancient Rome. 
To sum up, it can be revealed from the above description that the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability was widely recognised and practised among not only western civilizations 
but also other ancient civilisations. Although the basis for granting diplomatic 
inviolability, the degree of the respective practice of the principle, and the scope of the 
principle, varied from civilization to civilization, it can still be concluded that some 
essential common rules of the principle of diplomatic inviolability were widely 
respected by ancient civilizations. These included the necessary protection and personal 
safety of foreign envoys, the respect of the dignity of foreign envoys and the possible 
sanctions concerning the punishment of violations of the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability.  
Despite the fact that the principle of diplomatic inviolability was generally respected by 
ancient civilizations, it is also undeniable that its practice during ancient times was by 
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no means perfect. Such imperfection is arguably the most conspicuous feature of the 
practice of the principle of diplomatic inviolability during ancient times. It can be seen 
from the following three aspects: 
First and foremost, it is conspicuous that the theory regarding the basis for practising the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability was quite rudimentary during ancient times. As it is 
revealed above, almost all the ancient civilizations (except Ancient China) respected the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability based on religious beliefs. Undoubtedly, some rules 
such as the sanctions for violations of the principle of diplomatic inviolability might not 
have been developed without substantial religious considerations. However, as Barker 
points out, to overstate the importance of the role of religion is not right.
68
 Furthermore, 
as Ogdon explains, the actual forces for granting diplomatic inviolability were 
‘necessity’ and the ‘mutual advantage’ (ie, reciprocity),69 therefore religious beliefs was 
only ‘utilised as a form of guarantee’ of the practice of the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability.
70
  Unfortunately, even the Ancient Greeks and Romans failed to realise the 
significance of necessity and reciprocity fully. Moreover, accepting religious beliefs as 
the sole basis for granting inviolability of envoys definitely hampered the further 
theoretical development regarding the basis of the principle of diplomatic inviolability. 
As a matter of fact, it was not until the ‘Classical Periods’ of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth century that a breakthrough regarding the theoretical basis of the principle 
of diplomatic inviolability occurred. 
Secondly, it is evident that the scope of principle of diplomatic inviolability was rather 
limited during ancient times. In some civilizations, the scope of the principle only 
covered the basic protection and safety of envoys. Most importantly, among almost all 
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of the ancient civilizations, envoys that came from an enemy State were regarded as 
enjoying no inviolability at all. This was also the case of those envoys transiting through 
the territory of a third State.
71
 Furthermore, it seems that there were no concrete legal 
rules governing the inviolability of the (temporary) residence and property of envoys 
that can be inferred from the practice of the principle of diplomatic inviolability during 
ancient times. 
Finally, it is also obvious that the practice of the principle of diplomatic inviolability 
was by no means consistently applied during ancient times. This was a common 
characteristic of every ancient civilization. For example, among most of the Near East 
civilizations, domestic laws or political considerations might override the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability, regardless of the relevant customary rules of the inviolability of 
foreign envoys. Even in Ancient Greece and ancient Rome, the possibility of disrespect 
of the principle of diplomatic inviolability was never denied, especially during the high 
tide of intensive wars.
72
 
2.2.2 The Middle Ages 
From the fall of the Roman Empire in 476 AD until the rise of the resident diplomatic 
missions during the Renaissance in the mid-fifteenth century, the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability never ceased to evolve, even though the extent of such 
evolution was relatively slow compared with the one thousand year time span. During 
the Middle Ages, the evolution of the principle of diplomatic inviolability can be seen 
mainly through the practices of the Byzantines, the Papacy and in the Islamic world. 
When the old Roman Empire came to an end, it was the Byzantine Empire that 
substantially inherited the systematic diplomatic methods of their ancient western 
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counterparts. The Byzantines normally regarded themselves as the successors of the 
ancient Romans, so it was quite natural that they inherited many recognised diplomatic 
principles from ancient Rome. Evidently, the principle of diplomatic inviolability was 
among one of the principles and practices that the Byzantines inherited directly from 
their Roman ancestors. To the Byzantines, the sanctity of envoys was emphasized just 
as the ancient Romans had done. Apparently, the Byzantines still made use of religious 
sanctity for their bases of granting inviolability of envoys. The Byzantines inherited the 
theory of the ancient Romans that the sanctity of envoys came from their sacred status, 
and so, any violation of the personal inviolability of envoys ‘would constitute “an 
indelible infamy”’, and such violation would be regarded as ‘sacrilegious’.73 As a result, 
the practice of the principle of diplomatic inviolability by the Byzantines reveals that 
not only the personal safety but also the dignity of a foreign envoy was generally 
respected in spite of the fact that their traditional view regarded foreign envoys as 
spies.
74
  
While the Byzantines endeavoured to develop their diplomatic activities in the eastern 
part of the old Roman Empire, it was the papacy that controlled the relatively infrequent 
diplomatic activities of the western world.
75
 During the Middle Ages, the Roman 
Catholic Church actually dominated the diplomatic practice in the western part of 
Europe. The papacy, like the Byzantines, inherited certain diplomatic principles from 
the ancient Romans, among which the most notable example was the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability. To be specific, the principle of diplomatic inviolability mainly 
concerned the sacrosanctity of the papal legate—the personal representative of the 
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Pope.
76
 Actually, though the principle of inviolability evolved from the old Roman 
traditions, the practice of the inviolability of papal legates was also buttressed by 
several new factors. In the first place, the inviolability of papal legates derived from 
their sacred status linked directly to the Pope. Since the Pope frequently dispatched 
papal legates as his personal representatives, the papal legate was regarded as the “eye 
of the church”, the ‘arm of the pope’”.77 As a matter of fact, during the Middle Ages the 
Pope himself was regarded as having ultimate authority governing all matters of human 
society and should be highly respected; therefore it was not surprising that logically his 
personal representatives should naturally enjoyed certain kind of sacred status.
78
 
Secondly, just as the principle of diplomatic inviolability had been absorbed in the ius 
gentium during the heyday of the Roman Empire, during the Middle Ages the principle 
of diplomatic inviolability was evidently stipulated in the canon law of the time.
 79
 
Furthermore, the cost of defying the inviolability of envoys was high enough to deter 
those who would dare to challenge the principle of diplomatic inviolability. Notably, 
this applied not only to the inviolability of papal legates but also to those secular envoys 
that were sent to or sent by the Pope. Any kind of violation of the inviolability of papal 
legates or those who sent by or sent to the Pope would be subjected to severe penalties 
by the papacy. According to Frey and Frey, the Pope usually did not tolerate any 
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indecent treatment of his legates. He could rely on diplomatic channels to put pressure 
on secular rulers; he could make use of his exclusive fiscal tools to levy a tax on 
ecclesiastical goods;  and more seriously, he could use his most powerful weapon of the 
time – excommunication - to punish those who dare to challenge the inviolability of the 
papal legates.
80
 In a word, all the above three factors together with the ancient tradition 
made the inviolability of envoys (especially the inviolability of papal legates) a solid 
diplomatic principle of the Middle Ages. 
Apart from the practice of the Byzantines and the Papacy, the practice of the principle 
of the Islamic world is also worth noting. Generally speaking, during the Middle Ages 
the Muslims recognised the inviolability of envoys just like their western counterparts. 
This can be seen through the following two aspects: first, just like the fact that the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability was stipulated in the canon law of the western 
Christians, the inviolability of envoys was similarly stipulated in Islamic laws, which 
generally provided the legal basis for granting inviolable status on envoys;
81
 secondly, 
with regard to the diplomatic activities between the Islamic world and the western 
Christians, the principle of diplomatic inviolability still applied,
82
 mainly as an 
expedient of avoiding reprisal by the ‘infidel’ non-Muslims.83 
Overall, the characteristics of the practice of the principle of diplomatic inviolability 
during the Middle Ages can be summarised as follows: 
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First, with regard to the most significant factor that determines the evolution and 
practice of the principle of diplomatic inviolability, it is clear that during the Middle 
Ages, the dominant justification for inviolability was gradually transferred from 
religious beliefs to the principle of reciprocity. As it has been discussed in the previous 
section, during ancient times, the basis for the principle of diplomatic inviolability was 
dominated by religious beliefs. All major civilizations (except Ancient China) made full 
use of religious beliefs as their ground for granting inviolability of envoys. Besides, 
almost all punishments for violating the principle of diplomatic inviolability were also 
recourse to religious sanctions. Admittedly, even during the Middle Ages, religion still 
played an important role with regard to the theory and practice of the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability. However, as Barker points out: 
While religion suffices as an explanation for the inviolability of ambassadors 
within certain groups of people sharing a common religious background, it does 
not fully explain the inviolability between such groups.
84
 
Indeed, insofar as the recognition and respect of the inviolability of envoys between 
different or even opposing religious groups, the truth was that the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability still generally applied. Obviously, the influence of religious 
beliefs could no longer justify such a phenomenon. Instead, a more reasonable 
explanation of the recognition and observance of the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability between different religious groups could well be explained by the effects of 
the principle of reciprocity – on one hand, respecting and protecting envoys sent and 
received from other civilizations would probably guarantee the inviolability of their 
own envoys; on the other hand,  it was also predictable that defying the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability would lead to reprisal from other civilizations. Indeed, the 
principle of reciprocity became more and more significant when the diplomatic contact 
between the eastern world and the western world became more and more frequent, 
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especially during the later stage of the Middle Ages. Thus, Frey and Frey incisively 
concluded that during the Middle Ages, ‘the fear of reprisal served as the best safeguard 
for envoys’.85 
Secondly, compared with the inconsistent practice of the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability during the ancient times, the recognition and observance of the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability was considerably more enhanced during the Middle Ages. This 
can be justified by the fact that more influential factors contributed to the practice of the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability. First, the increasing number of law codes 
undoubtedly provided more guarantee on the observance of the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability. Indeed, as has been pointed out above, both the western Christians and the 
eastern Muslims compiled law codes that stipulated the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability.
86
 According to Frey and Frey, these law codes were ‘rigidly precise not 
only in dictating the envoy’s prescribed words and actions but also in determining the 
exact punishment meted out to those who harmed him’.87 In addition to law codes, 
many medieval customs also buttressed the observance of the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability, especially the custom of granting protection and respect for envoys of 
special status.
88
 Furthermore, at least as far as secular envoys were concerned, it can be 
asserted that law codes and custom played a more influential role in the practice of the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability than religious considerations. Last but not least, as 
has been pointed out in the previous paragraph, the principle of reciprocity made both 
the western Christians and Muslims strive to respect the principle of diplomatic 
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inviolability when making diplomatic contacts with each other. In a word, it was the 
combined effects of these factors that made the practice of the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability more consistent and stable than during ancient times. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that during the Middle Ages, all civilizations, no matter whether western 
Christian or eastern Islamic world or the Byzantines, respected the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability much better than their ancestors during ancient times.
89
 
Finally, it is not prejudiced to assert that the scope of the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability was still quite limited during the Middle Ages. This characteristic can be 
seen from two aspects. Theoretically, during the Middle Ages there was no systemic 
theory on the basis of the principle of diplomatic inviolability. Although religion, law 
codes, customs and the principle of reciprocity all provided valuable sources for the 
practice of the principle of diplomatic inviolability, these factors never formed a grand 
theory which was able fully to justify the principle of diplomatic inviolability. Instead, 
most of these factors were more or less only considered as expedients by medieval 
theorists.
90
 Practically, due to the lack of resident missions, the theme of the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability still mainly focused on the inviolability of envoys. Although 
both the personal property and the temporary residence of an envoy were generally 
protected by the host States during the Middle Ages, this was more or less a courtesy 
rather than a legal institution.
91
 In summary, it can be concluded that no systematic 
theory of the principle of diplomatic inviolability emerged during the Middle Ages, and 
the scope of the principle of diplomatic inviolability was confined to the inviolability of 
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envoys. As the history of diplomatic law reveals later, the more elaborated theories of 
diplomatic inviolability and the more extensive scope of the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability did not become the focus of theorists of diplomatic law until after the 
establishment of permanent diplomatic missions during the Renaissance period in the 
mid-fifteenth century.
92
 
2.2.3 The Renaissance and Classical Periods 
The Renaissance and Classical Periods which dated from the middle of the fifteenth 
century till the outbreak of French Revolution in 1789 are arguably the most significant 
era in the development of diplomatic law.
93
 Beginning with the emergence of resident 
embassies in Italy,
94
 the development of diplomatic law during these periods witnessed 
several watershed events. As far as the evolution of the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability is concerned, these events can be specified as follows: the defying of the 
rule of inviolability of envoys during the high tide of religious struggles, the newly 
introduced challenges to the inviolability of ambassadors in the notorious political 
conspiracies involving ambassadors, the astonishing extension of the inviolability of 
diplomatic premises and the negative consequences thereof, and most importantly, the 
establishment of three systematic theories regarding diplomatic privileges and 
immunities which were crystallised in legal classics written by great theorists of 
diplomatic law. Ultimately, it is during these periods that both the theory and practice of 
the principle of diplomatic inviolability achieved unparalleled progress. 
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The evolution of the principle of diplomatic inviolability during the Renaissance can be 
viewed as the continuation of the practice of the Middle Ages, with some notable 
features introduced. When resident diplomatic missions came into the forestage of 
diplomacy around the middle of the fifteenth century,
95
 it began to bring about two 
notable developments on the principle of diplomatic inviolability. First and foremost, 
with regard to the scope of the principle, the inviolability of embassy premises and 
diplomatic property were added to the contents of the old principle. Not only the 
personal inviolability of ambassadors and envoys but also the inviolability of their 
property, along with the inviolability of embassies and diplomatic correspondence were 
now covered by the principle of diplomatic inviolability.
 96
 As a result, when resident 
embassy became a widely accepted institution, it began to bring about several new 
issues related to the practice of the principle of diplomatic inviolability though specific 
issues such as the inviolability of ambassadors who were involved in conspiracies 
against the sovereign to whom they were accredited were not emerged as conspicuous 
theoretical and practical dilemmas during the Renaissance.
97
 Secondly, the notable 
increase in diplomatic contacts after the establishment of resident embassies also 
ensured that the principle of diplomatic inviolability became the focus of the legal 
theorists of the day. This was a natural by-product of the rise of resident embassies, for 
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the reason that more and more sovereign States had to rely on legal authorities to tackle 
practical issues related to the inviolability of resident envoys and their property.
98
  
In addition to the aforementioned two developments during the Renaissance, two 
disappointing drawbacks were also worth noting. First, perhaps under the influence of 
Machiavelli,
99
 incidents of violations of the principle of diplomatic inviolability such as 
the arrest of ambassadors and seizure of diplomatic documents were not uncommon 
during the Renaissance,
100
 though ‘[i]nviolability in time of peace must obviously have 
been generally observed’.101 Secondly, as far as the third States were concerned, the 
customary law still followed the practice of the ancient times and the Middle Ages, that 
is, the inviolability of envoys was only recognised by the States to which the envoy was 
accredited. Envoys were subjected to interception by third States during their journey to 
the destination States. Numerous incidents of intercepting and arresting envoys en route 
during the Renaissance proved that no advance was achieved with regard to this specific 
issue.
102
 
To sum up, the Renaissance period can be better regarded as a period of transition rather 
than an era of great leap in the evolution of the principle of diplomatic inviolability. 
Although it marked the beginning of resident diplomatic missions and contributed some 
                                                 
 
98
 For example, legal theorists in the Renaissance era such as Brunus, Martin of Lodi and Francisco de 
Vitoria had discussed the inviolability of ambassador in their works so as to offer advices to their 
governments faced with the issues brought about with the advent of resident embassies. See Frey and 
Frey (n 2) 149-150. It is also worth noting that during the same time, the legal issue regarding the 
immunity from jurisdiction of diplomats also became a significant theme of diplomatic law. Due to the 
theme of this thesis, in this Chapter only issues related to the principle of diplomatic inviolability will be 
discussed.    
99
 Nicolson (n 16) 32. 
100
 For instance, see the de Praet Incident in Young (n 19) 143. 
101
 Young (n 19) 145. See also Mattingly (n 5) 45-46. 
102
 For details of these incidents, see Frey and Frey (n 2) 133. 
 75 
 
new features to the evolution of the principle of diplomatic inviolability, it was obvious 
that revolutionary changes to the substantial rules of the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability had yet to been seen. 
Following the Renaissance, it was the Classical Periods, from the end of the sixteenth 
century to the end of the eighteenth century, which marked the actual revolutionary 
progresses in the evolution of the principle of diplomatic inviolability. First and 
foremost, these two hundred years witnessed the emergence of a batch of great theorists 
of diplomatic law who contributed enormously to the evolution of diplomatic law and, 
of course, the principle of diplomatic inviolability. These great theorists included 
Gentili, Ayrault, Hotman, Grotius, Zouche, Wicquefort, Bynkershoek, and Vattel.  They 
produced a plethora of ‘landmark’ treatises on diplomatic law 103  (or chapters on 
diplomatic law in their general works on the law of nations)
104
 which had significant 
impacts on the evolution of the diplomatic law of the day, both theoretically and 
practically. Theoretically, these treatises greatly stimulated the formation and 
recognition of the theories of diplomatic law.
105
 These three theories had their seeds 
planted in ancient times, yet they were indeed recent contributions made by the 
aforementioned theorists of the Classical Periods. Notably, it should be emphasized that 
with regard to the principle of diplomatic inviolability, the theoretical basis for granting 
inviolability of embassies and ambassadors were well discussed in most of these 
treatises. Practically, it is submitted that many controversial issues, such as the 
inviolability of embassy premises, the inviolability of an ambassador who is involved in 
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criminal offences, and the inviolability of diplomatic correspondence, were all 
systematically analysed and discussed in works of Gentili, Grotius, Wicquefort, 
Bynkershoek and Vattel.
106
 Their analysis and discussions greatly influenced State 
practice on the principle of diplomatic inviolability, which ultimately contributed to the 
consolidation of many specific rules of the principle of diplomatic inviolability by the 
end of the Classical Periods. 
In addition to the emergence of great theories and great works of diplomatic law, the 
contents of the principle of diplomatic inviolability were also substantially expanded, 
either as a result of the invocation of great theorists or the actual practice of States. 
Following the emergence of the theory of extraterritoriality, it was during the sixteenth 
century that the so-called ‘franchise du quartier’107 were incorporated to the content of 
the principle of diplomatic inviolability. In a few Western European capitals such as 
Venice, Rome, and Madrid, this notorious privilege ‘prevented the law enforcement 
officers of the receiving State from taking action in, or even entering the district 
surrounding, the embassy premises and entitled the ambassador to exemption from duty 
on supplies brought in nominally for his use’108 Similarly, the ‘droit de chapelle’109 had 
become a solid rule of the principle of diplomatic inviolability, after extensive State 
practice in the seventeenth century. Moreover, it is worth noting that more and more 
States began to recognise that the inviolability of ambassadors remained in effect during 
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wartime,
110
 and it was during this time that the inviolability of members of the families 
of diplomats was also gradually accepted as a customary rule.
111
  
Last but not least, it is worth noting that it was during the Classical Periods that the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability became gradually to be legislated in the municipal 
laws of many sovereign States, which in turn influenced the State practice of the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability of these States.
112
 As a matter of fact, with the 
gradually increase of newly introduced controversial issues regarding the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability, such as the inviolability of ambassadors involving criminal 
offences (especially political crimes such as conspiracies against the receiving 
sovereigns or the criminal act of espionage),
 113
 the inviolability of the property of the 
diplomatic mission, the inviolability of diplomatic correspondence, the necessity to 
legislate the principle of diplomatic inviolability under domestic law became obvious 
and urgent. Thus, beginning with the Netherlands decree of 1651,
114
 many European 
States started making municipal laws to stipulate the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability.
115
 This progress can be viewed as a watershed event in the evolution of the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability, for the reason that the stipulation of the principle 
of diplomatic inviolability in the municipal law of States not only codified their 
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respective State practice with regard to the principle of diplomatic inviolability but also 
influenced the further practice of the principle of diplomatic inviolability.
116
  
Notably, it is submitted that the above-mentioned revolutionary progression did not 
occur accidentally. Indeed, after the evolution in the transitional period of the 
Renaissance in the middle and late fifteenth century, diplomatic law in the Classical 
Periods had prepared for accepting great changes. In short, the great progress in 
diplomatic law can be regarded as the fruit of the combined effect of the following 
factors: in the first place, it was the enormous increase in both the frequency and 
intensity of diplomatic activities among sovereign States that stimulated the great 
progress in diplomatic law. As a matter of fact, most of the radical issues regarding the 
inviolability of diplomatic premises (eg, the issue of diplomatic asylum) did not exist 
until the emergence of resident embassies during the Renaissance, and, the actual 
emergence of other controversial issues regarding the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability (eg, the inviolability of ambassadors who involved in conspiracy against 
the sovereign of the receiving States) did not occur until there was ‘an enormous 
expansion in the amount of diplomatic intercourse and a change in many of its methods 
and characteristics’. 117  It can be asserted that it was only after the wide-spread 
establishment of permanent diplomatic mission that the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability became the focus of many theorists of international law.  
In the second place, the change of theme of diplomacy in the Classical Periods also 
contributed to the great progress. It is submitted that the theme of diplomacy in the 
seventeenth century had changed from the dealing with the conflicts of religion to 
dealing with the conflicts between European sovereign States. Even though religion still 
influenced the theoretical basis of the principle of diplomatic inviolability during the 
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Renaissance and early Classical Periods, it is quite obvious that after the Peace of 
Westphalia in 1648, European sovereign States became firmly aware of the importance 
of reciprocity, and religious factors could no longer rightly explain the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability. The necessity of introducing a new theoretical basis for the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability led to the boom of great treatises on diplomatic law, 
which resulted in the establishment of the aforementioned three significant theories of 
diplomatic law.
118
  
Finally, in order to keep pace with developments in the theory of diplomatic law, as 
well as adapting to the new diplomatic methods, certain additions to the scope and 
content of the principle of diplomatic inviolability were not only necessary but also vital 
to the practice of diplomatic relations among sovereign States. Thus, it was not 
surprising to witness the gradual emphasis on the protection of foreign diplomats and 
diplomatic premises, as well as diplomatic correspondence and other properties during 
the Classical Periods.
119
  
Overall, it is not exaggerating to state that the evolution of the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability achieved great progress during the Renaissance and Classical Periods. As 
has been discussed above, these three and half centuries witnessed not only the 
landmark progress in the theoretical aspects of the principle of diplomatic inviolability 
but also the practical aspects: great treatises on the issue of diplomatic inviolability had 
been produced; modern theories of the principle of diplomatic inviolability had been 
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introduced; the scope and contents of the principle of diplomatic inviolability had been 
expanded, and finally, municipal laws stipulating the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability had been gradually legislated. It is recognised that after the great progress 
in the Renaissance and Classical Periods, by the end of the eighteenth century, many 
specific rules of the principle of diplomatic inviolability had been consolidated as 
customary international law, and the principle of diplomatic inviolability was firmly 
established as one of the most recognised principles in the category of the law of 
nations.
120
 Indeed, the significance and profound influence of the evolution of the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability during the Renaissance and Classical Periods 
should not be overlooked. As Barker concludes: 
[I]t is clear that the emergence of diplomatic privileges and immunities into the 
settled regime apparent in modern diplomatic would not have been possible 
without the developments which took place during the [R]enaissance and Classical 
Periods.
121
 
2.2.4 From the nineteenth century to the present day 
Compared with the revolutionary progresses occurred in the Renaissance and Classical 
Periods, the evolution of the principle of diplomatic inviolability during the nineteenth 
century was relatively stable.
122
 That being said, there were still notable developments 
achieved during this century. In the first place, the shift of prevalence in legal 
philosophy from the natural law theory to legal positivism had a significant impact upon 
the theoretical concerns of the principle of diplomatic inviolability. The raison d'etre of 
the principle of diplomatic inviolability, along with other diplomatic privileges and 
immunities, were challenged by academic writers such as those from the Italian or the 
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Belgian schools.
123
 Nevertheless, it was probably due to the very influence of Vattel’s 
work in which great emphasis on the theory of functional necessity was placed that 
ultimately led to the ‘triumph of functionalism’124 in the nineteenth century. As a result, 
some overextended and extraordinary rights within the category of diplomatic 
inviolability that had developed during the Classical Periods such as the franchise du 
quartier and droit de chapelle became ‘archaic’ and inevitably lost favour among 
theorists,
 125
 even if they were not completely relinquished in practice.
126
 In the second 
place, the inviolability of envoys under special situations other than those inside the 
territory of a receiving State was practically recognised according to the general State 
practice by the nineteenth century. To be specific, the inviolability of envoys in transit 
was now generally recognised by third States.
127
 In addition, the inviolability of envoys 
from belligerent powers passing through neutral States was also granted.
128
 Moreover, 
the inviolability of envoys during wartime, no matter whether they are inside the war 
zones or under siege, was also recognised in principle.
129
 In the third place, during the 
nineteenth century, the evolution of the principle of diplomatic inviolability also 
witnessed the continuing trend of the late Classical Periods that States endeavoured to 
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incorporate specific rules of the principle of diplomatic inviolability into their municipal 
legal system. As Frey and Frey point out: ‘by the nineteenth century governments and 
courts often formally recognized the basic inviolability of the envoy and that of the 
embassy premises by incorporating what had been recognized as custom and usage into 
municipal law’.130 Finally, perhaps most significantly, it was during the second half of 
the nineteenth century that some attempts to codify a universal law regarding diplomatic 
privileges and immunities began to take place. These codifications include Bluntschli’s 
Draft Code (1868), Fiore’s Draft Code (1890) and the Resolution of the Institute of 
International Law, Cambridge (1895).
 131
 Notably, all of these codifications contained 
substantial parts dealing with the principle of diplomatic inviolability, which made 
valuable contributions to the consolidation of the principle of diplomatic inviolability.
132
 
Following the relatively stable evolution during the nineteenth century, the evolution of 
the principle of diplomatic inviolability during the twentieth century witnessed the most 
drastic changes ever since the Renaissance and Classical Periods. Indeed, the radical 
change of diplomatic methods, 
133
 the shattering of the old diplomatic system due to the 
two catastrophic world wars
134
 during the first half of the twentieth century and the rise 
of new international diplomacy as a result of decolonization and the Cold War during 
the second half of the twentieth century brought about unprecedented impacts on the 
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theory and practice of the principle of diplomatic inviolability, which can be well 
illustrated through both triumphs and challenges that brought to the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability. 
The triumphs of the evolution of the principle of diplomatic inviolability during the 
twentieth century can be seen from two aspects: First, the old principle of diplomatic 
inviolability successfully came through the ordeals of many upheavals of international 
relations during the twentieth century. There is no doubt that the heinous violations of 
the principle of diplomatic inviolability in various periods of the twentieth century, 
especially during the Second World War and the high tide of the Cold War, brought 
unprecedented impact to the existence of the principle of diplomatic inviolability.
135
 
However, Frey and Frey’s authoritative account of the history of diplomatic immunity 
during the twentieth century disclosed that even though there had been violations of the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability during such upheavals, generally the principle was 
still be widely recognised and respected not only by western European powers but also 
by Communist countries, as well as by all of the newly independent States during the 
post-war era.
136
  This very fact reaffirms that the principle of diplomatic inviolability is 
the ‘fundamental prerequisite’ of diplomatic relations, as pointed out by the ICJ in the 
Tehran Hostages Case.
137
  
The second aspect of the triumph of the evolution of the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability during the twentieth century is that, after painstaking efforts,
138
 the 
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principle of diplomatic inviolability was ultimately codified into a system of truly 
‘universal diplomatic law’ during the second half of the twentieth century139  -- the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability is highly evident throughout the provisions of the 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961, the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations 1963,
140
 the Convention on Special Missions 1969
141
 and the Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, 
including Diplomatic Agents 1973.
142
 There is no doubt that the codification of the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability in these Conventions
143
 marks a great triumph, for 
the reason that these Conventions ultimately crystallize the extant principle of 
diplomatic inviolability from its fluctuant evolution over several thousand years since 
its origin in antiquity. Indeed, these Conventions themselves can be regarded as the very 
                                                                                                                                               
 
International Law (1925), Phillimore’s Draft Code (1926), Strupp’s Draft Code (1926), Draft Code of the 
International Law of Japan (1926), the Project of the International Commission of American Jurists 
(1927), the Resolution of the Institute of International Law, New York (1929) and the Harvard Draft 
Convention on Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities (1932). Like those attempted codifications of the 
late nineteenth century, all of these draft codes stipulated the principle of diplomatic inviolability (mostly 
focused on the personal inviolability of diplomats). In addition to these draft codes, the Convention on 
Diplomatic Officers, adopted at Havana in1928, which can be regarded as a successful regional 
codification of diplomatic law, specifically stipulated the inviolability of diplomatic officers along with 
the inviolability of their residences and properties (Article 14). The full text of all the above mentioned 
codifications can be seen in the Appendix 4 to 11of the Harvard Draft Convention on Diplomatic 
Privileges and Immunities (1932) 26 AJIL Sup 18, 164-187. Notably, of all the codifications mentioned 
above, the provisions concerning the principle of diplomatic inviolability in the 1932 Harvard Draft 
Convention have the most significant importance. For a detail account, see E Denza, ‘Diplomatic 
Privileges and Immunities’ in JP Grant and JC Barker (eds), Harvard Research in International Law, 
Contemporary Analysis and Appraisal (William S Hein & Co 2007) 155-177, see especially the analysis 
on the duty of protection of the mission premises and the inviolability of mission archives, page 163-166. 
139
 Indeed, though attempts to codify a universal law of diplomatic privileges and immunities never 
stopped during the first half of the twentieth century, it was only during the second half of the twentieth 
century that the ‘fruit of codification of a universal diplomatic law’ became ripen. For reasons of this 
assertion, see Young (n 19) 180-181. 
140
 596 UNTS 261 (adopted 24 April 1963, entered into force 19 March 1967). 
141
 1400 UNTS 231 (adopted 8 December 1969, entered into force 21 June 1985). 
142
 1035 UNTS 167 (adopted 14 December 1973, entered into force 2 February 1977). 
143
 The specific stipulations of the principle of diplomatic inviolability under the VCDR will be discussed 
in detail in the next chapter.  
 85 
 
evidence that the principle of diplomatic inviolability survived the huge turmoil during 
its thousands of years of evolution.  
Along with the above-mentioned two triumphs, it is recognisable that the twentieth 
century also witnessed two new challenges that critically influenced the evolution of the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability: in the first place, the growing influence of the 
international human rights movement since the end of the Second World War has 
brought about debates on issues concerning the application of the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability, which include, but are not limited to: the problem of balancing 
the freedom of expression and the protection of the dignity and safety of mission 
premises/diplomatic agents;
144
 the dilemma of overriding the inviolability of diplomatic 
agents so as to stop ongoing public danger (eg, firing a pistol on the street, drunk-
driving, etc);
145
 the validity of entering mission premises to save someone from torture 
(or saving human’s life under public emergency), without initial consent from the head 
of mission; the validity of invoking the principle of diplomatic inviolability to grant 
asylum in mission premises under urgent situations of saving human life (eg, 
immediately after a failed coup d'etat ),
146
 to list but a few. These issues reveal several 
conflicts between the principle of diplomatic inviolability and other norms of 
international law,
147
 which can be viewed as one of the examples of the phenomenon of 
‘fragmentation of international law’.148 .  
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 Denza (n 1) 169-175, 263-264. 
145
 Ibid 266-268. 
146
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Harvard Law School Academic Year 2000-2001 Paper No.2. 
148
 See ‘Conclusions of the work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law: 
Difficulties arising from the diversification and expansion of international law’ in A Pronto and M Wood 
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In addition to the challenge from human rights issues, there is also the challenge from 
the ‘traditional’ consideration of national sovereignty. Indeed, the abuse of diplomatic 
inviolability, especially the abuse of the inviolability of diplomatic premises by the 
diplomats of the sending States as a convenient tool to endanger the national security of 
the receiving States, was not uncommon during the period of Cold War. Consequently, 
the never fading debate over the issue of inviolability of the mission premises and the 
right of self-defence revived during the second half of the twentieth century.
149
 
Moreover, the conflicts between sovereign issues and the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability have become even more complicated with the rapid development in science 
and technology during the last several years of the twentieth century.
150
 Such conflicts 
have seriously challenged the traditional State practice of the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability.
151
  
The conflicts between the principle of diplomatic inviolability and other norms of 
international law and the theoretical controversies arising from the conflicts will be 
thoroughly analysed in Chapters 5 and 6 of the thesis.  
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Chapter 3 The Contemporary Legal Regime of 
the Principle of Diplomatic Inviolability 
As was pointed out in Chapter 1, the material scope of the legal regime concerning the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability in contemporary diplomatic law covers three major 
categories: diplomatic premises, diplomatic personnel and diplomatic property.
1
 Most of 
the core rules of the principle of diplomatic inviolability have been codified in the 
VCDR. Meanwhile, it is worth mentioning that customary international law still plays 
an important role in the delimitation of specific rules of the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability. This chapter will focus on the relevant provisions in the VCDR as well as 
the rules of customary international law in order to provide a detailed survey of the 
contemporary legal regime of the principle of diplomatic inviolability. Particular 
attention will be paid to identifying controversies arising from the conflicts between the 
treaty provisions of the VCDR and other important norms of contemporary international 
law. 
3.1The Principle of Diplomatic Inviolability as Applied to Diplomatic 
Premises 
Generally speaking, diplomatic premises play a dual role in modern diplomatic practice. 
In the first place, diplomatic premises serve as the ordinary and major working places 
for the diplomatic mission. This is their primary function. Meanwhile, they also 
represent the sovereignty of the sending State and the dignity of its occupiers.
2
 As such, 
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 In the Commentary of the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles 1958, there is one paragraph 
which says ‘[t]he inviolability of the mission premises is not the consequence of the inviolability of the 
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it may be suggested that the inviolability of diplomatic premises can be regarded as the 
most significant category of the application of the principle of diplomatic inviolability.
3
 
Indeed, as has been pointed out in Chapter 2, ever since the rise of resident embassies 
during the Renaissance period, the significance of the inviolability of diplomatic 
premises was quickly recognised by scholars as well as in State practice,
4
 and ultimately, 
by the eighteenth century, it is unarguable that the inviolability of diplomatic premises 
was generally accepted as a rule of customary international law.
5
 Nowadays, the core 
rules concerning the inviolability of diplomatic premises are codified in the VCDR, 
which covers three kinds of premises: the mission premises which are defined so as to 
include the private residence of the head of the mission, the private residence of 
diplomatic agents other than the head of the mission, and the residence of minor staff 
and diplomatic couriers.
6
 With regard to the former two categories, the extent of 
inviolability is absolute and unqualified under the VCDR, whereas in relation to the 
third category only limited inviolability is recognised.  
3.1.1 The Inviolability of Mission Premises 
Article 22 of the VCDR expressly stipulates the inviolability of mission premises: 
1. The premises of the mission shall be inviolable. The agents of the receiving State 
may not enter them, except with the consent of the head of the mission. 
2. The receiving State is under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to protect 
the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any 
disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity. 
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 J d’Aspremont, ‘Premises of Diplomatic Missions’ in R Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2012) vol,VIII, 412, para 1. 
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6
 Strictly speaking, only the mission premises and private residence of diplomatic agents can be deemed 
as ‘diplomatic premises’. For the discussion in the current chapter, the author intends to extend the 
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inviolability of these premises.  
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3. The premises of the mission, their furnishings and other property thereon and 
means of transport of the mission shall be immune from search, requisition, 
attachment or execution. 
The above stipulation obviously reflects the two distinct aspects of the concept of 
inviolability: Articles 22.1 and 22.3 generally cover the first aspect of inviolability, that 
is, the immunity from any kind of interference or enforcement from the authorities of 
the receiving State. Meanwhile, Article 22.2 covers the second aspect of inviolability, 
that is, the status of being positively protected by the authorities of the receiving State.  
The three paragraphs of Article 22 of the VCDR constitute the normative legal regime 
of inviolability of mission premises in contemporary international law.
7
 
It should be noted that the stipulation of the inviolability of mission premises in Article 
22, although it expressly mentioning the two distinct aspects of diplomatic inviolability, 
nevertheless lacks detailed guidance for tackling with specific situations and certain 
thorny issues arising from the practical application of this article. It is also unclear under 
Article 22 and other provisions of the VCDR when the inviolability of mission premises 
begins and ends. Therefore, several important theoretical and practical points involving 
the inviolability of mission premises will be further elaborated in the following sections. 
a) The meaning of ‘mission premises’ 
The very first point that needs to be clarified is what constitutes ‘mission premises’. 
This point is vital to the whole issue because it concerns the practical question as to 
precisely what kind of premises should be granted inviolable status. According to 
Article 1 (i) of the VCDR, ‘mission premises’ or ‘the premises of the mission’ refers to 
‘the buildings or parts of buildings and the land ancillary thereto, irrespective of 
ownership, used for the purposes of the mission including the residence of the head of 
the mission’. This definition makes it clear that not only the main buildings of the 
mission, but also the surrounding land, such as embassy gardens and car parks, are 
                                                 
 
7
 Article 22.3, which is termed as the freedom from ‘jurisaction’, will be discussed in Section 3.3.1. 
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deemed as ‘mission premises’.8  As a result, these areas enjoy the same degree of 
inviolability as mission buildings. As to what buildings can be deemed as ‘used for the 
purposes of the mission’, it may be questioned whether premises that are generally 
opened to the public ought to be treated as mission premises.
9
 With regard to this issue, 
Denza suggests that Article 3 of the VCDR, which stipulates the functions of a 
diplomatic mission, may be invoked for the determination of such borderline cases.
10
 
However, it may be argued that even for tourist offices, they might be considered as 
important for the carrying out the function of ‘promoting friendly relations between the 
sending State and the receiving State’ as specified in Article 3.1 (e) of the VCDR. 
Therefore, it is suggested that in most cases, the sending State and the receiving State 
shall reach agreement on the status of certain premises so as to avoid further practical 
difficulties when dealing with the inviolability of mission premises.
11
 It is also worth 
noting that for certain premises, their status is subject to withdrawal by the receiving 
State once the receiving State no longer wishes to treat them as mission premises. This 
may happen when relevant terms of favourable treatment are cancelled due to 
administrative measures to control the abuse of the inviolable status of certain 
premises,
12
 or simply due to a kind of diplomatic retaliation.
13
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 Commentary on the ILC’s Draft Articles (n 2) 95. 
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 Typical premises of such kind include cultural institutes, tourist offices, embassy reading rooms, of 
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 E Denza, Diplomatic Law: Commentary on the Vienna Convention on the Diplomatic Relations (3rd 
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b) The negative duty of the receiving State and the extent of the inviolability of 
mission premises under Article 22.1 
The second point that needs to be elaborated is the extent to which the inviolability of 
mission premises under Article 22.1 applies. As has been pointed out above, Article 
22.1 imposes a negative duty on the receiving State. This duty is one of the most 
complicated issues arising from the inviolability of mission premises and needs to be 
divided into two aspects for further elaboration. First of all, according to the text of 
Article 22.1, without the express consent of the head of the mission, ‘agents’ of the 
receiving State are prohibited from entering the mission premises. ‘Agents’ includes 
those ‘persons clothed with governmental authority’, 14  namely those enforcement 
officials such as police and judicial officials.  Thus, for example, the police will not be 
able to chase a criminal into the mission premises without receiving permission from 
the head of the mission. Forcible entrance in such kinds of situations will inevitably 
cause protest from the sending State, as numerous cases have illustrated.
15
 Similarly, 
service of legal process on the mission premises by judicial officers will be considered 
as a contravention of the inviolability of mission premise.
16
 It is generally accepted that 
service of legal process by post is also prohibited.
17
 Essentially, ‘the receiving State is 
obliged to prevent its agents from entering the premises for any official purpose 
whatsoever’.18 
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The second aspect involving the extent of the application of inviolability of mission 
premises concerns whether there is any exception to the unqualified inviolability of 
mission premises under Article 22.1. State practice following the adoption of the VCDR 
reveals two possible situations that in which unqualified inviolability may be challenged. 
The first kind of situation is when there is an on-going emergency endangering human 
life. A typical example of this kind of situation is that of public emergency such as 
where a fire breaks out in the mission premises or in a neighbouring property. As has 
been discussed above, the text of Article 22.1 refers to ‘agents’ that generally includes 
State officials such as police and judicial officers. Whether such a term also includes 
non-State officials such as fire-fighters or doctors is less clear and may be subject to 
debate. It may be suggested that fire-fighters or doctors under the direct order of the 
government of the receiving State should be treated as ‘agents’ in the sense of Article 
22.1. However, it is not always easy to determine such status when such public 
emergency situation suddenly happens.  
Another example, which is less likely to happen but should be noted, is when the 
mission premises are being used in such an improper way that human life is directly 
threatened. The notorious incident that occurred on April 17, 1984 outside the Libyan 
Embassy in London is such a situation.
19
 Likewise, if evidence is found that there is on-
going torture being carried out inside the mission premise, it might be argued by the 
receiving State that the necessity of protecting human life can be invoked as a 
convincing reason for its authorities to overwhelm the unqualified inviolability of 
mission premises under Article 22.1.
20
 Nevertheless, it is obvious that the strict 
application of Article 22.1 of the VCDR requires that even in emergencies such as those 
highlighted above, no authority of the receiving State is generally allowed to enter into 
the mission premises without obtaining consent from the head of the mission. 
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The second situation in relation to which the unqualified inviolability of mission 
premises may be challenged is when activities taking place inside the mission constitute 
abuse of the inviolability of mission premises, and may be deemed by the receiving 
State as threatening its national security. According to Article 41.3 of the VCDR, 
mission premises ‘must not be used in any manner incompatible with the functions of 
the mission…or by other rules of general international law’. If the mission premises 
have been used as a base for supporting espionage activity or aiding local anti-
government groups, or have become an asylum for hiding anti-government activists, it 
may be argued that such activities constitute a form of abuse of the inviolability of 
Article 21.1, which is definitely not compatible with the functions of the mission. 
However, like the first situation that mentioned above, the strict application of Article 
21.1 generally prohibits any contravention of the inviolability of mission premises even 
when the receiving State deems that its national security will be endangered due to the 
on-going abuse of the inviolability of mission premises.
21
  
To sum up, it is generally accepted that the inviolability of mission premises stipulated 
under Article 22.1 is unqualified and absolute in nature. The strict application of this 
article requires no exception to inviolability. As a matter of fact, such strict application 
has raised great controversies and fierce academic debate since the adoption and entry 
into force of the VCDR.
22
 These controversies will be further discussed in detail in 
Chapter 5 of the thesis. 
c) The positive duty of protecting mission premises under Article 22.2 
As has been pointed out at the beginning of the current section, the positive duty of 
protecting mission premises under Article 22.2 reflects the second aspect of diplomatic 
inviolability. The necessity for such positive protection has already been discussed in 
                                                 
 
21
 Ibid. 
22
 D’Aspremont (n 3) para 14-22, 25; Denza (n 10) 144-147. 
94 
 
Chapter 1.
23
 The text of Article 22.2 also seems self-explanatory. It stipulates a dual 
aspect of protection and actually imposes a dual task for the authorities of the receiving 
State: in the first place, to prevent the mission premises from any kind of unauthorised 
physical intrusion; secondly, to prevent the mission from disturbance of its peace and 
impairment of its dignity. However, there are still two important issues with regard to 
the practical application of Article 22.2 that need to be further clarified. First, Article 
22.2 expressly mentions that the receiving State must take ‘all appropriate steps’ so as 
to protect the mission premises. The phrase ‘all appropriate steps’ is not expressly 
defined in the VCDR. However, in the Commentary to the ILC’s Draft Articles 1958 
there is a rather vague description that explains the expression in the following terms: 
The receiving State must, in order to fulfil this obligation [of protection], take 
special measures – over and above those it takes to discharge its general duty of 
ensuring order.
24
 
The above description nevertheless fails to specify the exact meaning of the phrase ‘all 
appropriate steps’. Practice after the adoption of the VCDR does provide valuable 
references to the issue. With regard to this particular issue, d’Aspremont holds the 
opinion that the extent of the protection provided should be ‘proportionate to the degree 
of threat to each particular mission of which the receiving State is aware’.25 Thus, it can 
be implied that the application of ‘all appropriate steps’ requires the authorities of the 
receiving State to make use of their discretion in various circumstances. For example, in 
face of a mass riot or mob attack, the receiving State shall increase police presence and 
set a cordon. Another valuable opinion can be found in UK Foreign Affairs 
Committee’s Report, ‘The Abuse of Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges’. In that 
report, the Committee points out that: 
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Provided always that work at the mission can continue normally, that there is 
untrammelled access and egress, and that those within the mission are never in fear 
that the mission might be damaged or its staff injured, the requirements of Article 
22 are met.
26
 
Thus, it can be suggested that the above commentary provides a set of criteria for the 
authorities of the receiving State to determine what kind of measures are ‘appropriate’ 
to the positive protection of mission premises. It is also worth noting that when a 
request for protection is made by the diplomatic mission, such as a call for help from the 
head of the mission, the receiving State should be taken seriously. It should not run the 
risk to failing its duty of protection.
27
 Indeed, it is the duty of the receiving State to 
make reasonable judgment in each specific case. For instance, when there is a mass 
demonstration targeted at the mission premises and the diplomatic mission requests for 
a detachment of police force to protect the premises, such a request should be deemed as 
reasonable. On the other hand, the receiving State has no obligation under Article 22 to 
fulfil unreasonable request such as stationing a battalion of policemen when there is 
nothing outstanding happens (or going to happen) outside the mission premises.  
The second issue related to the duty of positive protection under Article 22.2 is how to 
understand the phrase ‘peace and dignity’. Indeed, neither the phrase ‘peace and dignity’ 
nor the phrase ‘disturbance or impairment’ have been defined in the VCDR. The 
Commentary on the ILC’s Draft Articles 1958 also fails to specify any detailed 
definition for these terms. In practice, the receiving State frequently faces certain thorny 
situations which can place it in a dilemma. For example, when a politically motivated 
demonstration takes place outside a diplomatic mission and, for example, the national 
flag of the sending State is burned, what should the response of the receiving state’s 
authorities be? For example, should the authorities restrict such activity of the 
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demonstrators? What is evident is that in most democratic countries, constitutional 
rights grant citizens the right to demonstrate as a specific form of the freedom of speech 
and assembly. Meanwhile, various international human rights treaties also stipulate that 
State parties should endeavour to respect the right of their citizens to peaceful assembly, 
which includes the right to demonstrate outside a foreign diplomatic mission.
28
  The 
issue is, how can the authorities of the receiving State balance the positive protection of 
the peace and dignity of the diplomatic mission on one hand, and the right of its citizens 
to demonstrate on the other? Without an exact definition or even some criteria of the 
term ‘peace and dignity’, the complicated dilemma faced by the authorities of the 
receiving State cannot be easily solved. It is this kind of dilemma that becomes another 
controversy arising from the application of the inviolability of mission premises under 
Article 22.2. 
The above two controversies arising from the positive protection of mission premises 
under Article 22.2 will be further analysed in Chapter 6. 
d) The commencement and termination of the inviolability of mission premises 
The last point of controversy arising with regard to the inviolability of mission premises 
concerns the question of when inviolability begins and ends. In contrast to the 
commencement and termination of the inviolability of diplomatic agents, the 
commencement and termination of the inviolability of mission premises are not 
expressly stipulated anywhere in the VCDR. However, this issue is of vital importance 
for the reason that it regulates when the positive duty of protection under Article 22.2 
begins and ends. With regard to the commencement of the inviolability of mission 
premises, there are three suggested options. The first option suggests that the 
inviolability of mission premises begins when the sending State has expressly notified 
the receiving State of its acquisition of certain premises for use by its diplomatic 
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mission.
29
 Accordingly, protection under Article 22.2 should begin once the receiving 
State has received such notification from the sending State.
30
 The second option 
suggests that the inviolability of mission premises should begin when the premises have 
‘reached the stage of interior installation and decoration’.31 The third option suggests 
that the inviolability of mission premises should begin when the premises ‘were put at 
the disposal of the mission’.32 Though the second opinion has been supported by several 
cases, it may be of less value if a sending State does not use a newly constructed 
building, but instead acquire an already furnished and decorated one.
33
 The first option 
may be of practical value, and it still remains the first choice of some receiving States.
34
 
However, it should be noted that the actual putting into use of the premises by the 
mission is a far more decisive factor than the nominal notification. Thus, the third 
option, which obviously reflects the ‘functional necessity’ theory, may be a much better 
option. Just as d’Aspremont comments,  
It is clear that the requirement of prior notification is being eroded to give way to 
satisfaction of functional, or close thereto, usage of diplomatic premises in order to 
trigger inviolability.
35
 
With regard to the termination of the inviolability of mission premises, some similar 
approaches can be used to determine the end of the inviolable status of mission 
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 Article 3.2 of the Harvard Draft Convention. 
31
 Denza (n 10) 176. 
32
 Ibid. 
33
 For example, to use premises that were occupied and used formerly by another sending State. 
34
 This is the UK practice. In addition, Sections 1 (1) and 1 (3) of the UK Diplomatic and Consular 
Premises Act 1987 also specifies that the status of the premises is subjected to the acceptance or consent 
from the Secretary of State.  
35
 D’Aspremont (n 3) para 7. 
98 
 
premises. If the sending State expressly notifies the receiving State of its intention of 
not using certain mission premises anymore, and even specifies a date of such 
termination, the inviolability of these premises will accordingly cease on that date.
36
 If 
the sending State does not provide such notification to the receiving State, then the 
receiving State should continue to treat the mission premises as inviolable, until it is 
beyond doubt that the premises are not to be used by the mission.
37
 One further point is 
worth noting. According Article 45 (a) of the VCDR, even when  diplomatic relations 
are severed, or if a mission is permanently or temporarily recalled, the receiving State 
should generally treat the mission premises as inviolable for a ‘reasonable period’.38 
This ‘reasonable period’ can be a couple of days or even a couple of months, depending 
on different circumstances and the national legislation of the receiving State
39
 It is quite 
obvious that after such a period, the receiving State no longer has to protect the mission 
premises.
40
 
3.1.2 The Inviolability of Private Residence of Diplomatic Agents 
In addition to the premises of a diplomatic mission, another kind of diplomatic premises 
that is granted inviolable status under the VCDR is the private residence of diplomatic 
agents. In the first place, it should be noted that Article 1(i) of the VCDR expressly 
stipulates that the residence of the head of the diplomatic mission is regarded as a part 
of the mission premises. The inviolability of the private residence of the head of the 
mission is, accordingly, covered by Article 22 of the VCDR. Thus, the following 
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paragraphs will focus on the inviolability of private residence of diplomatic agents other 
than the head of mission.  
According to Article 30.1 of the VCDR,  
The private residence of a diplomatic agent shall enjoy the same inviolability and 
protection as the premises of the mission. 
The term ‘private residence’, as pointed out in the Commentary on the ILC’s Draft 
Articles 1958, should include even the temporary residence of the diplomatic agent.
41
 
Thus, it can be suggested that not only the regular (or ‘primary’) residence such as a 
leased apartment or a house, but also the temporary residence such as a hotel room or a 
villa during vacation, should be treated as the ‘private residence’ of the diplomatic 
agents as per Article 30.1. The above stipulation expressly regulates that the extent of 
the inviolability of the private residence of the diplomatic agent should be the same as 
that of the mission premises. Thus, the two aspects of inviolability should be applied 
with regard to relevant residence, that is, the authorities of the receiving State cannot 
enter the private residence of the diplomatic agent without securing his consent in 
advance.
42
 Additionally, the authorities of the receiving State should also provide 
special protection for the private residence of diplomatic agents. 
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With regard to the commencement and termination of the inviolability of the private 
residence of the diplomatic agent, the same rules with regard to those of the mission 
premises may be applied.
43
 However, it should be noted that if the diplomatic agent has 
permanently moved out of his or her primary residence, the inviolable status terminates 
instantly. As Denza points out, the analogy of a ‘reasonable period’ for the extension of 
the inviolability does not apply to the private residence of the diplomatic agent.
44
 Also, 
with regard to a temporary residence, its inviolability terminates once the diplomatic 
agent has left it. 
Another issue which is worth noting is whether the inviolability of the primary 
residence of the diplomatic agent should subsist when he is temporarily absent from it. 
It may be argued that such inviolability shifts to the temporary residence, and this 
argument accords with the idea that inviolability should keep up with the relevant 
individual. Nevertheless, as Denza comments, very often the diplomat’s property 
remains in his primary residence, and since the property of a diplomatic agent also has 
inviolable status under Article 30.2,
45
 it is naturally reasonable that even during the 
temporary absence of the diplomatic agent, his primary residence should remain 
inviolable. 
46
 
Last, but not least, it should also be noted that if the diplomatic agent is a national or 
permanent resident of the receiving State, his private residence may not be inviolable. 
According to Article 38.1 of the VCDR,  
[A] diplomatic agent who is a national of or permanent resident in that State shall 
enjoy only … inviolability, in respect of official acts performed in the exercise of 
his functions. 
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It may be argued that the term ‘inviolability’ in Article 38.1 only refers to the personal 
inviolability of a diplomatic agent. However, it should be noted that if the relevant 
diplomatic agent is actually engaged in an official task within the receiving State, his 
permanent and, where applicable, any temporary residence may still be entitled to 
inviolability. Likewise, if it is believed that certain official documents of the diplomatic 
mission are present in the primary residence of the diplomatic agent, inviolability 
should be conferred upon such residence even though the diplomatic agent is a national 
or a permanent resident of the receiving State. 
3.1.3 Other Premises that are Entitled to Inviolability: Residence of the 
Administrative and Technical Staff; Family Members 
Apart from the above two major categories of diplomatic premises, the VCDR also 
stipulates several other kinds of premises that are entitled to inviolability. These 
premises include the private residence of the administrative and technical staff, the 
private residence of the family members of the diplomatic agent and administrative and 
technical staff, and, arguably, the temporary residence of the diplomatic courier. 
The inviolability of the private residence of the administrative and technical staff is 
stipulated under Article 37.2 which mentions that: 
Members of the administrative and technical staff of the mission… if they are not 
nationals of or permanently resident in the receiving State, enjoy the privileges and 
immunities specified in Article 29 to 35. 
Since the inviolability of the private residence of a diplomatic agent is prescribed under 
Article 30.1, it can be concluded that the text of Article 37.2 suggests a similar kind of 
inviolability for the private residence of an administrative or technical staff member. It 
is worth noting that if these members are nationals or permanent residents of the 
receiving State, their private residence may not be inviolable, unless such inviolability 
is expressly admitted by the receiving State.
47
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The inviolability of the private residence of the family members of diplomatic agents 
and the inviolability of the private residence of the family members of administrative 
and technical staff are stipulated under Article 37.1 and Article 37.2 respectively. These 
two articles provide texts which accord the private residences of these family members 
the same inviolability of the diplomatic agents and administrative and technical staff 
respectively.
48
 However, an important proviso of these two articles is, if these family 
members are the nationals or permanent residents of the receiving State, their private 
residences enjoy no inviolability at all.
49
   
The last category of diplomatic premises that may be entitled to inviolability is the 
temporary residence of the diplomatic courier. Indeed, there is actually no express 
provision in the VCDR that stipulates the inviolability of the temporary residence of the 
diplomatic courier. However, it should be noted that under Article 27.5, the personal 
inviolability of the diplomatic courier is expressly prescribed. Accordingly, it can be 
argued that the personal inviolability of the diplomatic courier will not be fully realised 
if his temporary residence within the receiving State is not inviolable. It can be 
imagined that, without the positive protection of his temporary residence, diplomatic 
bags that he carries will easily be subjected to unlawful interception. It is worth noting 
that the inviolability of the residence of the diplomatic courier is expressly mentioned in 
Article 17 of the Draft Articles on the Status of the Diplomatic Courier and the 
Diplomatic Bag not Accompanied by Diplomatic Courier 1989, which states that ‘[t]he 
temporary accommodation of the diplomatic courier carrying a diplomatic bag shall, in 
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principle, be inviolable.’ The fact that the 1989 Draft Articles have yet to be enacted as 
a treaty suggests that as of now, there is no concrete customary international law rule on 
the inviolability of the temporary residence of the diplomatic courier. That being said, it 
is conceivable that the receiving State may grant inviolability on such premises on a 
reciprocal basis, since Article 47.2 (b) of the VCDR allows State parties to ‘extend to 
each other more favourable treatment than is required by the provisions of the present 
Convention’. 
3.2 The Principle of Diplomatic Inviolability as Applied to Diplomatic 
Personnel 
The inviolability of diplomatic personnel is another important category to which the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability applies. As a matter of fact, the personal 
inviolability of diplomatic agents is generally regarded as one of the oldest established 
rules of international law and its fundamental importance within the regime of 
diplomatic law is always emphasised.
50
 Under the contemporary regime of diplomatic 
law, the inviolability of diplomatic personnel has been elaborately stipulated in the 
VCDR. Basically, the stipulation covers the following categories of personnel: 
diplomatic agents, administrative and technical staff, the family members of the 
diplomatic agents and of the administrative and technical staff, and, finally, diplomatic 
couriers. 
3.2.1 The Inviolability of Diplomatic Agents 
The personal inviolability of diplomatic agents has been expressly stipulated under 
Article 29 of the VCDR, which states: 
The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He shall not be liable to any 
form of arrest or detention. The receiving State shall treat him with due respect and 
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shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his person, freedom or 
dignity. 
Similar to the text of Article 22 which stipulates the inviolability of mission premises, 
the above text of Article 29 reflects the two distinct aspects of the concept of 
inviolability and accordingly prescribes two kinds of duty for the receiving State: the 
first and second sentence of Article 29 reflect the first aspect of inviolability and 
stipulate a form of negative duty for the receiving State, while the third sentence reflects 
the second aspect of inviolability and stipulates a  positive duty. The following sections 
will provide further elaboration for the inviolability of diplomatic agents, based on this 
important article and other relevant articles in the VCDR. 
a) The meaning of ‘diplomatic agent’ 
The very first conceptual point concerning the personal inviolability of diplomatic 
agents concerns who is entitled to be identified as a ‘diplomatic agent’ under the current 
regime of the VCDR. According to Article 1 of the VCDR, a ‘diplomatic agent’ is ‘the 
head of the mission or a member of the diplomatic staff of the mission’, while the 
‘members of the diplomatic staff’ are those members of the staff of the mission ‘having 
diplomatic rank’.51 As Salmon suggests, these members ‘often belong to a group of 
public officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—whatever its name in any given 
country employed in the Foreign Service’. 52  To be more specific, these include 
‘ministers, minister-counsellors, counsellors, first, second and third secretaries, and 
attachés having diplomatic status’.53 It is worth noting that some writers argue that even 
the so-called ‘part-time’ diplomats can be regarded within the category of diplomatic 
agents and thus entitled to personal inviolability, as long as they are ‘performing 
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diplomatic functions as a principal, and not an incidental, part of their duties’.54 In this 
case, it must be noted that according to Article 10.1(a), the receiving State should be 
notified of the appointment and arrival of such ‘part-time’ diplomatic agents, and under 
Article 11.2, the receiving State may refuse to accept ‘part-time’ diplomatic agent. 
b) The negative duty of not taking any enforcement measure against the 
diplomatic agent 
Under Article 29, a diplomatic agent shall not be subjected to any kind of enforcement 
measures by the authorities of the receiving State. The text of Article 29 expressly 
mentions ‘arrest or detention’ as typical examples of such measures. However, it is 
undoubtedly the case that this enumeration is by no means exhaustive. Indeed, other 
measures of a similar nature may also be considered as contravention of the personal 
inviolability of the diplomatic agent and should not be allowed, such as having physical 
search by the police or taking a breathalyzer test or involuntary electronic screening.
55
 
In addition, personal service of legal process is also prohibited against the diplomatic 
agent.
56
 In short, the essence of the first aspect of the personal inviolability of a 
diplomatic agent grants a status that exempts the diplomatic agent ‘from certain 
measures that would amount to direct coercion’.57 Accordingly, the authorities of the 
receiving State should abstain from adopting any measures of such nature. 
Although the text of Article 29 is straightforward and self-explanatory, the actual 
application of the personal inviolability of diplomatic agents under Article 29 reveals 
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some thorny issues. First of all, just as with the inviolability of mission premises under 
Article 22, there is no exception mentioned in Article 29, and therefore, it is generally 
understood that the personal inviolability of diplomatic agents is absolute.
58
 It is not 
surprising that the absolute inviolability of the diplomatic agent has caused considerable 
controversy, in much the same way as occurred in relation to the application of the 
unqualified inviolability of mission premises. Dembinski has commented that the 
absolute inviolability of diplomatic agents could be contrary to the general principle of 
functional necessity, and could also make the receiving State less capable of protecting 
its own ‘vital interests’.59 Indeed, the absolute inviolability of diplomatic agents may be 
seen as controversial when certain incidents occur. Such controversy mainly rises in the 
following two kinds of scenarios. 
The first scenario is when a diplomatic agent is carrying out certain activities that are 
deemed by the receiving State as dangerous to its national security. Such activities 
include, but are not limited to: practising espionage, illicitly entering into restricted 
areas, sponsoring anti-government groups, aiding or training anti-government activists, 
to list but a few.
60
 Obviously, spying or other subversive activities are incompatible 
with the duty of diplomatic agents that is laid down in Article 41.1 of the VCDR, which 
states: 
Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, it is the duty of all persons 
enjoying such privileges and immunities to respect the laws and regulations of the 
receiving State. They also have a duty not to interfere in the internal affairs of that 
State. 
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It is beyond doubt that the abovementioned activities either violate the duty of 
respecting the law of the receiving State or violate the duty of non-interference with the 
internal affairs of the receiving State.  However, thanks to absolute inviolability under 
Article 29, the receiving State is required not to take actions directly against the 
diplomatic agent. Instead, the authorities of the receiving State can only declare the 
diplomatic agent persona non grata, as per Article 9 of the VCDR.
61
  
The second kind of scenario is when a diplomatic agent is practising serious criminal 
activities or doing something that directly endangers public safety. Typical situations of 
such nature include drink driving, shooting in the street, smuggling drugs or other 
illegal contraband, to list but a few. 
62
 Under these situations the authorities of the 
receiving State (usually the local police officers) must balance the personal inviolability 
of diplomatic agents on the one hand, and public safety on the other hand. The strict 
application of Article 29 requires the authorities not to take any coercive measures 
against the diplomatic agents. However, it may be impossible to bring such emergency 
situation under control without doing something that actually physically impedes the 
diplomatic agent. Nevertheless, unlike the unqualified inviolability of mission premises 
which almost preclude any possible contravention of the inviolability, the possibility of 
overriding the absolute inviolability of diplomatic agents if the risk to the public is 
considered as ‘extreme and continuing character’ is supported by writers and case law.63 
The abovementioned two scenarios reflect similar theoretical controversies that arise 
from the unqualified inviolability of mission premises. These controversies will be 
further analysed in Chapter 5. 
 
                                                 
 
61
 Ibid 77. 
62
 The shooting incident in St James Square in London on 17 April 1984 is the most infamous example. 
See n 19 above. 
63
 Denza (n 10) 267-268. 
108 
 
c) The positive duty of protecting the diplomatic agent 
In addition to the negative duty of not taking any enforcement measures against 
diplomatic agents, Article 29 also elaborates the duty of positive protection of 
diplomatic agents by the authorities of the receiving State. Such protection, like the 
protection of mission premises, includes not only physical protection but also the 
prevention of any attack on the diplomatic agent’s ‘dignity’. 
The physical protection of diplomatic agents has been long established not only as 
comity but also a legal practice ever since the Classical Periods of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth century.
64
 The increasing frequency of attacks, kidnapping and assassination 
attempts on the person of diplomatic agents during the second half of the twentieth 
century and into the twenty-first century makes such protection even more significant.
65
 
Under the regime of the VCDR, the duty of physical protection of the diplomatic agent 
requires that the authorities of the receiving State should ‘take all appropriate steps’ to 
prevent any physical attack on the diplomatic agent. Here again the term ‘all appropriate 
steps’ is not defined. What is clear is that such appropriate steps include ‘the provision 
of a special guard where circumstances so require’.66  It is suggested that the word 
‘appropriate’ implies that the protection of the diplomatic agents ‘must be proportionate 
to the perceived threat’. 67  However, it is worth noting that how to determine 
‘proportionate’ is a fairly difficult task and should be considered by the authorities of 
the receiving State under the particular circumstances. In certain emergency situations, 
the extent of protection should be higher than normal, especially when the mission 
premises are under siege or even under attack by a violent mob.
68
 However, such 
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‘appropriate steps’ never require that the receiving State must ‘do everything’ to fulfil 
the duty of protection. For instance, the receiving State has no duty to succumb to the 
terms set by terrorists so as to secure the release of a kidnapped diplomatic agent, 
although the receiving State should endeavour to take all necessary actions to realise the 
release.
69
 
It is also arguable whether the receiving State has a duty under Article 29 to make 
specific legislation dealing with the punishment of crimes against diplomatic agents. 
With the adoption and entry into force of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic 
Agents 1973,
 70
 State parties are required to make crimes against diplomatic agents 
punishable,
71
 while Article 2.3 reiterates the duty of protection as detailed in Article 29 
of the VCDR.  
With regard to the protection of the dignity of diplomatic agents, another thorny issue 
arises. On one hand, the receiving State is responsible to prevent diplomatic agents from 
the insulting or offensive conduct of private individuals. On the other hand, modern 
constitutional law of democratic countries as well as various international human rights 
treaties prescribe the freedom of speech of citizens. Thus, the authorities of the 
receiving State are frequently faced with the issue of determining whether certain 
conduct by private individuals constitutes an attack on the dignity of a particular 
diplomatic agent. Typical conduct of this nature includes writing ironic articles or 
comics in newspapers that expressly refer to the diplomatic agent, verbal abuse during a 
personal confrontation between the individual and the diplomatic agent, and so on.
72
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Although the dignity of the diplomatic agent is somehow easier to define than that of 
the diplomatic mission,
73
 in some marginal cases, the discretion of the authorities of the 
receiving State remains controversial.
74
 Furthermore, the exact measures a receiving 
State can adopt in order to protect the dignity of the diplomatic agents remains 
debatable. These controversies will be further discussed later in Chapter 6. 
d) The duration of the inviolability of diplomatic agents 
Unlike the commencement and termination of the inviolability of mission premises, 
details of the commencement and termination of the inviolability of diplomatic agents 
are elaborately stipulated in the VCDR. According to Article 39: 
1. Every person entitled to privileges and immunities shall enjoy them from the 
moment he enters the territory of the receiving State on proceeding to take up 
his post or, if already in its territory, from the moment when his appointment is 
notified to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs or such other ministry as may be 
agreed. 
2. When the functions of a person enjoying privileges and immunities have come 
to an end, such privileges and immunities shall normally cease at the moment 
when he leaves the country, or on expiry of a reasonable period in which to do 
so, but shall subsist until that time, even in case of armed conflict. 
The above provisions are mainly self-explanatory, but two practical issues are worth 
noting. First, with regard to the commencement of the inviolability of diplomatic agents, 
the stipulation of Article 39.1 infers that the receiving State shall begin to provide for 
the positive protection of the diplomatic agent at the moment that ‘he enters the 
territory’. It is worth mentioning that under Article 10.1 (a), the receiving State shall be 
notified of the appointment and arrival of diplomatic agents. Meanwhile, Article 10.2 
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requires that prior notification of arrival shall be given ‘where possible’. Such wording 
by no means suggests a compulsory duty of the sending State to notify the receiving 
State of the arrival of its diplomatic agents in advance. However, it can be argued that if 
no prior notification is sent to the receiving State, the receiving State may not be able to 
provide positive protection upon the arrival of the diplomatic agents. For example, if a 
diplomatic agent arrives at the border (usually an airport) of the receiving State and is 
physically attacked by private individuals, the receiving State may argue that it has no 
responsibility for the failure of positive protection, for the reason that it had not been 
notified by the sending State of the arrival time of the diplomatic agent and was 
therefore unable to provide the required level of protection.  
Secondly, with regard to the termination of the inviolability of diplomatic agents, the 
phrase ‘when he leaves the country’ in Article 39.2 normally refers to the moment that 
the diplomatic agent leaves permanently.
75
 The term ‘reasonable period’, as discussed in 
section 3.1.1 above, does not have a specific duration. State practice varies from several 
weeks to six months, or even a year.
76
 In some unusual cases, especially when the 
diplomatic relations between the sending and receiving State are in trouble, or the 
diplomatic agent has already been declared persona non grata by the receiving State, 
such ‘reasonable period’ may be specified by the receiving State and usually it is fairly 
short.
77
 
e) Special cases: the inviolability of diplomatic agents in transit in a third State; 
the inviolability of diplomatic agents who are nationals or permanent residents 
of the receiving State 
In addition to the two distinct aspects of inviolability, two further issues are worth 
noting: the inviolability of diplomatic agents in transit and the inviolability of 
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diplomatic agents who are nationals or permanent residents of the receiving State. Both 
cases are expressly stipulated in the VCDR. Under these two special cases, the extent of 
the inviolability is slightly different from the normal case. 
The rule regarding the inviolability of diplomatic agents in transit in a third State has 
been generally recognised in practice since the nineteenth century.
78
 The rule is now 
codified in Article 40.1 of the VCDR, which expressly stipulates that the third State 
shall accord inviolability to the diplomatic agent. It is quite obvious that the 
inviolability referred to in the text of Article 40.1 is the personal inviolability of the 
diplomatic agent.
79
 The inviolability here covers the two aspects: the immunity from 
any kind of enforcement and the positive duty of protection by the authorities of the 
third State. Whereas the first aspect of inviolability is not difficult to be observed, the 
extent of the protection may be subjected to debate. Whether the authorities of the third 
State have the same degree of duty to provide positive protection to the diplomatic 
agent in transit through its territory remains unclear. It is understandable that usually the 
duty of protection by the third State is not as positive as that of the receiving State for 
the reason that it is neither compulsory nor necessary that the third State should be 
notified of the entry into its territory of the diplomatic agent from the sending State. 
Nevertheless, here the principle of proportionality should be considered: if the 
diplomatic agent feels unsafe and request protection, the authorities of the third State 
should provide enough protection as requested.  
Another special case is the personal inviolability of diplomatic agents who are nationals 
or permanent residents of the receiving State. Under Article 38.1 of the VCDR, if the 
diplomatic agent is a national or permanent resident of the receiving State, he shall only 
have inviolability ‘in respect of official acts performed in the exercise of his functions’. 
Although the exact meaning of the term ‘official acts’ is not clearly defined in the 
VCDR, it is suggested that Article 3, which lists the major functions of a diplomatic 
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mission, can be regarded as a close reference to the determination of the ‘official acts’ 
of diplomatic agents. That is to say, a diplomatic agent that carries out any of the 
diplomatic functions listed in Article 3 shall generally be deemed to be doing ‘official 
acts’. 
3.2.2 The Inviolability of the Administrative and Technical Staff 
In addition to the inviolability of diplomatic agents, the members of the administrative 
and technical staff are also entitled to personal inviolability under the regime of the 
VCDR. The phrase ‘administrative and technical staff’ is defined in Article 1 (f) as 
‘members of the staff of the mission employed in the administrative and technical 
service of the mission’. Mission staff belonging to these two categories generally 
includes typists, cipher clerks, communications engineers, mission archivists, and 
interpreters, to list but a few.
80
 The granting of inviolability to these two kinds of staff 
definitely reflects the general trend that these members of staff are essential to some of 
the diplomatic functions, as well as the daily work of a modern diplomatic mission. 
Indeed, some of them (such as cipher clerk and mission archivist) are even essential to 
ensure the security of certain secret information and documents.
81
 The personal 
inviolability of the administrative and technical staff is prescribed under Article 37.2 of 
the VCDR: 
Members of the administrative and technical staff of the mission…shall, if they are 
not nationals of or permanently resident in the receiving State, enjoy the privileges 
and immunities specified in Articles 29 to 35. 
The text of Article 37.2 suggests that the extent of the inviolability of the administrative 
and technical staff should be exactly the same as that of the diplomatic agent as 
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stipulated in Article 29. They should not be arrested or detained by the authorities of the 
receiving State. They also enjoy the same kind of positive protection from any attack on 
their persons or dignity, though it may be argued that the degree of protection may not 
be as significant as that of diplomatic agents. Here the principle of proportionality once 
again applies: with regard to several key posts within the mission, such as a mission 
archivist or a cipher clerk, his or her personal inviolability may be much more important 
than that of a typist or an interpreter. The degree of protection is therefore determined 
by the importance of the relevant post, as well as the necessity of keeping sensitive 
documents safe from any kinds of harassment or attack. 
With regard to the members of the administrative and technical staff who are nationals 
or permanent residents of the receiving State, there is no obvious inviolability conferred 
upon them. However, Article 38.2 of the VCDR suggests that the members of the 
administrative and technical staff who are nationals or permanent residents of the 
receiving State may still be granted inviolability if the receiving State admits such 
inviolability upon them. The text of Article 38.2 also implies that these staff may have a 
limited inviolability during their performance of the functions of the mission. 
3.2.3 The Inviolability of the Family Members of Diplomatic Agents and those 
of the Administrative and Technical Staff 
Personal inviolability of the family members of diplomatic agents has been recognised 
in customary international law since the Classical Periods of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries.
82
 The reason for granting such inviolability to close members of a 
diplomatic agent is that such inviolability is essential to the independence of a 
diplomatic agent.
83
 Without the inviolability of his family members, the diplomatic 
agent may easily be harassed and therefore be hampered from carrying out his 
diplomatic functions.
84
 In the VCDR, the term ‘family members’ is further elaborated as 
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‘the members of the family of a diplomatic agent forming part of his household’.85 
Although there is no precise definition of this phrase in the VCDR, it is generally 
agreed that the term mainly covers the immediate family of the diplomatic agent, 
including his wife and children below the age of majority.
86
 Indeed, State practice on 
the category of family members varies and this issue generally reflects the differences 
among States in their social and culture values.
87
 
Under the regime of the VCDR, the inviolability of the family members of diplomatic 
agents is prescribed in Article 37.1, while the inviolability of the family members of the 
administrative and technical staff is prescribed in Article 37.2. These two provisions 
provide the family members of these staff with the same inviolability as the official, if 
they are not the nationals or permanent residents of the receiving State: they are immune 
from arrest, detention or any kind of interference by the authorities of the receiving 
State, and they should be positively protected from any kind of physical attack or 
impairment of their dignity. 
With regard to the family members of the diplomatic agent who are actually nationals or 
permanent residents of the receiving State, they generally do not enjoy any kind of 
inviolability. This can be inferred from the text of Article 38.1, which provides that a 
diplomatic agent who is a national or permanent resident of the receiving State only 
enjoys inviolability ‘in respect of official acts performed in the exercise of his 
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functions’. It is obvious that family members of a diplomatic agent generally do not 
perform any kind of official acts in the exercise of diplomatic functions. Therefore, it 
can be concluded that they are not entitled to the same inviolability as a diplomatic 
agent who is a national or permanent resident of the receiving State. It is also worth 
noting that the text of Article 37.1 only mentions the family members of a diplomatic 
agent who are nationals of the receiving State, but does not mention those who are 
permanent residents of the receiving State. In fact, this may only be a technical 
omission during the drafting process of the VCDR.
88
 Finally, with respect to the family 
members of the administrative and technical staff who are nationals or permanent 
residents of the receiving State, they usually have no inviolability at all.
89
 
3.2.4 The Inviolability of Diplomatic Couriers 
The last category of persons entitled to personal inviolability under the VCDR is 
diplomatic couriers. The term ‘diplomatic courier’ is not strictly defined in the VCDR, 
but it is defined in Article 3.1(1) of the Draft Articles on the Status of the Diplomatic 
Courier and the Diplomatic Bag not Accompanied by Diplomatic Courier 1989 as: 
 ‘[A] person duly authorized by the sending State, either on a regular basis or for a 
special occasion as a courier ad hoc, as a diplomatic courier within the meaning of 
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961’.90  
The related provision providing the ‘meaning’ of diplomatic courier within the VCDR 
is Article 27.5, which states: 
The diplomatic courier, who shall be provided with an official document indicating 
his status and the number of packages constituting the diplomatic bag, shall be 
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protected by the receiving State in the performance of his functions. He shall enjoy 
personal inviolability and shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention. 
It is clearly stipulated in Article 27.5 that the diplomatic courier must have an official 
document to prove his status as a diplomatic courier. This is also an essential 
requirement of his entitlement to personal inviolability. The necessity for such 
inviolability is unarguably based on ‘functional necessity’, which can be inferred from 
the phrase ‘performance of his functions’ in Article 27.5. The extent of the inviolability 
is elaborated in the text of Article 27.5 as ‘shall be protected’ and ‘shall not be liable to 
any form of arrest or detention’. Obviously, the two distinct aspects of inviolability are 
well stipulated.
91
 Interestingly, the text of Article 27.5 does not expressly mention the 
protection of the dignity of the diplomatic courier. Nevertheless, it is likely that the 
dignity of the diplomatic courier is an integral part of his personal inviolability, and so, 
it can be concluded that the protection of the inviolability of the diplomatic courier 
should include the positive protection of his personal dignity.
92
 
With regard to the so-called ‘diplomatic couriers ad hoc’,93 they shall enjoy same kind 
of inviolability as professional couriers, save that their inviolability ‘shall cease to apply 
when such a courier has delivered to the consignee the diplomatic bag in his charge’.94 
Normally, an ad hoc courier ‘departs almost immediately bearing diplomatic bags from 
the mission to the sending government or for delivery elsewhere’, which means he 
usually renews his inviolability almost immediately after his former inviolability ends. 
However, it is possible that his inviolable status will lapse if he remains in the receiving 
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or transit State without carrying out his normal function of delivery. 
95
 Such a 
possibility also reflects that the very nature of the inviolability of diplomatic couriers is 
based on ‘functional necessity’. 
3.3 The Principle of Diplomatic Inviolability as Applied to Diplomatic 
Property 
The third and last category to which the principle of diplomatic inviolability applies is 
diplomatic property. This category includes a wide range of things affiliated to either 
the diplomatic mission or the diplomatic agent. Accordingly, a distinct feature of the 
inviolability of diplomatic property is that such inviolability generally reflects the 
derivative nature of the property. The inviolability of diplomatic property covers the 
following three major categories of property: the mission property; the diplomatic 
archives, diplomatic correspondence and diplomatic bag; the private property of 
diplomatic personnel. 
3.3.1 The Inviolability of Mission Property 
Of all the different kinds of diplomatic property, the property of a diplomatic mission is 
perhaps the most important, for it covers the most extensive range of items within the 
diplomatic mission. The rules concerning the inviolability of the property of a 
diplomatic mission were gradually established during the Renaissance and the Classical 
Periods.
96
 It is well recognised that such inviolability came into existence following the 
rise of resident embassy during the Renaissance.
97
 It is in this regard that the 
inviolability of the mission property is actually derived from the inviolability of mission 
premises. Under the cotemporary regime of the VCDR, the inviolability of mission 
property is stipulated in Article 22.3, which states: 
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The premises of the mission, their furnishings and other property thereon and the 
means of transport of the mission shall be immune from search, requisition, 
attachment or execution. 
The text of Article 22.3 mentions three kinds of mission property: the mission premises, 
other property of the mission, and the means of transport of the mission. The first kind 
of mission property is actually the mission premises. It is worth noting that in Article 
22.3 the mission premises are treated as a kind of diplomatic property which denotes not 
only the premises but also the land on which the premises are built. Accordingly, the 
inviolability of mission premises prescribed in Article 22.3 differs from the inviolability 
stipulated in Article 22.1. In Article 22.1, the inviolability of mission premises denotes a 
kind of immunity against instant enforcement, that is, entry into the mission premises, 
while in Article 22.3 the inviolability generally denotes a kind of immunity against non-
instant enforcement. The non-instant enforcement in this regard usually involves the 
expropriation of the premises or the land for public use by the receiving State.  
The issue of expropriation of mission premises was mentioned in the Commentary on 
the ILC’s Draft Articles 1958 which suggested a possible exception to the absolute 
inviolability of the mission premises for the reason that ‘real property is subject to the 
laws’ of the receiving State. In this case, the sending State is required to ‘cooperate in 
every way in the implementation of the plan’ of the receiving State. 98 It can be inferred 
from the above two sentences that for some of the drafters, the absolute inviolability of 
mission premises may have been open to being overwhelmed by the land law of the 
receiving State if such law prescribes the right to expropriation. However, the final text 
of Article 22.3 simply makes such exception impossible. State practice following the 
adoption of the VCDR also proves that such expropriation without the consent of the 
sending State will be deemed as contravention of the inviolability of mission premises 
and therefore, it can be concluded that the inviolability of mission premises in Article 
22.3 is deemed absolute, just like the absolute inviolability in Article 22.1.  
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The second kind of mission property is stipulated in Article 22.3 of the Vienna 
Convention as ‘furnishings and other property thereon’. This term obviously denotes all 
the property within the mission premises which is accordingly immune from search, 
requisition, attachment or execution from the authorities of the receiving State. It seems 
that the inviolability of other property of the mission in Article 22.3 is redundant, for 
‘acts referred to [in Article 22.3] could not be performed without a contravention of 
[Article 22.1]’.99 Nevertheless, such stipulation obviously enhances the inviolability of 
mission premises for the reason that it precludes any possibility that the authorities of 
the receiving State are entitled to enter the mission premises in pursuance of a judicial 
order over the mission property.
100
 Obviously, the inviolability of mission premises and 
all the property within the premises as stipulated in Article 22.3 complements the 
inviolability of mission premises in Article 22.1, and these two provisions together with 
the entitlement to positive protection in Article 22.2 make the inviolability of mission 
premises consummate. 
The third kind of mission property that is entitled to inviolability is the means of 
transport of the mission. The phrase ‘means of the transport of the mission’ is not 
defined in the VCDR so its meaning may change with the development of transportation 
technology. It can be suggested that nowadays, the means of transport of a diplomatic 
mission may not be limited to cars. Other kinds of vehicles as well as helicopters or 
even motorboats can be regarded as ‘means of transport’ of the mission. Whatever the 
specific vehicles that the phrase ‘means of transport of the mission’ is referring to, it can 
be inferred from the text of Article 22.3 that they are entitled to the same kind of 
inviolability as other mission property if they are within the premises. If they are outside 
the mission premises, their inviolability will become somehow limited,
101
 though they 
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are still entitled to the immunity from direct enforcement such as those actions listed in 
Article 22.3.  
Last but not least, it is worth noting that the text of Article 22.3 of the Vienna 
Convention does not expressly mention the positive protection of the mission property. 
Nevertheless, it is easy to notice that for all the mission property that is located within 
the mission premises, their protection is actually incorporated and covered in the 
protection of the mission premises in Article 22.2. With regard to the means of transport 
of the mission, their protection is also covered by the positive protection of diplomatic 
agents under Article 30 if the diplomatic agent is riding in the vehicle.. 
3.3.2 The Inviolability of Diplomatic Archives, Diplomatic Correspondence and 
the Diplomatic Bag 
The second category of diplomatic property covers three kinds of items that are of a 
vital and confidential nature: the diplomatic archives, the diplomatic correspondence 
and the diplomatic bag. Their inviolable status is essential to the vital diplomatic 
functions of a diplomatic mission, as well as to the communication between the 
diplomatic mission and various organs of the sending State. Their inviolability will be 
analysed in the following three subsections. 
a) The inviolability of diplomatic archives 
The inviolability of diplomatic archives is prescribed in Article 24 of the Vienna 
Convention, which states: 
The archives and documents of the mission shall be inviolable at any time and 
wherever they may be. 
The text of Article 24 obviously fails to provide an exact definition of the term ‘archives 
and documents of the mission’. In fact, the term ‘diplomatic archives’ is not defined 
anywhere in the VCDR. Nevertheless, a similar term, ‘consular archives’ is defined 
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clearly in the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 1963,
102
 where Article 1.1(k) 
states: 
‘[C]onsular archives’ includes all the papers, documents, correspondence, books, 
films, tapes and registers of the consular post, together with the ciphers and codes, 
the card-indexes and any article of furniture intended for their protection or safe 
keeping. 
This definition is generally deemed as applicable to the diplomatic archives as 
mentioned in Article 24 of the VCDR.
103
 It is worth noting that the term ‘documents’ is 
accordingly incorporated into ‘archives’. Also, it is well accepted that with the 
development of science and technology, new forms of data storage as well as new 
electronic forms can be added to the already extensive meaning of the term ‘archives’. 
Indeed, the above definition is so extensive that even correspondence and furniture the 
inviolability of which are covered by other articles of the VCDR are also covered by 
Article 24.
104
 Such a stipulation is by no means repetitive. Instead, it reflects the very 
fact that these items are of vital importance and their inviolable status must be 
emphasized, if not enhanced by different provisions within the VCDR. 
105
 
Like all other kinds of terms that are dubbed with ‘inviolability’ in the Vienna 
Convention, the inviolability of diplomatic archives denotes two distinct aspects: the 
archives should be immune from any kind of interference by the receiving State, and 
meanwhile, they should be positively protected by the receiving State. With regard to 
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the first aspect, it generally requires that the diplomatic archives cannot be searched, 
seized or detained by the executive authorities of the receiving State.
106
 Neither can they 
be used as evidence in any legal proceedings.
107
 It is noteworthy that even if the 
documents which are recognised as diplomatic archives were stolen or obtained by 
improper means they do not lose their inviolable status.
108
 However, it is worth noting 
that in the recent Bancoult Case, which concerned the illegal leaking of diplomatic 
correspondence and its use as evidence in legal proceedings,
109
 the UK Court of Appeal 
provided a different opinion on this issue: 
[I]t is not necessary to explore the circumstances in which documents removed 
from a mission without the consent of the sending state may be admitted in 
evidence.  On the assumed facts of the present case, the documents were sent from 
the US mission in London to Washington with the consent of the sending state and 
were communicated to the world by a third party. ... There is nothing in the case-
law or the writings of the commentators (apart from those of Professor Denza) 
which says that the use of documents disclosed in such circumstances in legal 
proceedings would be contrary to articles 24 and 27.2 of the 1961 Convention. ... 
In our judgment, it makes no sense for the concept of inviolability of the mission to 
be extended to prevent a document that is in the worldwide public domain from 
being admitted in proceedings in England and Wales, simply because it emanated 
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from a diplomatic mission in the UK. ... To summarise, we would allow the appeal 
on the admissibility issue on the narrow basis that admitting the cable in evidence 
in the instant case did not violate the archive and documents of the US mission, 
since it had already been disclosed to the world by a third party.
110
 
Whether the above judgment reflects State practice is subject to debate and criticism. 
This author fully agrees with the position of Professor Denza. The inviolability 
stipulated in Article 24 should be interpreted in a restrictive way, for the reason that the 
essence of the inviolability of diplomatic archives lies in the very fact that diplomatic 
archives contain confidential materials (such as official documents, correspondence in 
paperwork or electronic form). Where the archives have been stolen and leaked illegally, 
in principle, the inviolability should still persist, otherwise the confidentiality of 
diplomatic archives will be compromised. Obviously, such consequences are not 
compatible with the purpose of Article 24.    
The second aspect of the inviolability requires that the archives should be protected 
against search, seizure and other forms of interference by the receiving State as well as 
any private individuals. Such protection is usually incorporated into the protection of 
the mission premises for the reason that for most of the time, the diplomatic archives are 
located within the mission premises. 
What makes the inviolability of diplomatic archives distinct is that such inviolability 
has a kind of infinitive temporal and spatial nature. The text of Article 24 expressly 
mentions ‘any time’ and ‘wherever’ to denote such nature. With respect to the temporal 
application of the inviolability, Article 24 requires that the inviolability of diplomatic 
archives persists even after diplomatic relations is severed between the sending State 
and the receiving State, or even during an armed conflict. This is obviously supported 
by Article 45 of the VCDR which emphasizes the duty of the receiving State to ‘respect 
and protect’ the archives during extreme circumstances. Nevertheless, the infinitive 
temporal aspect of the inviolability of diplomatic archives does not suggest a kind of 
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everlasting protection. The general practice is that such inviolability persists for a 
reasonable period of time and finally ‘lapse[s] along with the inviolability of the 
mission premises’.111 
Finally, concerning the spatial aspect of the inviolability, it is generally agreed that prior 
to the VCDR there was no consistent State practice on the inviolability of mission 
archives when they were not located within the mission premises.
112
 It is only after the 
adoption of the VCDR that the inviolability of diplomatic archives has become firmly 
established. Since the diplomatic archives are located within the mission premises for 
most of the time and enjoy the same degree of inviolability as other mission property, 
the significance of the ubiquitous inviolability in Article 24 lies in the occasions that the 
archives are outside the mission premise. For example, when the archives are carried in 
transit by a diplomatic courier or other mission staff and located in that person’s private 
residence (no matter temporary or permanent), the inviolable status will not be lost.
113
  
b) The inviolability of the diplomatic correspondence 
The inviolability of the diplomatic correspondence is stipulated in Article 27.2 of the 
VCDR, which states: 
The official correspondence of the mission shall be inviolable. Official 
correspondence means all correspondence relating to the mission and its functions. 
The text of Article 27.2 is straightforward and self-explanatory. First of all, it defines 
what the term ‘official correspondence’ means. Denza has cast doubts on whether only 
correspondence coming from the mission can be deemed as ‘official correspondence’ 
under Article 27.2, for during the drafting process in the ILC the term had been referred 
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to mail emanating from the mission only.
114
 The text of Article 27.2 expressly mentions 
‘all correspondence’, so it will be imprecise to limit the application of the term to 
‘correspondence sent from the mission’ and exclude correspondence sent to the mission.  
Secondly, the expressly mentioned term ‘inviolability’ obviously denotes that the 
diplomatic correspondence should enjoy immunity from any kinds of interference by 
the authorities of the receiving State. To be specific, diplomatic correspondence should 
not be opened, detained, or used as evidence during legal proceedings.
115
The 
inviolability of diplomatic correspondence also denotes that all the correspondence 
should be protected by the authorities of the receiving State from the abovementioned 
interference. The paradox of such protection lies in the fact that the authorities may not 
be able to recognise whether specific correspondence sent to the diplomatic mission is 
‘diplomatic correspondence’.116 As Denza points out, the text of Article 27.2 does not 
require the diplomatic correspondence to bear ‘visible external marks’ like that on the 
diplomatic bags.
117
 Thus, it can be suggested that the authorities of the receiving State 
ought to protect all the correspondence that is dispatched to and from the diplomatic 
mission, or at least not open it. Otherwise, the authorities of the receiving State may run 
the risk of contravening the inviolability of the diplomatic correspondence. 
Finally, it is worth noting that when delivered to the diplomatic mission, the 
correspondence usually becomes part of the archives and documents of the mission and 
will gain a much more extensive inviolability as stipulated in Article 24 of the Vienna 
Convention.
118
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c) The inviolability of the diplomatic bag 
The inviolability of the diplomatic bag is perhaps the most important and controversial 
aspect of the freedom of communication stipulated in Article 27 of the VCDR. As a 
form of diplomatic property, the vital importance of the inviolability of the diplomatic 
bag is critically summarised by Sir Ivor Roberts in Satow’s Diplomatic Practice:  
[W]ithout being able to rely on the inviolability of the diplomatic bag an embassy 
cannot usefully perform its function of observing and reporting to the sending 
government, and it will be seriously hampered in the conduct of negotiations on 
any matter of importance if it cannot receive confidential instructions.
119
 
The single specific provision that dealing with the inviolability of the diplomatic bag is 
Article 27.3 of the VCDR, which provides: 
The diplomatic bag shall not be opened or detained.  
Furthermore, Article 27.4 elaborates the criteria for determine a diplomatic bag: 
The packages constituting the diplomatic bag must bear visible external marks of 
their character and may contain only diplomatic documents or articles intended for 
official use. 
Several important points can be summarised from the above two provisions. First of all, 
in so far as the definition of the diplomatic bag is concerned, it can be seen from the text 
of Articles 27.3 and 27.4 that there is no detailed definition of the diplomatic bag in 
either of the provisions. Article 27.4 merely provides the method to distinguish a 
diplomatic bag from normal packages. According to Article 27.4, a diplomatic bag shall 
bear the ‘visible external marks of their character’. It can be inferred that in absence of 
such marks, the package will have no such inviolability as specified in Article 27.3. It is 
also worth noting that the text of Articles 27.3 and 27.4 provides no definitive limit on 
the size, weight and format of the diplomatic bag. 
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Secondly, it is worth noting that unlike Article 24 and Article 27.2 which stipulates the 
inviolability of diplomatic archives, documents and official correspondence, neither 
Article 27.3 nor Article 27.4 expressly mentions the term ‘inviolability’. So the issue is, 
whether the wording of Article 27.3 indeed provides inviolability to the diplomatic bag 
at all? If so, to what extent does the inviolability actually apply? In fact, during the 
ILC’s ninth and tenth sessions in 1957 and 1958 the crucial issue as to whether the 
diplomatic bag can possibly be opened under certain circumstances was extensively 
debated.
120
 Despite several contentious opinions during the ninth session, the 
Commentary on the ILC’s Draft Articles 1958 finally concluded that the diplomatic bag 
is inviolable and there are no exceptions whatsoever. The Commentary states: 
[T]he diplomatic bag is inviolable. ... The Commission has noted that the 
diplomatic bag has on occasion been opened with the permission of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the receiving State, and in the presence of a representative of the 
mission concerned. While recognizing that States have been led to take such 
measures in exceptional cases where there were serious grounds for suspecting that 
the diplomatic bag was being used in a manner contrary to paragraph 4 of the 
article, and with detriment to the interests of the receiving State, the Commission 
wishes nevertheless to emphasize the overriding importance which it attaches to 
the observance of the principle of the inviolability of the diplomatic bag.
121
 
At the Vienna Conference, the same issue whether the diplomatic bag is inviolable was 
raised once again.
122
 France, the United States, the United Arab Republic and Ghana all 
introduced their respective proposals for amending the 1958 Draft Articles on the issue. 
The French amendment provided that where there are especially serious reasons, the 
diplomatic bag could be opened in the presence of a representative of the mission.
123
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The US amendment specified that the diplomatic bag could be opened ‘if in an 
exceptional case the receiving State has serious grounds’ to suspect the content 
contained inside the bag and with both the permission of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of the receiving State and the diplomatic mission. In case the diplomatic mission does 
not provide its consent, the diplomatic bag ‘may be rejected’.124  The United Arab 
Republic’s amendment specified that the sending State ‘may be required to withdraw 
the said bag’ in ‘an exceptional case’. The amendment proposed by Ghana mentioned 
that ‘[i]n case of reasonable suspicion of misuse of any particular bag, the sending State 
shall have the right to withdraw such bag unopened.’125 In the following meetings the 
amendments from France, the US and the United Arab Republic were withdrawn, and 
the amendment of Ghana was rejected by vote.
126
 The United Arab Republic’s 
amendment was reintroduced by the UK and was also rejected by vote.
127
 And so, the 
final result on the issue of inviolability of the diplomatic bag did not change from the 
1958 Draft Articles.
128
 Consequently, even though the text of Article 27.3 does not 
expressly mention ‘inviolability’, it can be inferred from the discussion in the ILC and 
the voting results at the Vienna Conference that the diplomatic bag is inviolable.
129
 
Thirdly, with regard to the practical application of the inviolability, it can be seen that 
the phrase ‘shall not be opened or detained’ in Article 27.3 specifies the first aspect of 
its inviolability. The inviolability of diplomatic bag makes it illegal for the authorities of 
the receiving State to open or detain the diplomatic bag. According to general practice, 
this aspect of inviolability also prohibits the electronic scanning of the diplomatic 
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bag.
130
 It can also be implied from the text of Article 27.3 that as a principle, there is no 
exception to the inviolability.
131
  
Fourthly, while Articles 27.3 and 27.4 do not expressly mention the protection aspect of 
the inviolability, it will be absurd to assume that the receiving State has no duty to 
protect the diplomatic bag. Article 27.3 only provides a kind of immunity from 
interference from the authorities of the receiving State. However, it is quite obvious that 
without the positive protection by the receiving State, the diplomatic bag, which usually 
contains important and classified documents, may be subjected to interference by 
private individuals other than the authorities of the receiving State. Therefore, the 
protection aspect of the inviolability of the diplomatic bag, though not expressly 
mentioned, shall not be overlooked. 
The stipulation of the inviolability of the diplomatic bag under Articles 27.3 and 27.4 
has raised two major conceptual and practical issues ever since the adoption of the 
VCDR. Firstly, with regard to the attribution of the diplomatic bag, State practice 
reveals that the lack of a detailed definition and any specific stipulation on the size, 
weight and format of the diplomatic bag inevitably brings about debate on whether 
certain ‘package’ can be deemed as diplomatic bag. Although it is suggested that 
normally, a diplomatic bag ‘resembles a sack’, or may be in the form of ‘sack, pouch, 
envelope or any type of package whatsoever’, 132   it is quite conceivable that in 
exceptional cases, a diplomatic bag can also be very large and bulky such as a huge 
container, for it may contain essential office apparatus such as ‘photocopying machines, 
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cipher equipment, computers, and building materials’.133 Whether the receiving State 
has the right to reject certain forms of package as diplomatic bag and refuse to respect 
the inviolability of these items remains unclear under the current regime of the 
VCDR.
134
  
Secondly, with regard to the content of the diplomatic bag, Article 27.4 requires that the 
diplomatic bag shall only contain diplomatic documents or articles ‘intended for official 
use’. The term ‘intended for official use’ can be construed with the diplomatic functions 
that are listed in Article 3.1 of the VCDR. The general practice reveals that even if 
diplomatic bags contain articles which are not diplomatic documents or not ‘intended 
for official use’, its inviolability will not be invalidated. It is obvious that the text of 
Articles 27.3 and 27.4 do not expressly permit the authorities of the receiving State any 
right to disregard the inviolability of the diplomatic bag in such situations.
135
 Nelson 
recalls the discussion on this issue in the ILC: 
[I] t was proposed that the paragraph providing for the contents of the bag be 
placed before the provision regarding its inviolability. The majority of the 
delegates rejected the proposal, fearing that this structure would imply that the 
inviolability of the bag depended on the observance of the contents-limitation 
provision. The rejection of this proposal conveys that a majority of the 
Commission intended the diplomatic bag to be absolutely inviolable, even in the 
face of possible abuse.
136
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Nevertheless, as many scholars argue, theoretically, even if the abuse of the inviolability 
of the diplomat bag may not invalidate its inviolable status, practically, it will be absurd 
to stick to the absolute inviolability of the diplomatic bag if manifest abuse or even 
threat to human life is evident.
137
 Like the absolute inviolability of the diplomatic 
premises and diplomatic agents, controversies inevitably arise if such inviolability is 
confronted with the protection of vital national interest or the need to protect human life. 
Such controversies are reflected by the fact that a group of Arabic nations have entered 
reservations to Article 27.
138
 Moreover, the tentative draft of a brand new international 
convention on the status of the diplomatic bag was also unsuccessful.
139
 The 
controversies arising from the conflicts between the inviolability of the diplomatic bag 
and other principles of international law will be further analysed later in Chapter 5. 
3.3.3 The Inviolability of the Private Property of the Diplomatic Personnel 
The last category of diplomatic property that is entitled to inviolability is the private 
property of diplomatic personnel. Article 30.2 of the VCDR stipulates the inviolability 
of the private property of a diplomatic agent: 
His papers, correspondence and, except as provided in paragraph 3 of Article 31, 
his property, shall likewise enjoy inviolability.
140
 
The inviolability in Article 31.3 has two aspects. The first aspect of the inviolability 
requires that all the aforementioned property (papers, correspondences and other 
property of the diplomatic agent) shall be immune from search, inspection, seizure, 
                                                 
 
137
 Typical examples of such abuse include but not limited to:  using the diplomatic bag to carry weapons, 
alcohol, piece of art, jewellery, currency, or even human beings that are abducted.  See Denza (n 10) 242-
243; d’Aspremont, ‘Diplomatic Courier and Bag’ (n 130) para 13. 
138
 Denza (n 10) 229-230. 
139
 Various controversies on the Draft Articles on the Status of the Diplomatic Courier and the Diplomatic 
Bag not accompanied by Diplomatic Courier 1989 made it unable to become a universal convention. No 
international conference was held to discuss the draft articles since 1989. 
140
 Article 31.3 stipulates the immunity from execution of the diplomatic agent and his private property, 
except in the three cases that stipulated in Article 31.1. 
133 
 
detention or any other kind of interference.
141
 The inviolability of the private papers and 
correspondence of the diplomatic agent is especially vital for the reason that without 
this kind of inviolability, the authorities of the receiving State may try to use the pretext 
of searching the private papers and correspondence of the diplomatic agent in order to 
reveal certain confidential documents of the diplomatic mission. Indeed, it is often 
difficult to completely distinguish the private correspondence of a diplomatic agent 
from official correspondence. The stipulation of the inviolability of private papers and 
correspondence of the diplomatic agent completely removes such possibility and 
therefore grants a more secure status for the official correspondence. In addition to his 
private papers and correspondence, the inviolability is also extended to his personal 
bank account and his private means of transport.
142
  
The second aspect of the inviolability of the private property of the diplomatic agent 
requires that all the aforementioned property shall also be protected by the authorities of 
the receiving State. It is worth noting that such protection is generally extended to the 
private property of the diplomatic agent regardless of its location, as long as the 
property is located within the receiving State.
143
  
Finally, it should be noted that, in addition to the private property of the diplomatic 
agent, under Articles 37.1 and 37.2 of the VCDR, the private property of the family 
members of the diplomatic agent, the private property of the administrative and 
technical staff and their family members, if these persons are not nationals or permanent 
residents of the receiving State, shall also entitled to the same degree of inviolability as 
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that of the diplomatic agent. If the above-mentioned persons are nationals or permanent 
residents of the receiving State, their private property enjoys no inviolability. Likewise, 
the private property of other minor mission staff and the diplomatic courier also has no 
inviolability at all. 
 135 
 
Chapter 4    State Responsibility Arises from the 
Breach of the Principle of Diplomatic 
Inviolability  
In the previous chapter, the substantive rules of the principle of diplomatic inviolability 
stipulated under the VCDR were thoroughly discussed. The comprehensive stipulation 
of the rules of the principle of diplomatic inviolability in the VCDR implies that any 
contravention of these rules by a receiving State will constitute a breach of its 
international obligations under the VCDR. The breach will form an internationally 
wrongful act and may ultimately lead to the rise of international responsibility of that 
State if there is no valid defence to that breach.
1
  In contemporary international law, the 
rules concerning State responsibility are mainly governed by customary international 
law. In 2001 the ILC adopted its Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts.
2
 The Draft Articles, which have not yet been enacted as 
a treaty, is nevertheless considered by international scholars as an authoritative and 
comprehensive codification of the major customary rules of State responsibility.
3
 The 
general principles of the law of State responsibility are stipulated in the first three 
articles of the Draft Articles in which the well-recognised international law principle 
that ‘every internationally wrongful act of a State entails its international responsibility’ 
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 It is well recognised among international law scholars that ‘whenever one state commits an 
internationally unlawful act against another state, international responsibility is established between the 
two’. See MN Shaw, International Law (6th edn, CUP 2008) 778. See also J Crawford (ed), Brownlie’s 
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 J Crawford, ‘The ILC’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts: A 
Retrospect’ (2002) 96 AJIL 874, 890. See also Dixon (n 1) 253. 
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is expressly confirmed.
4
 Article 2 of the Draft Articles clearly specifies the two 
constituent elements of an internationally wrongful act that will give rise to State 
responsibility: 
There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an 
action or omission: 
(a) Is attributable to the State under international law; and 
(b) Constitute a breach of an international obligation of the State. 
Thus, based on Articles 1 and 2, it can be asserted that the key issue to determine the 
existence of State responsibility is to determine whether there exists a breach of an 
international obligation of that State, and whether that breach is attributable to that State. 
The present chapter will focus on a close examination of the two elements of the 
internationally wrongful act and their relevance to the international obligations of the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability that are stipulated in the VCDR,
5
 based on the 
analysis of the specific rules in the Draft Articles. In the first place, the two elements of 
the internationally wrongful acts that will give rise to the international responsibility of 
the receiving State will be thoroughly analysed. Then, the possible defences or excuses 
that may preclude State responsibility arising from the breach of the international 
obligations of the principle of diplomatic inviolability will be analysed. Finally, the 
legal consequences of a breach of diplomatic inviolability will be discussed. 
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 See Article 1 of the Draft Articles. 
5
 It is worth mentioning that apart from the State responsibility arising from the breach of the international 
obligations of the principle of diplomatic inviolability, State responsibility may also arise from the abuse 
of the principle of diplomatic inviolability by the diplomatic mission or diplomatic personnel of a sending 
State. Articles 41.1 and 41.3 of the VCDR expressly require that the diplomatic personnel who has 
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mission premises shall not be used in any manner incompatible with its diplomatic functions. Therefore, it 
can be inferred from the wording of Articles 41.1 and 41.3 that the abuse of the inviolable status of the 
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State. Owing to the nature and theme of the present thesis, the State responsibility arising from the abuse 
of the principle of inviolability of the sending State will not be discussed in detail. Relevant issues will be 
briefly analysed in section 4.2 of this chapter. 
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Throughout this chapter, various cases and incidents involving the breach of the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability will be discussed so as to illustrate the principal 
rules of State responsibility. 
4.1 The Elements of an International Wrongful Act in the Context of 
the Breach of International Obligations of Diplomatic Inviolability 
4.1.1 The breach of the international obligations of diplomatic inviolability by 
the receiving State
6
 
As Article 2 of the Draft Articles prescribes, the breach of an international obligation is 
one of the two elements that constitute an internationally wrongful act. The issue 
concerning the breach of an international obligation is elaborated in Articles 12 to 15 of 
the Draft Articles. In the first place, Article 12 stipulates that the existence of a breach 
of an international obligation by a State occurs:  
[W]hen an act of that State is not in conformity with what is required of it by that 
obligation, regardless of its origin or character. 
It has been emphasized by scholars that the essence of an internationally wrongful act 
‘lies in the non-conformity of the State’s actual conduct with the conduct it ought to 
have adopted in order to comply with a particular international obligation’.7 Thus, in the 
context of the emergence of State responsibility arising from the breach of the 
international obligations of the principle of diplomatic inviolability by the receiving 
State, the very first issue is to identify where such international obligations derive from. 
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 It is worth noting that in some extraordinary cases, a State other than the receiving State can commit an 
internationally wrongful act that forms a breach of the international obligation of the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability. See the NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy incident in the following 
section. 
7
 ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries 2001’, 
YILC [2001] vol II, 54. See also J Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State 
Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries (CUP 2001) 124. 
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Obviously, in contemporary international law, the major source for the international 
obligations of the principle of diplomatic inviolability is the VCDR. Relevant 
provisions in the VCDR that stipulate the specific rules of the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability have been extensively discussed in the previous Chapter. These provisions 
form the substantive part of the international obligations of the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability with which a State should comply under the VCDR. In addition to the 
stipulations of the rules of principle of diplomatic inviolability in the VCDR, similar 
rules are stipulated in the aforementioned Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic 
Agents 1973.
8
 For instance, Article 2.1 prescribes that attack on the inviolability of 
diplomatic premises and diplomatic personnel should be made by State party to the IPP 
Convention as a crime under its internal law; Article 2.3 reemphasizes the obligation of 
the receiving State to provide special protection of the personal freedom and dignity of 
the diplomatic personnel. These stipulations can be regarded as a set of complementary 
rules to the stipulations of the principle of diplomatic inviolability under the VCDR.   
It is also worth mentioning that the legal obligations derived from the abovementioned 
two international conventions can be divided into two distinct categories. As Article 2 
of the Draft Articles stipulates, a breach of an international obligation which will 
amount to an internationally wrongful act can be caused either by an act or an omission 
that is attributable to the State. Accordingly, the first category of obligation concerns the 
obligation not to conduct enforcement acts against inviolable premises, personnel and 
property. For instance, Articles 22.1 and 22.3 specifically focus on such an obligation. 
Indeed, a breach of this kind of obligation always involves a positive ‘act’ of the State. 
The second category is concerned with the obligation to provide special protection for 
inviolable premises, personnel and property. For instance, Article 22.2 is a typical 
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 1035 UNTS 167 (adopted 14 December 1973, entered into force 20 February 1977). As of June 2014, 
there are 176 states become parties to this Convention. Hereafter referred to as ‘the IPP Convention’. 
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stipulation of this kind of obligation. In fact, a breach of this kind of obligation always 
involves an ‘omission’ of the State. 
To sum up, all the aforementioned stipulations form the core source of international 
legal obligations of the principle of diplomatic inviolability. Any non-conformity of 
these obligations may constitute a breach of the international obligations and may 
become an internationally wrongful act and may ultimately give rise to the international 
responsibility of that State (subject to other relevant rules under the Draft Articles).
9
 
Following Article 12, Article 13 of the Draft Articles further stipulates that ‘an act of a 
State does not constitute a breach of an international obligation unless the State is bound 
by the obligation in question at the time the act occurs’. In the context of the 
international obligations of the principle of diplomatic inviolability, the stipulation of 
Article 13 suggests that an act performed by a receiving State may not be considered as 
a breach of the international obligation of the principle of diplomatic inviolability if that 
State is not a party to the aforementioned two international conventions. Nevertheless, it 
is worth mentioning that currently, a great many States have ratified both the VCDR 
and the IPP Convention. As of June 2014, the former has 190 State parties and the latter 
has 176 State parties. This fact reveals that the rules of the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability are almost universally applied in contemporary international relations and 
therefore, the international obligations of the principle of diplomatic inviolability exist 
extensively among States. 
In addition to Articles 12 and 13 of the Draft Articles, Article 14 further elaborates the 
temporal scope of a breach of an international obligation. First, Article 14.1 stipulates: 
The breach of an international obligation by an act of a State not having a 
continuing character occurs at the moment when the act is performed, even if its 
effects continue. 
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A vivid example of this circumstance can be seen in the infamous NATO bombing of 
the Chinese embassy in Belgrade on 7 May, 1999.
10
 In this incident, the premises of the 
Chinese diplomatic mission in Belgrade, capital of Former Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia was hit by five laser-guided missiles fired from a US B-2 stealth bomber 
and resulted in the partial destruction of the mission premises as well as three deaths 
and more than twenty injuries inside the premises.
11
 The bombing can be regarded as a 
flagrant breach of the international obligation of the inviolability of mission premises 
under Article 22.1 of the VCDR even though in this incident the US is not a receiving 
State.
12
 The nature of the bombing indicates that such a breach is an instant conduct, 
though the effects of this breach (partial destruction of the mission premises) persist. 
Secondly, Article 14.2 provides another circumstance: 
The breach of an international obligation by an act of a State having a continuing 
character extends over the entire period during which the act continues and remains 
not in conformity with the international obligation. 
A typical example of this circumstance can be found in the Armed Activities on the 
Territory of Congo Case
13
 in which the Ugandan embassy in Kinshasa was attacked by 
Congolese troops and resulted in the long-term occupation of the embassy premises by 
                                                 
 
10 ‘NATO Hits Chinese Embassy’ (BBC News, 8 May 1999) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/338424.stm> accessed 22 June 2014. 
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 Ibid. See also K Dumbaugh, ‘Chinese Embassy Bombing in Belgrade: Compensation Issues’ 
(Congressional Research Service) < http://congressionalresearch.com/RS20547/document.php> accessed 
26 June 2014. 
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 Obviously, the direct source of the obligation in this incident is the first sentence of Article 22, that is, 
‘[t]he premises of the mission shall be inviolable’. Even though the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations generally deals with relationship between the sending and receiving State, it never precludes the 
possibility that the legal obligations within its framework also have effect on the relationship between the 
sending State and a third State. 
13
 Case concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v 
Uganda) [2005] ICJ Rep 168. 
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them.
14
 It is obvious that in this case, the long-term occupation of the Ugandan embassy 
premises by the Congolese troops reflects that the act of the State of Congo (as a 
receiving State) continues and remains not in conformity with its international 
obligation under Article 22 of the VCDR and thereby, the occupation can be regarded as 
a continuing breach of the obligation of the inviolability of mission premises under 
Article 22 of the VCDR and Congo shall bear State responsibility for such a breach.
15
 
Finally, Article 14.3 stipulates another circumstance that: 
The breach of an international obligation requiring a State to prevent a given event 
occurs when the event occurs and extends over the entire period during which the 
event continues and remains not in conformity with that obligation. 
Perhaps there is no better example of this than the Tehran Hostages Case.
16
 In this case, 
the receiving State, Iran failed to prevent the attack on the US embassy premises. It also 
failed to prevent the attack on the US diplomatic personnel. Such failure persisted from 
the very first day of the attack on 4 November 1979 till the final release of the hostages 
on 20 January 1981, which lasted for a period of more than one year.
17
 As a result, the 
State of Iran failed to fulfil its international obligation under Articles 22 and 29 of the 
VCDR, and its omission constitutes a breach of the international obligation of the 
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 Ibid para 334-336. 
15
 Ibid para 344. See also RU Wittzack, ‘Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo Cases’ in R 
Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2012) vol I, 
587, para 16. In addition, the Commentary on the Draft Articles on State Responsibility also points out 
that unlawful occupation of embassy premises is a typical example of the circumstance of continuing 
wrongful acts. See Crawford  (n 7) 136. 
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 Case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v 
Iran) [1980] ICJ Rep 3. 
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 I Buffard and S Wittich, ‘United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran Case (United States of 
America v Iran)’ in R Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2nd 
edn, OUP 2012) Vol X, 543, para 2. 
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VCDR to which the State of Iran is a party. Consequently, State responsibility arises 
and extends over the entire period of more than a year. 
Whether Article 15 of the Draft Articles is also applicable to the breaches of the 
international obligations of the principle of diplomatic inviolability is subject to 
discussion. Article 15 elaborates a distinct circumstance when there is a breach of 
international obligation consisting of a composite act: 
1. The breach of an international obligation by a State through a series of actions 
or omissions defined in aggregate as wrongful, occurs when the action or 
omission occurs which, taken with the other actions or omissions, is sufficient 
to constitute the wrongful act. 
2. In such a case, the breach extends over the entire period starting with the first 
of the actions or omissions of the series and lasts for as long as these actions or 
omissions are repeated and remain not in conformity with the international 
obligation. 
With regard to the temporal factor, these breaches ‘extend in time from the first of the 
actions or omissions in the series of acts making up the wrongful conduct’.18 It is 
arguable whether the systematic breaches of the principle of diplomatic inviolability by 
the receiving States may also be considered as a breach of such kind. In the infamous 
Tehran Hostages Case, the receiving State, Iran, initially failed to prevent the attack by 
the armed militants on the US embassy premises and therefore it is responsible for its 
omission to provide sufficient protection for the US embassy premises.
19
 In the 
following events, the Iranian government actually made no effort to end the illegal 
occupation of the US embassy premises. It also made no effort to end the hostage 
crisis.
20
 Neither did it ever take action to punish the attackers in spite of the fact that 
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 Ibid. 
19
 Case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v 
Iran) [1980] ICJ Rep 3, para 66 and 77. 
20
 Buffard and  Wittich (n 17) para 1.  See also ibid, para 67. 
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such punishment is required by Article 3 of the IPP Convention to which Iran had been 
a party since July 1978. Evidence revealed that the government of Iran even showed its 
approval of the attack and occupation of the embassy premises.
21
 Thus, according to the 
judgment of the ICJ, the government of Iran should be responsible for: 
repeated and multiple breaches of the applicable provisions of the Vienna 
Conventions even more serious than those which arose from their failure to take 
any steps to prevent the attacks on the inviolability of these premises and staff.
22
 
The above judgment obviously emphasizes the grave nature of the breaches of the 
Iranian government’s obligation under the VCDR and its vicious impact on the ‘very 
foundations’ of the long-established regime of diplomatic law.23  Thereby, it can be 
argued that such a systematic breach can be deemed as ‘a breach through a series of 
actions or omissions defined in aggregate as wrongful’, and therefore, according to 
Article 15.2, the breach extends over the entire period from the initial failure to prevent 
the attack on the US embassy till the end of the occupation of the embassy premises and 
the final release of the hostages.  
4.1.2 The attribution of the breach of the international obligations of 
diplomatic inviolability to a State 
As Article 2 of the Draft Articles prescribes, in addition to the breach of an international 
obligation, an act or omission will not form an internationally wrongful act unless such 
act or omission is attributable to that State. It is well recognised that an unlawful act by 
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 Buffard and Wittich (n 17) para 15. See also Case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular 
Staff in Tehran (United States of America v Iran) [1980] ICJ Rep 3, para 73-75. 
22
 Case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v 
Iran) [1980] ICJ Rep 3, para 76. The Court in the following paragraph 77 also specified that the 
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 Ibid para 86. 
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private individuals acting for themselves may not be regarded as an act of the State.
24
 
The detailed rules regarding the issue of attribution of the breach of international 
obligation to the State are stipulated in Articles 4 to 11 of the Draft Articles on Stare 
Responsibility. Most of these provisions are applicable to the context of the breach of 
the international obligations of the principle of diplomatic inviolability.
25
 
In the first place, Articles 4 and 5 clearly stipulate that the conduct of any State organ 
and the conduct of those persons or entities exercising elements of governmental 
authority should be regarded as an act of that State. Such kind of act is directly 
attributable to the State. A typical example that illustrates these two articles is the 
unauthorised entry into embassy premises by officials of the receiving State, such as 
police and judicial officers. In February 1973, the Pakistan police were empowered by 
the Pakistan government to enter into the Iraqi embassy in Islamabad to carry out a 
search of the embassy premises, in spite of the fact that the Iraqi ambassador Hikmat 
Sulaiman had refused to give the permission for such a search.
26
 It is obvious that the 
unauthorised entry by the Pakistan police constitutes a breach of the obligation of the 
inviolability of the embassy premises under Article 22 of the VCDR, and according to 
either Article 4 or Article 5 of the Draft Articles, such an act is deemed as the act of the 
Pakistan State.
 27
 Thereby, Pakistan was directly responsible for such a breach. 
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 Dixon (n 1) 258; see also J Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part (CUP 2013) 113. 
25
 Article 6, which stipulates the responsibility arising from the conduct of organs placed at the disposal 
of a State by another State, is nearly inapplicable in the context of breaches of international obligations of 
diplomatic inviolability. 
26
 I Roberts (ed), Satow’s Diplomatic Practice (6th edn, OUP 2009) para 8.11. See also S Saeed, ‘Caught! 
(But What?)’ (The Friday Times, 4 March 2011) 
<http://www.thefridaytimes.com/04032011/page26.shtml> accessed 22 June 2014. 
27
 According to Article 4.2, it is the internal law of the State that decides whether police officers fall into 
the category of ‘State organs’. As a result, the conduct of the police officers is attributable to the State 
based on either Article 4 or Article 5. 
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Secondly, Article 7 of the Draft Articles stipulates the responsibility that arises from 
‘ultra vires’ acts, that is, those acts conducted by persons or entities that exceed the 
manifested authorisation of the State. According to Article 7, this kind of act shall also 
be considered an act of the State as long as the person or entity concerned acts in their 
official capacity, even if the acts actually exceed the original authorisation or 
contravenes instructions. Thus, in the rare circumstances, when the police officials of 
the receiving State are under order from the government to protect the embassy 
premises of the sending State, but they actually join a mob attack on the embassy, the 
receiving State is still responsible for the breach of its obligation to protect the embassy 
premises. A similar provision is stipulated in Article 9 of the Draft Articles. According 
to Article 9, conduct carried out in the absence or default of the official authorities shall 
nevertheless be considered as an act of the State as long as the persons involved in the 
act are exercising official capacity. For instance, if a police officer who had been given 
the order to protect the embassy premises turned out to join the mob attack on the 
embassy premise when he is still wearing his uniform and during his duty period, s, his 
act will still be attributed to the State. 
Furthermore, Article 8 stipulates that a State will be held responsible for the conduct of 
a person or groups of persons that are directed or controlled by a State. Quite often a 
mass demonstration targeted at foreign embassy premises is proved to be backed or 
even intentionally directed by the receiving State. For example, it is said that the two 
attacks by the demonstrators on the British embassy in the Indonesian capital Jakarta on 
16 and 18 September 1963 were supported by the Indonesian government. Similar 
events happened several times during the Chinese ‘Cultural Revolution’ when the 
British mission was attacked by officially inspired demonstrators.
28
 
                                                 
 
28
 Roberts (n 26) para 17.9-17.11, and also17.16. It is worth noting that the deliberate siege and attack on 
the UK embassy in Beijing during the Chinese ‘Cultural Revolution’ is quite different from the Tehran 
Hostages Case. In the latter case, the ICJ holds that several general declarations by the Iranian religious 
leader did not amount to an authorization from the State to undertake the specific operation of invading 
the seizing the US Embassy. On the contrary, the siege on the British mission premises by the Chinese 
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Article 10 stipulates that the conduct of an insurrectional movement will be attributed to 
that State if this movement succeeds in establishing a new government. Indeed, on some 
occasions when an insurrectional movement tries to control the capital of the State, 
diplomatic premises are especially vulnerable to various kinds of intrusion during the 
chaos. For instance, during the coup d’état in Iraqi capital Baghdad in July 1958, the 
British embassy was stormed by a mob, which resulted in the burning of embassy 
premises and the loss of embassy property. The British military attaché was also killed 
during the chaos. After the incident, the newly established military government 
acknowledged its responsibility for the incidents and accepted the responsibility to 
make compensation to the British government.
29
 This case is a vivid example of the 
practice of Article 10. 
Last but not least, Article 11 of the Draft Articles stipulates that conduct acknowledged 
and adopted by a State as its own will be considered as an act of that State, even if the 
original conduct is not attributable to that State. A typical example of this situation is 
the Tehran Hostages Case in which the Iranian government actually approved the 
seizure and continuing occupation of the US embassy premises by the attackers.
30
 
Indeed, the ICJ pointed out that there is no evidence that the original attack and 
occupation of the US embassy premises was officially authorised by the Iranian 
government. Therefore, the initial attack ‘cannot be considered as in itself imputable to 
the Iranian State’, though Iran is still held responsible for its omission ‘to take 
appropriate steps to ensure the protection’ of the US embassy premises, diplomatic 
                                                                                                                                               
 
demonstrators was almost officially endorsed, immediately after the Chinese government sent an 
ultimatum to the British government. See Case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff 
in Tehran (United States of America v Iran) [1980] ICJ Rep 3, para 59. 
29
 Roberts (n 26) para 17.1-6. 
30
 Case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v 
Iran) [1980] ICJ Rep 3, para 73-74. 
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personnel and property.
31
 Nevertheless, the official governmental approval and 
endorsement of the situation by the Iranian religious leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, is the 
key that finally gives rise to the direct responsibility of the Iranian government.
32
 The 
ICJ, upon finding enough evidence showing the official stance of the Iranian 
government, held that:  
The policy thus announced by the Ayatollah Khomeini of maintaining the 
occupation of the Embassy and the detention of its inmates as hostages … was 
complied with by other Iranian authorities and endorsed by them repeatedly in 
statements made in various contexts. The result of that policy was fundamentally to 
transform the legal nature of the situation … The approval given to these facts by 
the Ayatollah Khomeini and other organs of the Iranian State, and the decision to 
perpetuate them, translated continuing occupation of the Embassy and the 
detention of the hostages into acts of that State. The militants, authors of the 
invasion and jailers of the hostages, had now become agents of the Iranian State for 
whose acts the State itself was internationally responsible.
33
 
As a result, the Court decided that the Iranian government was responsible for the 
breaches of its international obligations under various articles of the VCDR.
34
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 Ibid para 59-61. 
32
 It is worth noting that the essential factor to decide whether the State indeed ‘acknowledges and adopts’ 
a conduct as its own lies in whether the State shows its ‘intention to accept responsibility for otherwise 
non attributable conduct’. See Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State 
Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries (n 7) 123. 
33
 Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v 
Iran) [1980] ICJ Rep 3, para 74. 
34
 Ibid para 95. See also O de Friuville, ‘Attribution of Conduct to the State: Private Individuals’ in J 
Crawford, A Pellet and S Olleson (eds), The Law of International Responsibility (OUP 2010) 274. 
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4.2 Defences that Preclude Wrongfulness of conduct of a Receiving 
State from the Breach of the International Obligations of Diplomatic 
Inviolability 
The above section has discussed the normal situations when State responsibility arises 
from a breach of international obligations of diplomatic inviolability if such a breach 
can be attributed to that State. However, it is possible that in some situations, the 
wrongfulness of the conduct of a State may be precluded due to various valid defences. 
Accordingly, no State responsibility will arise as long as the defences are validly 
established. These situations involve various types of defences under the title 
‘circumstances precluding wrongfulness’ in the Draft Articles. In the following 
subsections, the six different types of possible defences expressly stipulated in the Draft 
Articles will be analysed. Attention will be paid to the practical application of these 
defences within the context of the breach of the international obligations of the principle 
of diplomatic inviolability. It will be revealed that not all types of defences are actually 
applicable in this context.  
4.2.1 Consent from the sending State 
The first valid defence that stipulated in the Draft Articles is the consent by the injured 
State. Article 20 of the Draft Articles prescribes that: 
Valid consent by a State to the commission of a given act by another State 
precludes the wrongfulness of that act in relation to the former State to the extent 
that the act remains within the limits of that consent. 
One typical circumstance in the context of the breach of the international obligations of 
the principle of diplomatic inviolability is, when the receiving State has evidence to 
suspect misuse of a diplomatic bag, upon receiving express consent from the sending 
State, the diplomatic bag could be opened in the presence of a diplomatic agent of the 
sending State. In this circumstance, the receiving State will not be held responsible for 
the breach of the inviolability of the diplomatic bag under Article 27.3 of the VCDR. 
Similarly, a receiving State will not be held responsible for the breach of the 
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inviolability of the embassy premises if the sending State has given its consent to the 
authorities of the receiving State entering the premises.
35
 
An important practical concern which is unclear from the wording of Article 20 is 
whether the consent is required always to be express. Crawford contends that consent 
must be ‘clearly established’ and ‘actually expressed’ by the State, but he acknowledges 
that this ‘does not prevent consent from being tacit or implicit rather than 
communicated in some formal way’. The key to distinguishing tacit or implicit consent 
from presumed consent lies in the perception of the acting State, that is, whether the 
State believes in good faith that the other State has consented. 
36
 The Commentary on 
the Draft Articles suggests that the consent may be given by a State in advance or even 
as the issue it is occurring.
37
 This is especially conceivable in cases where the head of 
mission requested local policemen or fire fighters to enter the mission premises to carry 
out their duties. The Commentary also points out that ‘consent given after the conduct 
has occurred’ will be deemed as ‘a form of wavier or acquiescence’, which, according 
to Article 45, leads to the loss of the right for the injured State to invoke responsibility. 
However, this kind of circumstance is relatively rare in the context of the breach of the 
international obligations of the principle of diplomatic inviolability. 
4.2.2 Self-Defence 
The second possible defence stipulated in the Draft Articles is self-defence. According 
to Article 21:  
                                                 
 
35
 As a matter of fact, Article 22.1 of the VCDR expressly mentions such a circumstance. With the 
consent of the head of the mission, the officials of the receiving State can enter the premises without 
giving rise to the State responsibility of the receiving State. Obviously, the consent from the head of the 
mission can be regarded as ‘valid’. 
36
 Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part (n 24) 284-285. 
37
 Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and 
Commentaries (n 7) 163. 
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The wrongfulness of an act of a State is precluded if the act constitutes a lawful 
measure of self-defence taken in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations. 
Based on the text of Article 21, it can be concluded that the invocation of the right of 
self-defence as a valid defence to preclude the wrongfulness of an act of a State seemed 
to be strictly limited to the scope of the application of the right of self-defence stipulated 
under Article 51 of the UN Charter. The conditions for invoking the right of self-
defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter is summarised by Greenwood as follows: 
(i) it must be a response to an armed attack; 
(ii) the use of force, and the degree of force used, must be necessary and 
proportionate;  
(iii) it must be reported to the Security Council and must cease when the Security 
Council has taken ‘measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security’.38 
It is worth mentioning that Article 51 of the UN Charter does not provide a clear 
definition of the term ‘armed attack’. According to one commentator, the term ‘armed 
attack’ can loosely be construed to denote ‘threat or use of force’ or ‘threats to the 
peace’, though such a reference is far from precise.39 Inevitably, the application of the 
right of self-defence as a valid defence to preclude wrongfulness of an otherwise clear 
breach of an international obligation of a State leads to controversy.
40
  
One infamous case occurred in 1984 when a policewoman was killed by shots fired 
from the diplomatic premises of Libyan embassy in London.
41
 Obviously, in that 
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 See C Greenwood, ‘Self-Defence’ in R Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2012) vol IX, 103, para 8. 
39
 Ibid para 10. 
40
 For a detailed discussion on the controversy of the application of the right of self-defence, see Chapter 
5. 
41
 See ‘1984: Libyan Embassy Shots Kill Policewoman’ (BBC News) 
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specific case, whether such a firing constituted an armed attack on UK was the key to 
determine whether the UK could invoke its right of self-defence to overwhelm the 
inviolability of the Libyan embassy premises. In the ‘First Report from the Foreign 
Affairs Committee’, the firing of the weapon was not regarded as an armed attack and 
the right of self-defence was, accordingly, deemed inapplicable.
42
 Indeed, whether the 
right of self-defence can be practically invoked as a valid defence to preclude the 
wrongfulness of the breach of the international obligations of the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability is subjected to academic debate and its practical application depends on 
specific merits of each different case.
43
  
For instance, in the aforementioned 1973 Iraqi embassy in Islamabad incident, one 
scholar of diplomatic law maintains that the right of self-defence could have been 
adopted by Pakistan as a response to the threat to its national security.
44
 Nevertheless, 
whether such a justification falls within the scope of Article 51 of the UN Charter is 
controversial.
45
 As a result, the invocation of self-defence as a valid defence to preclude 
wrongfulness of a breach of the international obligation of the principle of diplomatic 
                                                                                                                                               
 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/april/27/newsid_2502000/2502565.stm> accessed 26 
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42
 See UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, ‘The Abuse of Diplomatic Immunities and 
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inviolability is relatively rare in State practice, though theoretically such an application 
is conceivable.
46
 
4.2.3 Countermeasures 
Article 22 of the Draft Articles stipulates that the wrongfulness of an act of a State may 
be precluded if the relevant act constitutes a lawful countermeasure against another 
State. The application of countermeasures is further elaborated in Article 49 to 54 of the 
Draft Articles, in which Article 50.2 (b) expressly prescribes that  
A State taking countermeasures is not relieved from fulfilling its obligations: 
(b) To respect the inviolability of diplomatic or consular agents, premises, archives 
and documents. 
It can be deducted from the above text of Article 50.2 (b) that generally, a receiving 
State may not be able to invoke countermeasures as a valid defence to preclude the 
wrongfulness of the breach of its obligations of the principle of diplomatic inviolability. 
Indeed, any act that amounts to a breach of the obligation of the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability, such as the search and detention of diplomatic bags in response to a 
similar breach of the inviolability of diplomatic bags by another State, will generally be 
deemed as a kind of diplomatic retaliation. Obviously, under Article 50.2 (b), such kind 
of act will not be deemed lawful, and, as a result, the wrongfulness of this kind of act 
will not be precluded.  
4.2.4 Force majeure 
It is well established in domestic law of various nations as well as customary 
international law that force majeure is a valid defence to preclude wrongfulness of an 
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 The controversies arising from the conflicts between the application of the right of self-defence and the 
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otherwise unlawful act.
47
 This classic defence is reflected in Article 23 of the Draft 
Articles. According to Article 23, the term ‘force majeure’ means:  
[T]he occurrence of an irresistible force or of an unforeseen event, beyond the 
control of the State, making it materially impossible in the circumstances to 
perform the obligation.  
It is pointed out by Hentrei and Soley that the practical application of force majeure as a 
valid defence to preclude the breach of an obligation is subjected to three conditions: 
irresistibility, unpredictability and externality.
48
 First of all, ‘irresistibility’ means that 
the specific event that led to the State act which contravenes an international obligation 
should be brought about by a purely natural cause such as an earthquake, tsunami, or 
volcano eruption.
49
 Secondly, ‘unpredictability’ means that in general terms, the 
specific events that led to the State act which contravenes an international obligation 
should not normally be foreseeable and indeed beyond the control of that State.
50
 
Finally, ‘externality’ requires that no causal link exists between the situation of force 
majeure and the acts of the State.
51
 In short, as Crawford points out, ‘[I]t is essentially 
involuntary.’52 
Although cases involving the invocation of force majeure as a valid defence of 
precluding wrongfulness of an act of a State in the context of the breach of the 
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international obligations of diplomatic inviolability are relatively rare, there is one 
situation that the defence of force majeure may be practically invoked. During the great 
earthquake in the capital of Haiti in January 2010, the Taiwan embassy was completely 
destroyed and the Taiwanese ambassador was seriously injured.
53
 Under this 
circumstance, it is conceivable that the local Haitian authorities would enter the 
embassy premises to rescue the victims without practically obtaining the consent from 
the ambassador. The wrongfulness of the act of entering into embassy premises for 
rescue without consent can be precluded in accordance with the conditions to invoke the 
defence of force majeure.  
4.2.5 Distress 
Similar to force majeure, distress is another classic defence that may preclude 
wrongfulness of an otherwise unlawful act.
54
 Article 24 of the Draft Articles elaborates 
the circumstance when distress can be invoked as a valid defence to preclude the 
wrongfulness of a State act: 
The wrongfulness of an act of a State … is precluded if the author of the act in 
question has no other reasonable way, in a situation of distress, of saving the 
author’s life or the lives of other persons entrusted to the author’s care. 
Obviously, the essential condition to invoke distress as a valid defence to preclude 
wrongfulness of an otherwise unlawful act of a State lies in the immediate necessity to 
save someone’s life – either the author of the act or other persons entrusted to the 
author’s care.55 Distress differs from force majeure in that the author of the act has free 
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will to decide whether to undertake such an act.
56
 That means, in face of the breach of 
an international obligation on one hand and the immediate necessity to save someone’s 
life on the other hand, the author intentionally chooses the latter option as a priority on 
the basis that complying with the specific international obligation ‘would almost 
certainly cause his or her death or that of the persons entrusted to his care’.57 This is 
reflected in the text of Article 24 as ‘no other reasonable way’ to avoid the consequence, 
apart from breaching the relevant international obligation. In this regard, the necessity to 
save human life clearly outweighs the international obligations being breached.  
As a matter of fact, the invocation of distress as a valid defence to preclude 
wrongfulness of an act of the receiving State is not inconceivable in the context of the 
breach of the international obligations of diplomatic inviolability. For instance, if a 
diplomatic agent loses his control and is firing a pistol in the street, the local authorities 
of the receiving State may adopt forcible measures to stop him. That is, to overwhelm 
the personal inviolability of the diplomatic agent so as to protect the lives of those 
innocent people in the street from the immediate threat from the diplomatic agent. In 
ordinary situations, these actions would be deemed as a breach of the personal 
inviolability of the diplomatic agent under Article 29 of the VCDR. However, it is 
obvious that in this specific scenario, there is almost no alternative other than adopting 
forcible measures to stop the diplomatic agent. In accordance with the application of the 
defence of distress under Article 24 of the Draft Articles, the wrongfulness of the act of 
the local authorities will be precluded. In fact, the jurisprudence of the ICJ supports 
such a defence. In the judgement of the Tehran Hostages Case, the Court incisively 
points out that:   
The observance of [the principle of diplomatic inviolability] does not mean… that 
a diplomatic agent caught in the act of committing an assault or other offence may 
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not, on occasion, be briefly arrested by the police of the receiving State in order to 
prevent the commission of the particular crime.
58
 
Another two typical situations in which distress can be invoked as a valid defence to 
preclude wrongfulness of a State act that may constitute a breach of the international 
obligations of the principle of diplomatic inviolability include: stopping a diplomatic 
agent from drunk driving, or opening a diplomatic bag which carries a human hostage.
59
 
However, to acknowledge the possible invocation of distress, the receiving State must 
establish enough evidence to prove that there is a distress. Practically, this is extremely 
difficult, and moreover, the condition that ‘there is no other reasonable way to save life’ 
is not easy to be validated. Therefore, it can be seen from State practice that receiving 
States rarely invoke distress as a valid defence to the breach of the international 
obligation of the principle of diplomatic inviolability. 
4.2.6 Necessity 
The last possible defence to preclude the wrongfulness of an otherwise unlawful act of a 
State is necessity.
60
 Like force majeure and distress, necessity is also a classic defence 
in customary international law.
61
 Whereas the invocation of distress is limited to 
circumstances to save human life, the invocation of necessity covers issues related to the 
safeguard of ‘essential interest’. To be specific, Article 25.1 (a) of the Draft Articles on 
State Responsibility prescribes that necessity can be invoked as a valid defence to 
preclude the wrongfulness of a State act if the act ‘is the only means for the State to 
safeguard an essential interest against a grave an imminent peril’. 
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It can be seen from Article 25.1 (a) that the invocation of necessity is subjected to three 
essential conditions. In the first place, there should be an ‘essential interest’ for the State 
to protect. The term ‘essential interest’ is not strictly defined in the text of Article 25.1 
(a) so it can be suggested that the interpretation of ‘essential interest’ varies from case to 
case.
62
 Secondly, the essential interest of the State must have been threatened by ‘a 
grave and imminent peril’. Like the term ‘essential interest’, what can be deemed as 
‘grave’ is subject to interpretation in different circumstances.63 Finally, the State act 
should be ‘the only means’ that the State can feasibly take to protect the essential 
interest. The term ‘only means’ suggests that necessity may not be invoke ‘if there are 
other (otherwise lawful) means available, even if they may be more costly or less 
convenient’.64 
In addition to Article 25.1 (a), Article 25.1 (b) specifies another condition on the 
invocation of necessity: the act of the State shall not ‘seriously impair an essential 
interest of the State or States towards which the obligation exists, or of the international 
community as a whole’. Practically, it can be revealed that in the context of the breach 
of the international obligations of the principle of diplomatic inviolability, necessity is 
less frequently invoked as a valid defence by a receiving State to justify its otherwise 
unlawful act. The reason is quite evident: the principle of diplomatic inviolability itself 
may be generally regarded as an underlying principle of international community. The 
ICJ has expressly pointed out in the judgement of the Tehran Hostages Case that: 
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[T]he principle of the inviolability of the persons of diplomatic agents and the 
premises of diplomatic missions is one of the very foundation of this long-
established regime.
65
 
 Moreover, the Court also pointed out in the same judgement that diplomatic law is a 
‘self-contained’ regime, 66  and so, it can be inferred that the receiving State shall 
normally not take an action which constitutes a breach of the international obligations of 
the principle of diplomatic inviolability so as to ‘safeguard an essential interest against a 
grave an imminent peril’. Obviously, such an act is well beyond the acceptable 
measures which a receiving State can take within the regime of diplomatic law. 
4.3 Legal Consequences from the Breach of the International 
Obligations of Diplomatic Inviolability 
4.3.1 Legal consequences 
It has already been pointed out above that breaches of the international obligations of 
diplomatic inviolability, if there is no valid defence applicable, will ultimately lead to 
the existence of the international responsibility of the receiving State. Provisions 
concerning the legal consequences of the breach of the international obligations  are 
provided in Article 28 to 33 of the Draft Articles, among which Articles 29 to 31 are of 
particular relevance to the principle of diplomatic inviolability. 
In the first place, Article 29 of the Draft Articles provides that: 
The legal consequences of an internationally wrongful act under this Part do not 
affect the continued duty of the responsible State to perform the obligation 
breached. 
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Thus, in accordance with Article 29, it can be confirmed that a receiving State has the 
‘continued duty’ to perform its obligations of the principle of diplomatic inviolability 
even if such obligations have previously been or are currently being breached. To be 
more specific, whatever breach or breaches the receiving State has committed, its 
obligation of the principle of diplomatic inviolability still exists, and therefore, the 
receiving State must continue to perform its obligation of diplomatic inviolability. For 
instance, in the Tehran Hostages Case, Iran still had the continued responsibility to 
perform its obligations of protecting US embassy and diplomatic personnel even though 
it initially failed to perform such obligations.
67
 Indeed, it was the intentional 
indifference and its failure to keep performing its obligations of diplomatic inviolability 
that transformed the initial non-attributable acts into the State acts of Iran, which 
ultimately gave rise to its responsibility. 
Secondly, Article 30 of the Draft Articles requires that a State that is found to be 
responsible for its internationally wrongful act is under an obligation: 
(a) To cease that act, if it is continuing; 
(b) To offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, if 
circumstances so require. 
The above provision (a) requires that the responsible State must, in the first place, cease 
committing the internationally wrongful acts in concern.
68
 This provision is especially 
important to the observance of the principle of diplomatic inviolability by the receiving 
State. Indeed, the request for the immediate cessation of a continuing breach of the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability reflects one of the eminent characteristics of 
                                                 
 
67
See Case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America 
v Iran) (Order) (Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures) [1979] ICJ Rep 7, para 2 (c), (d) and 
(e). 
68
 As Crawford comments, ‘Cessation of conduct in breach of an international obligation is the first 
requirement in eliminating the consequences of wrongful conduct.’ See Crawford, The International Law 
Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries (n 7) 196. 
 160 
 
diplomatic inviolability: the inviolable status of the diplomatic personnel, premises and 
property underlies the very basis of modern international relations. Breaching of such 
inviolability will not only ruin the relationship between the sending State and receiving 
State, but also threatens the whole international community. Such heinous acts must be 
terminated as soon as possible otherwise the very basis of international relations will be 
greatly undermined. Therefore, it is not unusual to witness in various cases that 
following the breach of the international obligations of the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability by the receiving State, the very first request from the sending State is to 
call for the immediate cessation of the breach. For instance, in the Tehran Hostages 
Case, the ICJ in its initial order for provisional measures required that: 
the Government of Iran immediately clear the premises of the United States 
Embassy, Chancery and Consulate of al1 persons whose presence is not authorized 
by the United States Chargé d' Affaires in Iran, and restore the premises to United 
States control.
69
 
It is also worth noting that a similar statement was later reiterated in the Court’s final 
judgement of the case.
70
 
In addition to paragraph (a), paragraph (b) of Article 30 provides another obligation for 
the responsible State. Whereas paragraph (a) emphasizes the urgent necessity to restore 
the situation back to normal, paragraph (b) emphasizes the necessity for the responsible 
State to make a ‘non-repetition’ promise to the injured State. Such necessity actually 
reflects that the injured State ‘has reason to believe that the mere restoration of the pre-
existing situation does not protect it satisfactorily’, as Crawford points out.71 Such kind 
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of promise is also commonly seen following the typical breach of the international 
obligations of the principle of diplomatic inviolability by a receiving State. For instance, 
following the violent attack on the Chinese embassy in The Hague on 6 July, 2009, the 
Dutch foreign minister in his official apology expressly mentioned his government’s 
commitment to ‘avoid repetition of such incidents in the future’.72 
Thirdly, Article 31 provides another important legal consequence from the breach of an 
international obligation, that is, the requirement for the responsible State to make 
reparation to the injured State:  
1. The responsible State is under an obligation to make full reparation for the 
injury caused by the internationally wrongful act. 
2. Injury includes any damage, whether material or moral, caused by the 
internationally wrongful act of a State. 
The above paragraph 1 reflects the general principle of international law that ‘every 
violation of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation’, as pointed out at 
the beginning this chapter.
73
 The second paragraph further elaborates that the term 
‘injury’ in paragraph 1 may include not only material damage but also moral damage. 
This stipulation is especially relevant to the violation of the dignity of the diplomatic 
mission or the personal dignity of a diplomatic agent, as stipulated in Article 22.3 and 
Article 29 of the VCDR.  
4.3.2 Forms of reparation 
Whereas Article 31 of the Draft Articles generally stipulates the obligation for the 
responsible State to make full reparation to the injured State, Articles 34 to 37 provide 
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 ‘Dutch Government Apologizes for Attack on Chinese Embassy’, (Embassy of the People’s Republic of 
China in the Kingdom of the Netherlands Official Website, 8 July 2009) < http://nl.china-
embassy.org/eng/xwdt/t571992.htm> accessed 23 June 2014. 
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 Case concerning the Factory At Chorzów (Germany v Poland) [1928] PCIJ Series A, No. 17, at 29, as 
cited in Shaw (n 2) 100. 
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more detailed stipulation on the various specific forms of reparation. According to 
Article 34 to 37, three forms of reparation may be made separately or in combination by 
the responsible State: restitution, compensation and satisfaction. 
Restitution is defined in Article 35 of the Draft Articles as a commitment to ‘re-
establish the situation which existed before the wrongful act was committed’. With 
regard to the breach of the obligation of the principle of diplomatic inviolability, 
restitution has frequently been adopted by the receiving State as a typical form of 
reparation in cases that the normal situation is not difficult to be restored.
74
 For example, 
the receiving State releases the diplomatic agent who has been unlawfully detained, thus 
redresses the former breach of the diplomatic agent’s personal inviolability.75 Another 
typical example is that following the attack on embassy premises by demonstrators, the 
receiving State helps the diplomatic mission to refurbish the building, thus restore the 
original status of the building.  
Compensation is another typical form of reparation adopted by the responsible State 
when restitution cannot be adopted as an appropriate form of reparation. Basically, 
compensation means ‘the payment of damages as a remedy for making good the 
damage caused by a previous violation of an international obligation’.76 Its essence is to 
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 It is worth noting that Article 35 specifies two exceptions to the application of restitution: firstly, when 
the restitution is not materially possible; secondly, when the restitution involves a burden out of all 
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compensation or apology for the sending State. See ‘Libya Offers Further Apology for U.S. Envoy's 
Death’ (Reuters, 20 September 2012) < http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/20/us-protests-libya-usa-
idUSBRE88J0HT20120920> accessed 23June 2014. See also A Tanzi, ‘Restitution’ in R Wolfrum (ed), 
The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2012) vol VIII, 972, para 14. 
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<http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/meast/01/10/iran.diplomat.arrested/index.html> accessed 23 June 
2014. 
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 S Wittich, ‘Compensation’ in R Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law (2nd edn, OUP 2012) vol II, 499, para 1. 
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cover ‘financially assessable damage’ caused by the breach of the international 
obligation.
77
 In fact, it can be seen as ‘the most commonly sought in international 
practice’.78 Compensation as the preferred form of reparation has seen practice in most 
cases related to the breach of the international obligation of the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability of the receiving State. For instance, following the demonstration outside 
the US embassy in Beijing, the Chinese government paid US$2.8 million to the US 
government as compensation for the damage of the premises caused by the 
demonstrators.
79
 
Finally, satisfaction can be adopted by the responsible State as a third form of reparation. 
According to Article 37.1 of the Draft Articles, the responsible State is ‘under an 
obligation to give satisfaction for the injury … insofar as it cannot be made good by 
restitution or compensation’. It is evident through the wording of Article 37.1 that 
satisfaction is generally used as a complementary form of reparation. The specific forms 
of satisfaction: acknowledgement of the breach, expression of regret and formal apology 
are commonly adopted by the government of the receiving State following the breach of 
the international obligation of the principle of diplomatic inviolability.
80
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 Article 36.2 of the Draft Articles.  
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 Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and 
Commentaries (n 7) 218. It has to be pointed out that compensation is not the appropriate form of 
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 E Denza, Diplomatic Law: Commentary on the Vienna Convention on the Diplomatic Relations (3rd 
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Chapter 5    Controversies Involve the Principle 
of Diplomatic Inviolability (I): The Protection of 
National Security, Public Safety and Human Life  
It was noted in the previous two chapters that several controversies exist in connection 
with the principle of diplomatic inviolability. To be specific, in various scenarios, the 
application of certain rules of diplomatic inviolability in the VCDR can clash with other 
norms and doctrines of international law.
 
It can be asserted that whenever such conflict 
arises, the receiving State will inevitably face a dilemma in which it has to reconcile 
different international law norms and decide which norm takes precedence. The 
dilemma can be illustrated in two aspects. On the one hand, the receiving State has an 
incumbent obligation under the VCDR to respect the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability so as to conform its conduct to the norms of diplomatic law. On the other 
hand, it must also take into account other norms of international law and endeavour to 
refrain itself from breaching its international obligations under other treaties. As a 
matter of fact, this kind of dilemma not only reflects the practical difficulty in the 
practice of the principle of diplomatic inviolability ever since the adoption of the VCDR, 
but also reflects the growing challenges to the long established principle of diplomatic 
inviolability within the contemporary international law framework.
1
  
The purpose of this chapter and the next is to examine the controversies in three distinct 
scenarios: when the principle of diplomatic inviolability clashes with the protection of 
the national security of the receiving State, when the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability clashes with the protection of public safety and human life under 
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 See Chapter 2, section 2.2.4. 
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emergency, and finally, when the principle of diplomatic inviolability clashes with the 
protection of human rights. The former two scenarios mainly involve the first aspect of 
inviolability, that is the negative duty of refraining from interference; whereas the third 
scenario mainly involves the second aspect of inviolability, that is the positive duty to 
protect. The major task of the present chapter is exposing and analysing the 
controversies arising from the first two scenarios and examining the relevant rules and 
doctrines of other norms of international law, wherever applicable, in these scenarios. 
Particular attention will be paid to the practical difficulties faced by the receiving State. 
The controversy arising from the third scenario will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
5.1 Controversies Between the Principle of Diplomatic Inviolability 
and the Protection of the National Security of the Receiving State 
The first scenario in which controversies will arise is when the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability clashes with the protection of the national security of the receiving State. 
This scenario is perhaps the most politically sensitive one from the perspective of the 
receiving State. This section will examine the concept of ‘national security’ in 
international law first, and then analyse various situations when the protection of 
national security of the receiving State conflicts with the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability. Furthermore, relevant international law norms, especially the right to self-
defence and ‘necessity’, will also be discussed. 
5.1.1 ‘National Security’ in international law 
The term ‘national security’ is derived from ‘security’, an important term in the subject 
of international relations.
2
 In fact, it has been noted by international relations scholars 
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 A MacDonald and Hanna Brollowski, ‘Security’ in R Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2012) vol IX, 72, para 2. ‘Security’ has been loosely referred to 
‘a condition of being or feeling secure, that is, safe from harm, danger, anxiety, or apprehension, and the 
measures necessary to ensure such safety or peace of mind.’ See also ‘Security’ in G Evans and J 
Newnham, The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations (Penguin 1998) 490; N Klein, Maritime 
Security and the Law of the Sea (OUP 2012) 4-6. 
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that no single definition of ‘security’ exists, and its meaning often changes depending 
on the context in which it is used.
3
 This is the same with regard to the concept of 
‘national security’, which can be loosely defined as ‘the security interest of discrete 
States’.4 Some scholars also recognise ‘national security’ as the synonym of ‘national 
interest’, another ambiguous but rubric term in international relations.5 Nevertheless, the 
concept of ‘national security’ (or simply ‘security’) is still essential to State-centred 
international law, since ‘safeguarding national security is arguably the primary political 
interest of all States’.6 
As a matter of fact, the term ‘national security’ has frequently been mentioned in 
various international documents, though all of these documents fail to provide a clear 
definition of the term.
7
 For instance, Article 19 of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea 1982 
8
 mentions that the right of innocent passage through the territorial 
sea should not prejudice the security of the costal State. Here the term ‘security’ can be 
properly construed as containing the specific meaning of ‘national security’.9 Notably, 
Article 19.2 of the UNCLOS further lists several activities which can be deemed as 
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 MacDonald and Brollowski (n 2) para 2. 
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 Ibid. See also KA Mingst, Essentials of International Relations (4th edn, Norton 2008) 244;  
5
 DA Lake, ‘The State and International Relations’ in C Reus-Smit and D Snidal (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of International Relations (OUP 2010) 46. See also ‘Vital Interest’ in GR Berridge and L 
Lloyd, The Palgrave Macmillan Dictionary of Diplomacy (3rd edn, Palgrave Macmillan 2012) 387; 
‘National Interest’ in Evans and Newnham (n 2) 344-346. 
6
 MacDonald and Brollowski (n 2) para 3. 
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 The term ‘national security’ is also frequently mentioned in domestic law and policy documents. For 
example, see ‘The National Security Strategy of the United States of America’ (The White House 2002). 
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 1833 UNTS 3. Adopted 10 December 1982, entry into force 16 November 1994. Hereafter referred to as 
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 This article is based on Article 14 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone 
1958 (516 UNTS 205, adopted 29 April 1958, entry into force 10 September 1964). See also WM 
Reisman, ‘The Regime of Straits and National Security: An Appraisal of International Law Making’ 
(1980) 74 AJIL 48, 54, 65, 76. 
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‘prejudicial’ to the security of the coastal State, such as the threat or use of force, and 
spying. Such activities can be identified as prejudicial to the national security of a State. 
The relevance of these activities to the protection of national security in controversial 
situations will be further analysed later in this section.   
5.1.2 Controversial situations involving the principle of diplomatic inviolability 
and the protection of national security of the receiving State 
The necessity to protect national security and its relevance to the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability often attracts scholastic concerns for the reason that the VCDR does not 
provide any express provision on the exception to the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability.
10
 Thus, it is not surprising that controversies often arise in situations when 
the protection of the national security is claimed by the receiving State as a valid reason 
to challenge the inviolability enjoyed by the sending State. Here three categories of 
controversial situations should be noted.  
a) Inviolability of mission premises and the protection of national security 
The first category of controversial situations regarding the conflict between the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability and the protection of national security of the 
receiving State involves the protection of national security of the receiving State against 
the abuse of the inviolability of the premises of the diplomatic mission. Indeed, the 
inviolability conferred on the mission premises suggests that the diplomatic mission is 
at liberty to carry out any sort of activities within mission premises.
11
 State practice 
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It is noteworthy that neither did the ILC’s Draft Articles on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities 
1958 provide any exception to the principle of diplomatic inviolability. See ‘Draft Articles on Diplomatic 
Intercourse and Immunities’, YILC [1958] vol II, 89, 95, 97. See also EL Kerley, ‘Some Aspects of the 
Vienna Conference on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities’ (1962) 56 AJIL 88, 102-103; G Tunkin, 
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 Just as Wicquefort had commented, ‘[T]he ambassador ought to enjoy in his house so great a liberty 
that nobody can there control his actions’. See A de Wicquefort, The Embassador and His Functions 
(first published 1681, J Digby tr, University of Leicester Press 1997) 266. See also M Hardy, Modern 
Diplomatic Law (Manchester University Press 1968) 42. 
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reveals that, thanks to the absolute inviolability of mission premises stipulated in Article 
22 of the VCDR, the diplomatic mission can occasionally make use of its inviolability 
to cover activities that can be deemed as ‘prejudicial to the national security’ of the 
receiving State. Arguably, such activities may include but not be limited to: espionage, 
granting asylum to anti-government activists, aiding anti-government activists or groups 
as well as other kinds of direct or indirect subversive activities.  
As was pointed out in Chapter 3, Article 41.3 of the VCDR expressly stipulates the 
obligation of the diplomatic mission not to use the mission premises in any way 
incompatible with its proper functions.
12
 According to that provision: 
The premises of the mission must not be used in any manner incompatible with the 
functions of the mission as laid down in the present Convention or by other rules of 
general international law or by any special agreements in force between the 
sending and the receiving State.
13
 
Undoubtedly, the abovementioned activities are outside the five proper functions of the 
diplomatic mission under Article 3 of the VCDR. In essence, these activities are flagrant 
abuses of the inviolability of the mission premises. With regard to these activities, 
Denza has incisively commented as follows: 
To take the extreme case, the members of the diplomatic mission may not use the 
premises to plot the removal or the destabilization of the government or the 
political system of the receiving State.
14
 
It is also worth noting that the use of the diplomatic mission as a place to plot the 
removal or the destabilisation of the government of the receiving State may also amount 
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 See Chapter 3, section 3.1.1 (b).  
13
 Article 41.3 of the VCDR. 
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 E Denza, Diplomatic Law: Commentary on the Vienna Convention on the Diplomatic Relations (3rd 
edn, OUP 2008) 470. 
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to unlawful intervention, which is contrary to the principle of territorial integrity and 
political independence stated in Article 2.4 of the UN Charter, as well as customary 
international law.
15
 
One infamous incident can be served as a vivid illustration of how such kind of abusive 
activity of the diplomatic mission ultimately gives rise to a clash between the necessity 
of protecting the national security of the receiving State and securing the inviolability of 
the mission premises. On 10 February 1973, huge amount of ammunition and guerrilla 
warfare training equipment were found in the Iraqi embassy in Islamabad, after the 
forcible entry into the embassy by the Pakistan special police forces.
16
 Before the actual 
entry into the Iraqi embassy, the Iraqi ambassador Hikmat Sulaiman had refused the 
request for entry from the Pakistani authorities. However, even without securing the 
consent of the ambassador, the Pakistani authorities proceeded to the forcible entry of 
the embassy premises, on the grounds that ‘their concern for national security overrode 
all considerations of diplomatic immunity’.17 
It is true that the activities of providing weapons for the anti-government groups was an 
abuse of the inviolability of mission premises and was undoubtedly incompatible with 
normal diplomatic functions. It is also true that the forcible entry into the mission 
premises without the consent of the ambassador constituted a breach of the inviolability 
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 Article 2.4 of the UN Charter provides that all member States of the UN shall refrain from the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of another State. See also 
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of the mission premises. The issue is, when the receiving State faces such kind of 
blatant abuse and a direct threat to its national security, whether it is entitled to invoke 
the protection of its national security as a valid excuse to override the inviolability of 
the mission premises, as the Pakistani authorities claimed in the above incident? Or 
must the local authorities stay silent and wait until the weapons are dispatched outside 
of the embassy premises? 
Whereas espionage activities and aiding anti-government activists can be deemed as 
direct threat to the national security of the receiving State, another typical situation, 
which can be deemed as an indirect threat to the national security of the receiving State, 
is also worth noting. This is the situation related to so-called diplomatic asylum. Indeed, 
it is not uncommon that the absolute inviolability of mission premises naturally makes 
the embassy a perfect haven for criminals to seek asylum, especially those fugitives 
who urgently need a place to hide after a failed coup d’etat. Like espionage, the grant of 
diplomatic asylum to anti-government activists can be deemed by the receiving State as 
potentially prejudicial to its national security. Thus, the receiving State faces the issue 
of whether it is entitled to override the inviolability of the mission premises when it 
finds it essential to capture the anti-government fugitive hiding inside the mission 
premises. 
The right of diplomatic asylum has yet to be generally accepted as a customary rule in 
contemporary international law.
18
Accordingly, if a diplomatic mission provides asylum 
to an anti-government activist, the asylum may be deemed as outside the proper 
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 P Shah, ‘Asylum, Diplomatic’ in R Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2012) vol I, 713, para 5 and 10. See also CN Ronning, Diplomatic 
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function of the diplomatic mission and the mission runs the risk of intervening the 
internal affairs of the receiving State.
19
 Just as the ICJ pointed out in the Asylum Case: 
A decision to grant diplomatic asylum involves a derogation from the sovereignty 
of that State. It withdraws the offender from the jurisdiction of the territorial State 
and constitutes an intervention in matters which are exclusively within the 
competence of that State.
20
 
Article 41.3 of the VCDR refers to ‘special agreements in force between the sending 
and the receiving State’. This phrase may be of particular value with regard to the issue 
of granting diplomatic asylum to anti-government activists in the mission premises. It is 
generally agreed that the right of diplomatic asylum has been recognised among Latin 
American countries and so, diplomatic missions of certain Latin American countries 
may grant diplomatic asylum to those anti-government activists without the challenge 
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 Denza (n 14) 141. See also AP Rubin, ‘Diplomatic Asylum and Fang Lizhi’ (1990) 1 Diplomacy and 
Statecraft 84, 85.  
20
 Asylum Case (Columbia v Peru) [1950] ICJ Rep 266, 274-275.  
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from the receiving State.
21
 Special bilateral or multilateral agreements concluded 
between certain States may also establish the right of diplomatic asylum.
22
 
The above two situations reveal the controversies as well as dilemmas faced by the 
receiving State. With regard to these issues, international law scholars have different 
opinions. For instance, Denza concludes that abusive activity inside the mission 
premises which amount to the breach of the duty imposed by Article 41.3 of the VCDR 
is ‘not in itself sufficient to entitle the receiving State to take measures contrary to the 
inviolability of the mission premises’.23 Nevertheless, it is worth noting that by saying 
‘not in itself sufficient’, she suggests that other factors should also be taken into account. 
In fact, Denza argues that the right of self-defence can be invoked as a valid excuse to 
override the inviolability of mission premises.
24
 Hardy also worries that national 
security might be invoked by the receiving State as an excuse to override the 
inviolability of mission premises. He contends that such unilateral power of 
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 Though, in the Asylum Case, the ICJ did not recognise Columbia had the right of asylum in this specific 
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determination will greatly undermine the inviolability of mission premises.
25
 In the 
Tehran Hostages Case, the ICJ also refuted Iran’s claim that the US embassy had been 
used as a centre of espionage and the claim that interference in Iranian internal affairs 
was a justification of the attack on the US embassy.
26
 On the other hand, Vattel had 
asserted that the receiving State should not be deterred by the inviolability of mission 
premises if such inviolability may cause ‘injury and ruin of the State’.27  Similarly, 
scholars such as Cahier also cast doubt on whether the stipulation of the absolute 
inviolability of the mission premises is a wise decision in the case of a grave threat to 
the security of the receiving State.
28
 The evaluation of these divergent opinions and the 
feasibility of some of the solutions will be presented in Chapter 7.  
b) Inviolability of diplomatic agents and the protection of the national security of 
the receiving State 
The second category involves the protection of national security of the receiving State 
against the abuse of the inviolability of the diplomatic agents. As the development of 
diplomatic law witnessed, the involvement of diplomatic agents in activities that 
potentially threaten the national security of the receiving State is by no means a recent 
phenomenon. Whenever a diplomatic agent is involved in a conspiracy against the 
sovereign of the receiving State or commits espionage, the limit to his personal 
inviolability will be at issue. Some famous cases during the Renaissance and Classical 
Periods, such as the Leslie Case and the Mendosa Case,
29
 the Gyllenburg incident and 
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the Cellamare incident
30
all attracted international law scholars to present their 
remarkable opinions on this kind of issues. For instance, Gentili argued that an 
ambassador who is a spy and a traitor should not be punished (especially not be put to 
death) but only be expelled as long as the criminal act (spying, conspiracy against the 
sovereign) has not been actually proceeded.
31
 It seems that Gentili’s proposal is akin to 
the modern power to declare a diplomatic agent persona non grata under Article 9 of 
the VCDR. On the other hand, Hotman argued that an ambassador could be detained for 
conspiracy against the sovereign of the receiving State.
32
 For Grotius, in line with the 
view of Gentilis, an ambassador in this situation ought to be sent back to the sending 
sovereign, but Grotius also asserted that the ambassador can be detained and questioned 
and even be put into death for the reason of self-defence of the receiving State.
33
 With 
regard to the same issue, Vattel also agreed that an ambassador who  has plotted an 
intrigue against the receiving State or committed a serious offence against the sovereign 
of the receiving State can be expelled based on the right of self-defence of the receiving 
State.
34
 Vattel also maintained that if an ambassador seriously endangers the national 
security of the receiving State by acting as an enemy to the State, he can be repressed by 
force.
35
 For the same reason, an ambassador is also subject to arrest if the situation 
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requires.
36
 Like Grotius, Vattel also cited historical cases to maintain that a diplomat 
may also be put into death if necessity requires so.
37
 
In more modern time, the issue of personal inviolability of a diplomatic agent was 
discussed during the draft process of the law of diplomatic intercourse and immunities 
by the League of Nations. The rapporteur, Mr Diena mentioned the possible situation 
that the personal inviolability of a diplomat agent may not be invoked in case of 
‘reprehensible acts committed by him compelling the State to which he is accredited to 
take defensive and precautionary measures’.38 He admitted that this situation might give 
rise to controversy. 
The same issue was once again debated by the International Law Commission. In 
relation to the final Draft Articles of 1958, the ILC Commentary mentioned that 
personal inviolability ‘does not exclude in respect of the diplomatic agent either 
measures of self-defence or, in exceptional circumstances, measures to prevent him 
from committing crimes or offences’.39 However, during the Vienna Conference the 
proposal by China to include the above proviso to the personal inviolability was rejected. 
As a result, the text of Article 29 of the VCDR does not expressly specify any exception 
to the personal inviolability of a diplomatic agent.
40
 That said, the question remains as 
to whether Article 29 infers the right of self-defence of the receiving State if its national 
security is endangered by conspiracy or similar activities by the diplomatic agent. Based 
                                                 
 
36
 Ibid 381. 
37
 Ibid 382. 
38
 ‘Codification of the International Law Relating to Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities, 
Memorandum prepared by the Secretariat’ in YILC [1956] vol II, 137. The origin of this sentence can be 
found in Article 6 of the Cambridge Draft of the Institute of International Law on Diplomatic Privileges 
and Immunities. 
39
 ‘Draft Articles on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities’, YILC [1958] vol II, 97. 
40
 Denza (n 14) 258. 
 176 
 
on the draft material the answer seems to be affirmative, but such a construction is not 
free from controversy. Contemporary scholars have different opinions toward this issue. 
On one hand, there are scholars who propose a conditional inviolability when the 
national security of the receiving State is threatened. For instance, Jennings and Watts 
followed Vattel’s doctrine and argued that a diplomatic agent who conspires against the 
receiving State may be arrested, though they recognised that Article 29 of the VCDR 
does not refer to such an exception.
41
 Chatterjee also agrees that the personal 
inviolability of an diplomatic agent can be compromised if the receiving State finds it 
necessary to restrain him if he conspires against the receiving State.
42
 On the other hand, 
Hardy does not recognise any exception to the personal inviolability of the diplomatic 
agent.
43
 With regard to the actual State practice, Denza incisively points out that: 
in the twentieth century there appears to be no instance where a receiving 
sovereign relied on self-defence to take measures stronger than expulsion against a 
diplomat discovered to be actively conspiring against him.
44
 
Thus, whether the personal inviolability of a diplomatic agent can be overridden by the 
necessity to protect national security of the receiving State remain unclear. It is also 
unclear whether customary international law has ever established specific rules on this 
issue.
45
 
c) Inviolability of diplomatic bag and the protection of the national security of the 
receiving State 
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Finally, the third category involves the protection of the national security of the 
receiving State against the abuse of the inviolability of the diplomatic property. It seems 
that the major controversy in this context relates to the inviolability of the diplomatic 
bag, due to the very fact that the inviolable status of the diplomatic bag tends to be 
abused by the sending State more frequently than any other kind of diplomatic 
property.
46
 It is recognised that the nature of the diplomatic bag provides an ideal and 
convenient way for the sending State to transport or even smuggle weaponry and other 
contraband into the receiving State. Admittedly, the weapons may be acquired by local 
anti-government groups to against the government of the receiving State. The 
aforementioned 1973 Iraqi embassy in Islamabad incident is a vivid illustration of this 
kind of issue. The great number of weapons found in the Iraqi embassy were alleged to 
be smuggled into Pakistan by the Iraqi diplomatic mission itself, probably using 
diplomatic bags.
 47
 
It should be noted that in customary international law the inviolable status of the 
diplomatic bag is slightly different from its inviolability as provided in Article 27.3 of 
the VCDR. In fact, before the adoption of the VCDR, State practice revealed that the 
receiving State could challenge the content of the diplomatic bag and ask the suspected 
bag to be returned back to the sending State (the ‘challenge and return’ option).48 
However, the discussion during the draft process in the ILC and the Vienna Conference 
resulted in the adoption of the absolute inviolability of the diplomatic bag, since it was 
believed that ‘the value of the diplomatic bag as a means of free communication for the 
sending State would be greatly diminished, if not destroyed’, if the inviolability of the 
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diplomatic bag were to be conditional. 
49
 Following the adoption of the VCDR, the 
increasing abuse of diplomatic bags caught international attention. For instance, the UK 
Foreign Affairs Committee’s Report commented on the vital issue of whether electronic 
scanning of diplomatic bags was permitted under Article 27.3 of the VCDR: 
The Government, while acknowledging that some other countries disagree, now 
inclines to the view that scanning is not unlawful under the Convention, which 
requires only that the bag be not ‘opened or detained’ and does not accord 
inviolability in full. It can thus be argued that scanning or other remote 
examination by equipment or dogs would be compatible with Article 27.
50
 
Such an assertion is based on the assumption that electronic scanning cannot actually 
reveal the content of the diplomatic bag. However, it is conceivable that with the 
gradual development of technology, the content of the diplomatic bag may in the future 
be compromised by way of electronic scanning.
51
 Undoubtedly, electronic scanning that 
can reveal the content of a diplomatic bag is ‘not compatible with the basic purpose of 
Article 27’52 even though it does not directly contravene the wording of ‘shall not be 
opened or detained’. In the late 1980s, the ILC sought to clarify the issue of electronic 
scanning of diplomatic bag in a new draft convention on the status of the diplomatic bag. 
In its Draft Articles on the Status of the Diplomatic Courier and the Diplomatic Bag not 
Accompanied by Diplomatic Courier 1989, Draft Article 28.1 specified the extent of the 
inviolability of diplomatic bag as follows: 
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The diplomatic bag…shall be exempt from examination directly or through 
electronic or other technical devices. 
This stipulation is quite significant for the following two reasons. First, it is obvious that 
a diplomatic bag which contains weapons will inevitably be revealed through electronic 
scanning by the authorities of the receiving State. The prohibition of the electronic 
scanning will therefore ensure the full inviolability of the diplomatic bag, which is in 
accord with Article 27.3 of the VCDR. In fact, through Article 28.1 of the Draft Articles 
1989 the inviolable status of the diplomatic bag would have been further enhanced. 
Secondly, the prohibition of electronic scanning of the diplomatic bag also reflects the 
general reluctance of the receiving State to adopt such a measure to challenge the 
content of the diplomatic bag. Denza points out that the reluctance reflects the fear of 
the receiving State that its own diplomatic bags will be vulnerable to ‘generalised and 
indiscriminate challenge’.53 Moreover, the commentary to the Draft Articles 1989 noted 
that: 
The view prevailed in the Commission that the inclusion of this phrase was 
necessary as the evolution of technology had created very sophisticated means of 
examination which might result in the violation of the confidentiality of the bag, 
means which furthermore were at the disposal of only the most developed States.
54
 
From the above facts, it can be revealed that the inviolability of the diplomatic bag shall 
generally not be challenged. However, the reality is that the 1989 Draft Articles failed to 
become an international convention and therefore the significant stipulation of Article 
28.1 does not have binding force at all.  
One final issue which is worth noting is: if the receiving State manages to secure strong 
evidence that the diplomatic bag contains weapons which may intend to be used by anti-
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government groups, are these authorities entitled to override the inviolability of the 
diplomatic bag, just as the security forces of Pakistan did in 1973? The only plausible 
reason to justify the compromise of the inviolability of the diplomatic bag so as to 
protect the national security of the receiving State is the right of self-defence. Whether 
the right of self-defence is applicable in this situation will be discussed later in this 
chapter. 
5.2 Controversies between the Principle of Diplomatic Inviolability and 
the Protection of Public Safety and Human Life in an Emergency 
Even though the protection of national security may be the very first concern of the 
receiving State, it is perhaps the necessity to protect public safety and human life under 
emergency situations against the principle of inviolability that more frequently puts the 
authorities of the receiving State in dilemma. Whereas the controversies arising in 
respect of the necessity to protect national security against the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability involves the possible abuse of the inviolability by the sending State, in the 
case of emergency situations when the necessity to protect public safety and human life 
are confronted with the principle of diplomatic inviolability, both abuse and non-abuse 
of the inviolability will give rise to the controversy. Hence, this kind of situation is more 
complicated than the necessity to protect national security.  
5.2.1 The relevance of the necessity to protect public safety and human life to 
the principle of diplomatic inviolability 
Although there is no exact definition of ‘public safety’ in international law, the notion 
has been linked with emergency situations and it is also closely linked to the necessity 
to protect human life. It is understandable that most emergency situations involve a 
threat to public safety and may also involve the threat to human life. And so, the 
necessity to protect public safety and human life can be treated as one integral situation 
and discussed together. Notably, in the ILC’s original Draft Articles on Diplomatic 
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Intercourse and Immunities, the special rapporteur Sandström had mentioned ‘…an 
extreme emergency, in order to eliminate a grave and imminent danger to human life, 
public health or property…’ 55  It is also worth noting that public safety can be 
endangered by man-made acts and acts of nature, that is, force majeure. For instance, 
the Commentary to the Harvard Draft Convention mentioned ‘acts of God and force 
majeure’.56 Whatever the exact meaning of public safety, this concept is important to 
the application of the principle of diplomatic inviolability. In fact, from time to time, the 
necessity to protect public safety and human life has been proposed as typical 
exceptions to the principle of diplomatic inviolability.
57
 During the Vienna Conference, 
the representatives from Mexico proposed that ‘the head of mission shall cooperate with 
local authorities in case of fire, epidemic or other emergency.’58 Though the Mexican 
proposal does not expressly mention the term ‘exception’, it can be inferred that this 
proposal requires the diplomatic mission to concede its inviolability under such 
situations, at least through cooperation. Another proposal was jointly proposed by 
Ireland and Japan, which suggested that the inviolability of mission premises shall not 
prevent the receiving State from ‘taking measures essential for the protection of life and 
property in exceptional circumstances of public emergency and danger’. 59  These 
proposals, however, were later withdrawn by their proposers.
60
 And so, Article 22 of the 
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VCDR does not specify any exception to the inviolability of mission premises under 
emergency situations. Likewise, Article 27.3 does not expressly provide exceptions to 
the inviolability of diplomatic bags, and Article 29 does not expressly mention any 
exception to the personal inviolability of diplomatic agents. 
5.2.2 Controversial situations involving the principle of diplomatic inviolability 
and the protection of public safety and human life 
Since there is no express stipulation in the VCDR that specifies any exception to the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability under public emergency, it is conceivable that when 
the receiving State is under an emergency situation of protecting public safety and 
human life, it will have to make a judgment on whether the relevant inviolability should 
be overridden. The following sections will analyse several typical situations. 
a) The inviolability of mission premises and the protection of public safety and 
human life 
With regard to the controversy arising in relation to the inviolability of mission 
premises and the protection of public safety and human life, two distinct kinds of 
emergency situations should be noted. The first kind of emergency situations involves 
emergency caused by force majeure, such as fire, flood, earthquake, epidemic, and 
similar situations. Obviously these situations have no connection to the abuse of the 
inviolability of the mission premises. The second kind of emergency situation involves 
situations caused by the abuse of the inviolability of mission premises, such as ongoing 
violence committed inside the mission premises. These two different kinds of situations 
should be discussed separately. 
(i) Emergency situations caused by force majeure 
Concerning the various emergency situations caused by force majeure, it should first be 
noted that the strict observance of Article 22 of the VCDR requires officials of the 
receiving State to refrain from entering the mission premises without the consent of the 
head of the mission, even in emergency when public safety and human life are in great 
danger. The first controversial issue with regard to the strict application of Article 22 is 
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the interpretation of the word ‘consent’. Since Article 22 does not specify whether the 
consent can be deemed as including tacit or presumed consent, it may be argued by the 
receiving State that under a serious emergency situation such as a fierce fire, their 
officials are entitled enter the mission premises to extinguish the fire so as to prevent 
further threat to public safety and human life. However, Nahlik contends that such a 
wide construction of the word ‘consent’ in Article 22 would inevitably encourage the 
authorities of the receiving State ‘to presume the occurrence of such an exceptional 
situation’. 61 Hardy also presented a similar argument.62 Nevertheless, the denial of the 
presumed consent may inevitably lead to another controversial issue: if the head of the 
mission is somehow not able to be contacted, what could the authorities of the receiving 
State do? Just as Sen pointed out: 
In such an emergency, it may be necessary to take immediate action, and if the 
envoy cannot be contacted with a view to obtaining his permission, much damage 
and even loss of human life may be caused.
63
 
It is highly possible that during emergency situations such as a fierce fire and 
catastrophic earthquake, the communication facilities inside the mission premises are 
damaged, or the head of the mission himself is wounded. In this case, it is unclear 
whether the authorities of the receiving State should be allowed to enter into the mission 
premises to save human life including the life of the head of the mission?  
Last but not least, if the head of the mission refuses to give consent to entry, what can 
the authorities do? Should they do nothing and bear the disastrous consequences or 
should they enter into the mission premises to take action to protect public safety and 
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human life? Notably, it has been asserted in the Harvard Draft Convention that in the 
emergency situation of fire, ‘it would be absurd to wait for the consent of a chief of 
mission in order to obtain entry upon the premises’.64 Silva also commented that: 
In these cases it would be absurd to wait for the consent of the head of mission and 
the possibility of a refusal would still be more absurd.
65
 
With regard to these controversies, several cases are worth mentioning. The first four of 
these involved fires in the relevant diplomatic mission. The first case involved a fire 
inside the Soviet embassy in Ottawa on 1 January 1956. According to the description of 
the incident, the Soviet diplomatic staff attempted to put out the fire themselves even 
though the Canadian firemen were ready just outside the embassy. It is reported that it 
was only after tense negotiations with the Soviet ambassador that the firemen were 
allowed to enter the mission premises and do their job. When the fire was finally put out 
after six hours, the embassy building had already been destroyed by the fire.
66
 The 
second case happened in the US embassy in Moscow on 28 March 1991. In this case, it 
is reported that four KGB (Soviet security agency) officers posed as firefighters and 
successfully ‘pulled out secure telephones and communications equipment as well as 
passports and personnel effects of embassy personnel’.67 The third case also happened 
in the US embassy in Moscow in October 2000. This time the US mission staff 
managed to extinguish the fire ‘without help from dozens of firefighters left waiting 
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outside the building’.68  The fourth case happened in the Israeli embassy in Paris on 23 
May 2002. It is reported that the Israeli embassy guards ‘immediately alerted’ the local 
authorities and the French firefighters rushed to the scene within minutes.
69
 The fifth 
case involved the catastrophic earthquake happened in Haiti in January 2010. In this 
case, the Taiwanese ambassador himself was seriously injured during the earthquake 
and the local rescue team entered into the embassy to carry out the rescue.
70
  
From the above five cases it can be seen that State practice varies on different occasions. 
It can also be seen that use of presumed consent from the head of mission may lead to 
the compromise of classified mission archives or other sensitive items. That is why in 
some cases, embassy staff refused the help from the local authorities in spite of the 
disastrous situation. Furthermore, as Sen points out, presumed consent may also lead to 
unexpected consequence. For example, the authorities of the receiving State may 
deliberately create an emergency fire by throwing an incendiary bomb.
71
 Thus, as has 
already been pointed out, the strict application of Article 22 of the VCDR requires that 
even under emergency situations, express consent from the head of the mission should 
always be secured. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the issue of the possibility of presumed consent from the 
head of mission in emergency situations has been expressly stipulated in other 
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international conventions. For instance, Article 31.2 of the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations 1963
72
 provides that: 
The consent of the head of the consular post may, however, be assumed in case of 
fire or other disaster requiring prompt protective action. 
 Likewise, the Convention on Special Missions 1969
73
 further elaborates the same issue. 
According to Article 25.1: 
Such consent may be assumed in case of fire or other disaster that seriously 
endangers public safety, and only in the event that it has not been possible to obtain 
the express consent of the head of the special mission or, where appropriate, of the 
head of the permanent mission. 
Whether the provisions in the VCCR and the Convention on Special Missions provide a 
solution to the controversies in Article 22 of the VCDR is debatable. It must be 
emphasized that the nature of the inviolability of consular premises and special missions 
are different. The solution to the controversies that arise in the inviolability of mission 
premises will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
(ii) Emergency situations caused by abuse of the mission premise 
Concerning emergency situations caused by abuse of the mission premises, one 
remarkable case worth noting is the fatal shooting of policewoman Fletcher in St 
James’s Square in London on 17 April 1984. On that day, Fletcher was on duty in St 
James’s Square to maintain order during a peaceful demonstration outside the Libyan 
People’s Bureau (viz, the Libyan embassy). She was killed ‘by shots of automatic 
gunfire from a window’ of the Libyan mission premises.74 Subsequently the Libyan 
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diplomatic mission refused entry of the British police to carry out a search and 
commence an investigation. The incident was discussed in the UK Foreign Affairs 
Committee several months later. Particularly, the controversy about whether the 
inviolability of mission premises can be overridden in emergency situations caused by 
abuse of the mission premises when public safety and human life are in great danger 
was discussed. The report drafted by the Committee quoted the argument in Hardy’s 
Modern Diplomatic Law in which a similar scenario was depicted: 
[I]t would be a manifest abuse, and indeed an instance of outright foolishness, if, in 
the event of…a man shooting with a rifle from the window of a mission, the local 
authorities were not able to go in and deal with the matter.
75
 
However, for similar reasons to those discussed in the emergency situation caused by 
force majeure, Hardy concluded that: 
[E]ven if a mission fails to use its premises in accordance with legitimate purpose, 
its inviolability must still be respected by the receiving State.
76
 
Sir Francis Vallat agreed with Hardy, and he recalled a similar discussion during the 
Vienna Conference, which concluded that: 
[I]t was considered that in the interests of international relations there should really 
be a protection of embassies, an inviolability of premises, without exception. One 
of the fears was if specific exceptions were made in the Convention this would give 
a certain power of appreciation to the receiving State which it was thought might 
lead to trouble and be undesirable.
77
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The report also commented on another controversy: whether the right of self-defence 
can be invoked against the inviolability of the mission premises in emergency situations 
when public safety and human life are in great danger. The report examined various 
opinions from scholars and concluded that the right to self-defence ‘could not have 
acted as a lawful basis for the forcible entry of the Bureau premises’.78 The conclusion 
of the UK Foreign Affairs Committee was later endorsed by the UK Government’s 
White Paper.
79
 Nevertheless, the official conclusion of the UK government was not free 
from controversy. For instance, Mann argued that:  
[T]he inviolability of mission’s premises is by no means absolute, but must give 
way if the mission has allowed such danger to arise in its premises as to provoke 
the receiving State and take measures reasonably necessary to protect the security 
of the life and property of the inhabitants. … It is therefore impossible to agree 
with the conclusions of the House of Commons Committee, accepted in paragraph 
83 of the Government White Paper.
80
  
Also, it is worth mentioning the opinion of Denza. Although she admits that the 
inviolability of mission premises shall not be overridden due to abuse, she 
acknowledges the justification of the invocation of the right of self-defence as the last 
result to protect human life.
81
 Evidently, some other scholars agree with Denza on this 
issue.
82
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The controversy of the applicability of the right of self-defence will be analysed later in 
this chapter. 
b) The inviolability of diplomatic agent and the protection of public safety and 
human life 
While the inviolability of mission premises is controversial under emergency situations 
caused both by force majeure and by abuse of the inviolability, it is recognisable that 
the controversy involving the inviolability of diplomatic agents are mainly connected to 
the emergency situations caused by abuse. The conduct of diplomatic agents, together 
with member of their family who enjoy the same degree of inviolability under the 
VCDR, occasionally gives rise to conflict between the inviolability and the necessity to 
protect public safety and human life. For instance, when the diplomatic agent is drunk-
driving, can he be stopped and arrested by the police?
83
 Or when a diplomatic agent 
loses control and assaults someone, can the police use force to suppress him on the spot 
and arrest him?
84
 
As it has been discussed earlier, Article 29 of the VCDR does not expressly mention 
any exception to the personal inviolability of the diplomatic agent. Indeed, Article 41.1 
of the Convention states that the duty of the diplomatic agents to respect the laws and 
regulations of the receiving State is ‘without prejudice to their privileges and 
immunities’. Thus, the major controversy unsurprisingly lies in whether the personal 
inviolability of the diplomatic agent can be overwhelmed when the diplomatic agent is 
undertaking an act which is deemed threatening to public safety or human life.  
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To begin with, it is worth noting that many classical writers discussed the same issue 
hundreds years ago. They mostly focused on invocation of the right of self-defence, 
which is deemed as self-evident in the traditional doctrine of the natural law.  For 
example, Grotius pointed out the possibility of overwhelming the inviolability of the 
diplomatic agent based on ‘natural defence’. He argued: 
[A]ll human laws have been so adjusted that in case of dire necessity they are not 
binding; and so the same rule will hold in regard to the law of the inviolability of 
ambassadors. … Therefore that an immediately threatening peril may be met, if 
there is no other proper recourse, ambassadors can be detained and questioned.
85
  
Indeed, considering the criteria mentioned above, it can be seen that the criteria of 
‘natural defence’ pointed out by Grotius are similar to the concept of self-defence in 
contemporary international law. Bynkershoek agreed with the opinion of Grotius. He 
commented that: 
[W]hether an ambassador who initiates violence cannot be repelled with 
violence…whether he acts…privately by assaulting or killing our citizens or 
something of the sort. Whosoever uses force, him it has always been permissible to 
repel by force, nor is there any exception in the case of ambassadors.
86
 
Wicquefort also presented a similar opinion in favour of the natural right of ‘necessary 
defence’: 
It is moreover certain that the ambassador is not inviolable when he commits a 
violence, because in that case the Law of Nature is preferable to the Law of Nations: 
though even then care should be taken to keep within the bounds of a lawful and 
necessary defence; that is to say, rather to oppose such violence than offer any.
87
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Vattel, based on his reasoning from the law of nature, apparently agreed with the above 
arguments.
88
 To sum up, it is quite obvious that the classical writers all agreed that it is 
necessary for the receiving State to overwhelm the personal inviolability of the 
diplomatic agent if his conduct is deemed as threatening the public safety and human 
life. 
As has already been pointed out, in the Commentary to the Draft Articles produced by 
the ILC, it was mentioned that the personal inviolability of the diplomatic agent ‘does 
not exclude in respect of the diplomatic agent either measures of self-defence or, in 
exceptional circumstances, measures to prevent him from committing crimes or 
offences’.89 During the Vienna Conference, the Chinese delegate once again proposed 
to include this sentence into the provision of personal inviolability of diplomatic agents. 
However, the proposal was later rejected without further discussion.
90
 Nevertheless, it is 
worth noting that the International Court of Justice acknowledges the possibility of the 
exception to the general rule of the inviolability of the diplomatic agent: 
Naturally, the observance of this principle does not mean … that a diplomatic agent 
caught in the act of committing an assault or other offence may not, on occasion, 
be briefly arrested by the police of the receiving State in order to prevent the 
commission of the particular crime.
91
 
To what extent do the above mentioned opinion and the statement of the ICJ reflect 
customary international law? Does customary international law does recognise the right 
of the receiving State to overwhelm the personal inviolability of the diplomatic agent in 
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emergency situations when public safety and human life are threatened by the conduct 
of the diplomatic agent? State practice reveals inconsistency with regard to this issue. 
For instance, the official opinion of the UK holds that ‘it is not correct that when a 
diplomat violates this duty [under Article 41 of the VCDR] he loses his immunity’,92 
while the Canadian practice makes clear that the personal inviolability of the diplomatic 
agent can be temporarily compromised.
93
 Notably, the German practice seems to be 
ambiguous and inconsistent.
94
 Also, scholars are divided into those who propose a 
limited inviolability
95
 and those who have concerns about the possible prejudice of such 
an approach to the question of inviolability.
96
 Therefore, it seems that the controversy of 
whether the personal inviolability of the diplomatic agent can be overridden by the 
necessity to protect public safety and human life is not completely settled. 
c) The inviolability of the diplomatic bag and the protection of public safety and 
human life 
Arguably, the controversies that arise from the conflict between the inviolability of the 
diplomatic bag and the necessity to protect public safety and human life is the most 
critical one among all controversies related to the practice of diplomatic inviolability. 
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To begin with, it is worth noting that Article 27.3 of the VCDR (‘the inviolability of the 
diplomatic bag’) is the only provision of all the provisions concerning the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability that has attracted reservations by State parties to the Convention. 
A group of Arabic States, including Bahrain, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and 
Yemen, have made reservations to the absolute inviolability of the diplomatic bag.
97
 
These States tried to stick to the customary international rules of ‘challenge and return’ 
of the diplomatic bag if the inviolability of the diplomatic bag is being abused.
98
 These 
reservations were expressly objected to by several States for the reason that such 
reservations are ‘in clear contravention of the principle of the inviolability of the bag 
established in Article 27’.99 Remarkably, the reservation of Bahrain received a sweeping 
objection from almost all European States.
100
 Nevertheless, the sheer number of the 
reservations and objections reflect that the absolute inviolability of the diplomatic bag is 
perhaps the most controversial issue in the VCDR. 
Evidently, the controversy of the absolute inviolability in emergency situations to 
protect public safety and human life is the thorniest issue faced by the receiving State. 
Several infamous incidents are worth mentioning so as to illustrate this controversy. The 
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type of incident involves abuse of the diplomatic bag in a way that directly or indirectly 
endangers public safety. On 5 April 1986, a bomb was exploded in La Belle discothèque 
in West Berlin, resulting in 3 deaths and leaving over 200 injured. The explosive which 
caused the incident was alleged to have been brought into Germany through a 
diplomatic bag.
101
 In 2012, the authorities in Bangkok found several undetonated bombs 
which it was claimed had been smuggled into Thailand through the diplomatic bag.
102
 It 
is also worth mentioning that the weapon which caused the death of WPC Fletcher on 
17 April 1984 was believed to be brought into the Libyan People’s Bureau though the 
diplomatic bag.
103
 In these incidents, the abuse of the diplomatic bag were not disclosed 
when the diplomatic bag passed through Customs in the receiving State. Had the 
authorities of the receiving State obtained convincing evidence, they would have faced 
the dilemma of whether or not to challenge the diplomatic bag. If they did, they would  
have breached the inviolability of the diplomatic bag under Article 27.3 of the VCDR. 
The second kind of incidents involves the abduction of human beings using the 
diplomatic bag. The most notorious example is the Dikko incident.
104
 On 5 July 1984, 
the former Minister of Transportation of Nigeria, Umaru Dikko, was abducted in the 
streets of London. In the afternoon of the same day, two large crates labelled as normal 
cargo were sent to Stansted Airport. British Customs officials at the airport noticed that 
the crates had airholes and they detected a medicinal smell coming from the crates. 
Since the crates were not labelled as diplomatic bag as per Article 27.4 of the VCDR, 
the crates were opened by British officials without objection from the Nigerian 
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diplomats at the scene. Dikko, who had been drugged and blindfolded, was found 
unconscious inside one of the crate.
105
 In this incident, the British officials challenged 
and opened the crates since the crates were not diplomatic bags. However, as Nelson 
points out, if the crate containing Dikko had indeed been properly marked as diplomatic 
bag according to Article 27.4 of the VCDR, the British officials ‘could not have opened 
it without violating the VCDR’.106  
The controversy from the abovementioned incidents is quite obvious: when facing 
manifest abuse of the inviolability of the diplomatic bag and when there is immediate 
emergency threat to public safety and human life, does the necessity to protect public 
safety and human life actually override the inviolability of the diplomatic bag?  
The controversy was discussed in the UK Foreign Affairs Committee’s Report on the 
Abuse of Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges. Mr Ivan Lawrence, a member of the 
Foreign Affairs Committee, noted that: 
[H]ad the crate [in the Dikko affair] constituted a diplomatic bag, took fully into 
account the overriding duty to preserve and protect human life.
107
 
The Foreign Affairs Committee accepted that the inviolability of the diplomatic bag 
cannot take precedence over human life.
108
 A similar conclusion was later endorsed by 
the UK government in its White Paper: 
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[W]here the evidence is good that the contents of a bag might endanger national 
security or the personal safety of the public or of individuals the Government will 
not hesitate to take the necessary action on the basis of the overriding right of self-
defence or the duty to protect human life.
109
 
Apparently, most scholars welcome this conclusion.
110
 
Last but not least, it is worth mentioning that the Draft Articles on the Status of the 
Diplomatic Courier and the Diplomatic Bag not Accompanied by Diplomatic Courier 
1989 keep the absolute inviolability of the diplomatic bag unchanged from Article 27.3 
of the VCDR. The Commentary to the 1989 Draft Articles mentioned that some 
delegates proposed that the absolute status of the inviolability of the diplomatic bag 
should be changed to the conditional inviolability stipulated in Article 35.3 of the 
VCCR.
111
 However, the commentary noted: 
In the end, and after extensive consideration of the problem, the Commission opted 
for the present formulation, which maintains the existing regime as contained in the 
four codification conventions as a compromise solution capable of ensuring better 
prospects of wide adherence by States to the present articles.
112
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Thus, it can be concluded that the issue of whether the absolute inviolability of the 
diplomatic bag can be overwhelmed by the necessity to protect public safety and human 
life remains not completely free from controversy. 
5.3 The Right of Self-defence Against the Principle of Diplomatic 
Inviolability and the Dilemma Faced by the Receiving State 
It can be seen from the above discussion that many international law scholars as well as 
State practice suggests that the absolute inviolability of diplomatic premises, diplomatic 
agents and diplomatic bags can be subjected to certain limits, especially when the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability conflicts with the right of self-defence if there is an 
urgent necessity to protect the national security of the receiving State, or public safety 
and human life. Indeed, self-defence as a classical doctrine of international law has 
frequently been mentioned as an ‘inherent’ or ‘overriding’ right of a State113 and it has 
also been proposed as a valid excuse to override diplomatic inviolability in certain 
situations by authorities of diplomatic law such as Grotius, Vattel and, more recently, 
Denza.
114
 Besides, it is worth reiterating that theoretically, self-defence can be invoked 
as a valid defence to exclude the wrongfulness of the breach of the obligations of 
diplomatic inviolability under the VCDR had the conditions to invoke the right of self-
defence been met.
115
 The issue is, whether the right of self-defence can really be 
invoked under the three scenarios mentioned above. In order to answer this question 
correctly, it is necessary to examine the concept of self-defence in contemporary 
international law first, before proceeding to investigate whether the conditions of the 
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application of the right of self-defence can be met under the abovementioned three 
scenarios. 
5.3.1 The concept and conditions for the application of the right of self-defence 
in contemporary international law   
It is recognised by international law scholars that the modern notion of the right of self-
defence in customary international law arose out of the Caroline Case in 1837,
116
 in 
which the classical statement of the right of self-defence was provided by the US 
Secretary of State, Daniel Webster as: 
A necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and 
no moment for deliberation...The act, justified by the necessity of self-defence, 
must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it.
117
 
Based on the above statement, a clear textbook definition of the right of self-defence in 
customary international law is provided by one scholar as follows: 
[The use of force] in response to an immediate and pressing threat, which could not 
be avoided by alternative measures and if the force used to removed that threat was 
proportional to the danger posed.
118
 
The conditions for applying the right of self-defence are self-evident from the definition: 
facing an immediate threat, no alternative measures available, and the principle of 
proportionality.
119
 In order to invoke the right of self-defence, all of these three 
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conditions should be met. Accordingly, the circumstances in which the right of self-
defence can be applied in customary international law are proposed by the same scholar 
as follows: 
1. In response to and directed against an ongoing armed attack against State 
territory; 
2. In anticipation of an armed attack or threat to the State’s security, so that a 
State may strike first, with force, to neutralise an immediate but potential threat 
to its security; 
3. In response to an attack (threat or actual) against State interests, such as 
territory, nationals, property and rights guaranteed under international law. If 
any of these attributes of the State are threatened, then the State may use force 
to protect them; 
4. Where the ‘attack’ does not itself involve measures of armed force, such as 
economic aggression and propaganda. All that is required is that there is an 
instant and overwhelming necessity for forceful action.
120
 
The above definition and conditions indicate a wide possibility for the application of the 
right of self-defence in customary international law, although admittedly, some of the 
points are indeed not free from controversy.
121
 By contrast, a much more restrictive 
application of the right of self-defence is stipulated in Article 51 of the UN Charter, 
which provides: 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security. 
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It can be seen that the right of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter differs 
significantly from the right of self-defence in customary international law in the 
following several aspects. 
First , while in customary international law the application of the right of self-defence 
may not have to be confined to the actual existence of an ‘armed attack’, the UN 
Charter prescribes the ‘armed attack’ as a prerequisite to the application of the right of 
self-defence. Thus, under the UN Charter, the application of the right of self-defence 
without an actual armed attack is inconceivable, since Article 51 of the UN Charter is 
the sole source for the application of the right of self-defence, and according to that 
article the existence of an actual ‘armed attack’ is obviously indispensable to the 
invocation of that right.
122
 Notably, Brownlie has commented on Article 51 of the UN 
Charter that:  
[I]t is not incongruous to regard Article 51 as containing the only right of self-
defence permitted by the Charter. (emphasis added)
123
 
Since ‘armed attack’ is the key element of the conditions to apply the right of self-
defence, the question has been raised as to the exact meaning the term ‘armed attack’. In 
the narrowest sense, an armed attack can be deemed as ‘an invasion by the regular 
armed forces of one State into the territory of another State’.124 In addition to this 
‘paradigm case’, there have been several attempts to clarify the meaning of the term 
‘armed attack’ in Article 51 of the UN Charter. For instance, according to US Foreign 
Relations Committee, the term ‘armed attack’: 
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clearly does not mean an incident created by irresponsible groups or individuals, 
but rather an attack by one State upon another…However, if a revolution were 
aided and abetted by an outside power such assistance might possibly be 
considered an armed attack.
125
  
Brownlie further suggests that: 
[A] co-ordinated and general campaign by powerful bands of irregulars, with 
obvious or easily proven complicity of the government of a State from which they 
operate, would constitute an ‘armed attack’.126 
The ICJ in the Nicaragua Case provides a similar statement in which the Court points 
out that an ‘armed attack’ can be identified as: 
the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or 
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed forces against another State of such 
gravity as to amount to (inter alia) an actual armed attack conducted by regular 
forces, or its substantial involvement therein.
127
 
It is worth noting that the Court expressly rejected the idea that the right of self-defence 
can be invoked when a State merely provides ‘assistance to rebels in the form of the 
provision of weapons or logistical or other support’.128 Dixon further points out that: 
Although it is an unlawful use of force to supply rebels in this fashion, apparently 
this does not amount to an ‘armed attack’ by the supplier against the threatened 
State so as to justify the use of force in self-defence.
129
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In addition the existence of an actual armed attack (or activities amounting to an actual 
armed attack), another distinct difference between the application of the right of self-
defence in customary international law and the UN Charter is the possibility that the 
right of self-defence may be applied in customary international law to protect vital State 
interests other than the State territory from invasion. Such application may include, but 
is not limited to the protection of nationals and property abroad, and arguably, the 
economic interest and other kind of vital interests of a State. As Bowett expressly 
pointed out in his classical work Self-Defense in International Law, the function of self-
defence is ‘to justify action otherwise illegal, which is necessary to protect certain 
essential rights of the State against violation by other States’.130 It seems that this wide 
interpretation is far beyond the scope of application of the right of self-defence in 
Article 51 of the UN Charter, though there are some scholars advocate such an 
application.  
For instance, with regard to the application of the right of self-defence to protect 
nationals abroad, Greenwood elaborates that: 
the possession of a ‘population’ is one of the requirements of statehood and a case 
can certainly be made that an attack of sufficient violence upon a substantial 
number of a State’s nationals, especially where those nationals are selected as 
victims on account of their nationality and, in particular, where they are attacked in 
order to harm, or put pressure upon, their State of nationality, is a more serious 
assault upon the State than some forms of attack upon its territory. Thus the rescue 
of nationals abroad may well fall within the ambit of the right of self-defence, 
where the territorial State itself is unable or unwilling to act.
 131
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Dixon also points out that ‘a number of States argue that aggression can take many 
forms, not only the classic attack against territory, especially in the modern age’.132 
Notwithstanding the differences between the application of the right of self-defence in 
customary international law and the UN Charter, it is admitted that the customary 
international law application of the right of self-defence ‘continued to exist alongside 
the treaty law (ie, the UN Charter)’.133 Just as the ICJ commented on the continuing 
relevance of the customary international law application of self-defence: 
Article 51 of the Charter is only meaningful on the basis that there is a ‘natural’ or 
‘inherent’ right of self-defence and it is hard to see how this can be other than of a 
customary nature, even if its present content has been confirmed and influenced by 
the Charter…It cannot, therefore, be held that article 51 is a provision which 
‘subsumes and supervenes’ customary international law…The areas governed by 
the two sources of law thus do not overlap exactly, and the rules do not have the 
same content. 
134
 
It will be seen in the next section that the dual existence of the right of self-defence 
under the UN Charter (treaty law) and in customary international law greatly affects the 
controversy arising in scenarios when the application of the right of self-defence 
conflicts with the principle of diplomatic inviolability. 
5.3.2 The controversies between the application of self-defence and the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability 
The above section has analysed the different circumstances in which the right of self-
defence can be invoked and applied under the UN Charter and customary international 
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law. How such differences impact on the application of the right of self-defence as a 
valid excuse to breach the principle of diplomatic inviolability under the 
aforementioned three distinct scenarios will now be analysed.  
First, can the right of self-defence be invoked against the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability when there is a necessity to protect the national security of the receiving 
State? Obviously, such application cannot find any basis in the text of Article 51 of the 
UN Charter. Generally speaking, espionage and subversive activities carried out by the 
diplomatic mission or diplomatic agents do not involve any kind of direct armed attack 
as specified in Article 51 of the UN Charter. Besides, such activities generally do not 
reach ‘amount to an actual attack conducted by regular forces’ as specified in ICJ’s 
judgement in the Nicaragua Case mentioned above. Thus, the right of self-defence 
cannot be invoked based on treaty law (Article 51 of the UN Charter). In the case of 
self-defence in customary international law, scholars such as Bowett advocate that the 
right of self-defence can be invoked to protect vital interest of a State. Arguably, 
national security can be regarded as such a vital interest. In order to trigger self-defence 
the situation the receiving State should constitute as immediate threat with no other 
alternative available or feasible response, and the force used must be proportionate to 
the threat. In the abovementioned February 1973 Iraqi embassy in Islamabad incident, 
the Pakistani authority stormed the Iraqi embassy and a large quantity of weapons were 
found. Even though there was evidence showing that the weapons were intended to be 
used by the anti-government groups, it is still difficult to conclude the mere storage of 
weapons can be claimed as constituting an immediate threat to the national security of 
Pakistan. Moreover, it is difficult to prove that there were no other alternative measures 
available. In the same incident, the Iraqi ambassador refused to provide his consent for 
the search of the embassy by the Pakistan police. However, the Pakistan authorities 
obviously had many alternative measures at hand other than forcible entry of the 
embassy: they could request the search through formal contact with the Iraqi 
government; they could deploy police force around the embassy (which will not breach 
the inviolability of the mission premises) so no weapon can be smuggled out of the 
embassy. In other cases, for example, the transport of weapons in diplomatic bags, the 
 205 
 
claim that such activity would cause immediate threat to the national security is even 
less plausible. Likewise, there are more alternative measures to cope with threat to the 
national security from diplomatic agents and diplomatic bags instead of directly 
breaching their inviolability. For instance, if a diplomatic agent is found spying, he can 
be declared persona non grata under Article 9 of the VCDR. This classic measure is 
always available to the receiving State so as to put a possible threat to its national 
security to an end. To sum up, it can be concluded that in the scenario when the 
protection of national security conflicts with the principle of diplomatic inviolability, it 
is not convincing to invoke the right of self-defence to overwhelm the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability. Neither the application of the right of self-defence under treaty 
law (Article 51 of the UN Charter) nor customary international law provides a valid 
reason to invoke the right of self-defence in this specific scenario. 
The controversy in the application of the right of self-defence against the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability in the scenario when there is a necessity to protect public safety 
and human life is a bit more complicated. To begin with, whether the right of self-
defence is applicable under Article 51 of the UN Charter in this specific kind of 
scenario is questionable. As a matter of fact, there is no concrete legal basis to support 
the argument that Article 51 of the UN Charter endorses the application of the right of 
self-defence in this kind of scenario. As it has been pointed out above, the jurisprudence 
of the ICJ in the Nicaragua Case illustrates that Article 51 requires an actual attack (or 
activities amounting to an actual attack) on the territory of a State. Obviously, 
emergency situations when public safety or human life is endangered will not generally 
raise the issue of direct attack on the territory of the receiving State. Indeed, it can be 
seen that in the scenarios that public safety and human life endangered by force majeure 
(usually caused by natural disasters such as earthquake, flood, etc), there is little link 
between the actual disaster and the diplomatic mission or diplomatic agents. Even in the 
case of a fire in the diplomatic premises, this has little to do with any actual armed 
attack on the territory of the receiving State. Even when the emergency situation is 
caused by the abuse of inviolability by the diplomatic mission or the diplomatic agent, 
for instance, drunk driving by a diplomatic agent that endangers the public safety and 
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human life, there is still very little link between the emergency and an armed attack as 
stipulated in Article 51 of the UN Charter.  
The real controversy occurs in relation to the application of the right of self-defence 
under customary international law. Perhaps, the most problematic situation arises from 
the situation where weapons are fired onto the street from the diplomatic mission 
endangering both public safety and human life. This situation is exemplified by the 
infamous fatal shooting incident happened in St James’s Square in London on 17 April 
1984.
135
 During the discussion of the incident in the UK Foreign Affairs Committee 
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international law against diplomatic inviolability to protect human life from ongoing 
violence: 
Self-defence is an important principle of customary international law, exemplified, 
but not exhausted, by Article 51 of the UN Charter. From the nature of self-defence 
it derives from the law of nature from which international law derives its being. It 
comes into play when act of force are committed by States, although it is not 
limited to such contingencies. Thus, in the incident of the shooting of Woman 
Police Officer Fletcher on 17 April, 1984, by an inmate within the Libyan Embassy 
whose status and identity was unknown, it can properly be contended that, an 
immediate response, counter-fire might have been directed at the Libyan Embassy 
windows by the police. Further, in the period immediately after the firing from the 
embassy, entry might have been carried out by the police, with firearms, if 
available, and sufficient force used within the embassy to overpower the assailant 
or any person armed and remove all weapons found inside. Such acts would, in 
exercise of the right of self-defence, probably have been required immediately after 
the firing from within or during continued firing.
136
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Several points can be summarised from Draper’s comments. First, the necessity to 
protect human life in an emergency can find its legal basis in the customary 
international law of self-defence. Secondly, in an emergency involving shooting from 
embassy premises, the authorities (in this situation, the police) can invoke the right of 
self-defence against the inviolability of mission premises (counter-fire and enter the 
premises to carry out search). Thirdly, provided that the measures adopted are 
proportional to the threat, and the actions are taken in time (immediately after the firing 
from the embassy), the conditions for the applying of the right of self-defence under 
customary international law (not the conditions under Article 51 of the UN Charter) 
should be considered as fully met. 
Notably, several scholars hold the same or similar opinion as Draper’s. For example, Sir 
John Freeland, in reply to the question whether ‘self-defence in international law is held 
to refer only to the self-defence of States against other States rather than individuals’, 
expressly commented that: 
I think self-defence not only applies to action taken directly against a State but also 
to actions directed against nationals of that State.
137
 
Freeland further elaborated his appreciation of the application of the right of self-
defence to protect human life against diplomatic inviolability: 
I certainly would not exclude the possibility of its being justifiable in a case where, 
for example, there is continued firing of weapons from the premises of an embassy, 
where every other method has been tried and has failed to stop that, for it then to be 
lawful to go into the embassy to stop it.
138
 
Although Freeland emphasized the conditions of necessity and especially, exhaustion of 
other possible methods, he argues that applying the right of self-defence can be justified 
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if ‘there is continued firing of weapons from the premises of an embassy’. His 
extraordinary example has been criticised by other scholars. For instance, Brown points 
out that ‘[t]here appears to have been no example of a State exercising such a right of 
self-defence’. 139  Higgins is also ‘skeptical as to the applicability at all of the 
international law concept of self-defense to violent acts by the representatives of one 
State within the territory of another, directed against the latter’s citizens’. 140  Both 
Brown and Higgins hold the opinion that even in the above scenario when there is 
actual shooting coming from the embassy, the right of self-defence cannot be applied. 
Similar but not identical to Freeland’s hypothetical scenario of ‘continued firing from 
the embassy’, Sir Francis Vallat proposed another scenario of emergency: 
Suppose the embassy were being used as a kind of fortress for a running battle with 
people in the street, [the right of self-defence] might then become justifiable, but I 
find it difficult to imagine that before an international tribunal of repute one would 
be held to be justified to run into an embassy because there had been one or two 
shots fired, even if that happened to cause an injury or death.
141
 
Vallat’s contention of such a threshold for testing the conditions of necessity is strongly 
criticised by Mann. Mann points out that Vallat’s argument: 
seems to mean that the authorities have to wait for the death of a third person 
before they can intervene – a proposition which must be described as wholly 
unacceptable and unrealistic.
142
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Indeed, if what Vallet suggested is unacceptable and unrealistic, what else can be 
proposed to tackle the whole issue? Mann argued, in contrast with Brown and Higgins, 
that if public safety or human life is endangered by the abuse of diplomatic inviolability, 
there is no doubt that the right of self-defence could and should be applied against 
diplomatic inviolability so as to save life and property. He argued, if ‘a large quantity of 
explosives is stored in the premises of an embassy and constitute a danger of the utmost 
gravity to a large, inhabited section of a town’, it would be absurd to wait for the 
explosion and actual enormous damage occurred before the local authorities take any 
action to prevent the consequences. Similarly,  
[O]nce shots have been fired from an embassy and an undertaking to prevent 
similar acts has been declined by the diplomat in charge, the receiving State should 
be entitled to enter the embassy, search it and remove such weapons as may be 
found.
143
 
Mann’s straightforward solution seems to be effective with regard to emergency 
situations when the abuse of the principle of diplomatic inviolability is extremely 
obvious, leaving no doubt of the nature of the abuse. Thus, following Mann’s logic, if a 
diplomatic agent is found shooting weapons on the street, there is no doubt that the local 
police can overwhelm the diplomatic agent and adopt any necessary force to forestall 
the threat to the public safety and human life. This logic also seems to conform to the 
judgement of the ICJ in the Nicaragua Case, which expressly recognised the possibility 
that the inviolability of a diplomatic agent can be overwhelmed and he can even be 
arrested by the police if he is found committing assault or other offence.
144
 However, 
the vague statement in the ICJ’s judgement does not expressly mention that such a 
measure is based on the right of self-defence. Neither does the judgement specify what 
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particular crime can trigger such a measure. What is clear is that the judgement referred 
to the situation as ‘on occasion’ and that term suggests that such a situation is rare, and 
it is not a general rule to overwhelm the inviolability of the diplomatic agent even in 
this kind of situation.   
Mann’s logic also suggests that the right of self-defence should be invoked when there 
is a necessity to protect public safety and human life against the inviolability of the 
diplomatic bag. In the Dikko incident mentioned above, the crates were not labelled as 
diplomatic bags so the issue of disregarding the inviolability of the diplomatic bag did 
not arise. Had the crates been properly labelled as diplomatic bags, the issue whether to 
open the crates without consent from the Nigerian diplomatic agent based on the right 
of self-defence to protect human life would be a rather thorny one for consideration. 
The same issue will arise if there is enough evidence to believe that the diplomatic bag 
might contains explosive articles. However, the problem of Mann’s argument is that 
often it is not easy and feasible for the authorities to detect the abuse of the diplomatic 
bag so as to protect public safety and human life. In the Dikko incident, for instance, the 
evidence of abnormity of the crate (the presence of the air hole, and the moan emitted 
from the crate) led the authorities believe that someone was inside the crate. In most 
occasions, however, the evidence to prove manifest abuse of the diplomatic bag is 
extremely difficult to obtain without actual breach of the bag’s inviolability. 
To sum up, it would be too radical for the authorities of the receiving State to disregard 
the principle of diplomatic inviolability, especially the inviolability of the diplomatic 
premises, simply based on the imaginary extreme scenarios and deduction from scholars 
described above. Interestingly, the UK Foreign Affairs Committee in its report 
concluded that the right of self-defence cannot be adopted to overwhelm the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability in most kinds of emergency situations and therefore, the 
inviolability of the diplomatic premises and diplomatic agent, as well as the diplomatic 
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bag should generally be observed.
145
 However, the UK government later in its official 
response to the Foreign Affairs Committee’s Report did recognise the possibility of 
overwhelming the inviolability of the diplomatic bag based on the right of self-defence 
so as to protect national security, public safety and human life.
146
 The somehow 
contradictory conclusion suggests that the controversies arising from the application of 
the right of self-defence against the principle of diplomatic inviolability is far from 
settled. 
In addition to the controversies of the application of the right of self-defence, there are 
other factors that contribute to the conflict between the principle of the diplomatic 
inviolability and the protection of national security, public safety and human life. The 
factors can be seen through the actual dilemma faced by the receiving State in the 
controversial situations. These factors will be discussed in the following section. 
5.3.3 The dilemma faced by the receiving State 
It can be revealed from the above analysis that in certain situations when the necessity 
to protect national security, public safety and human life conflicts with the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability, the authorities of the receiving State have to decide whether 
they should consider the protection of certain interests (ie, national security, public 
safety and human life) as a priority over specific kinds of inviolability. In addition, the 
controversies arising in the application of the right of self-defence also reveal that it is 
definitely not easy for the authorities of the receiving State to invoke the right of self-
defence to overwhelm the principle of diplomatic inviolability, thanks to the 
inapplicability of the right of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter, as well as 
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the uncertainty in the conditions of application of the right of self-defence in customary 
international law. In a word, in these scenarios, the authorities of the receiving State 
would inevitably face a dilemma: whether they should keep observing the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability as stipulated in the VCDR, or disregard the inviolability so as to 
protect national security, public safety and human life? In essence, should the protection 
of national security, public safety and human life prevail over the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability? 
Admittedly, such a dilemma is also closely intertwined with the State responsibility of 
the receiving State. As it has been discussed in Chapter 4, if the receiving State commits 
an act which breaches its international obligations of the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability under the VCDR, it shall bear responsibility for the internationally 
wrongful act unless it can invoke one of the valid defences to preclude the wrongfulness 
of that act. It has already been pointed out in Chapter 4 that these possible defences are 
not usually applicable in the context of the breach of the international obligation of the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability.
147
 Evidently, such cases are extremely rare, 
according to State practice since the adoption of the VCDR. In addition, the seemingly 
plausible application of the right of self-defence is highly controversial as discussed in 
the above section. That is to say, as a matter of fact, it is extremely difficult for the 
authorities of the receiving State to invoke any of the valid defences to preclude the 
wrongfulness of a breach of the principle of diplomatic inviolability. 
It is also worth noting that in contemporary public international law there are no definite 
rules providing that the protection of national security or the protection of public safety 
and human life should prevail over the principle of diplomatic inviolability. According 
to the traditional theory of the hierarchy of norms in international law,  only peremptory 
norms of international law (jus cogens) shall prevail other rules of customary 
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international law or treaty law.
148
 It appears that the protection of national security and 
the protection of public safety have not been generally considered as peremptory 
norms.
149
 Even though some scholars propose that the right to life is among jus 
cogens,
150
 whether the particular protection of human life can be identified as a 
peremptory norm is far from clear. Therefore, the authorities of the receiving State may 
not invoke jus cogens to validate its breach of the principle of diplomatic inviolability, 
and the superiority of ‘jus cogens’ in the hierarchy of international law provides no easy 
solution to the dilemma faced by the receiving State.
151
 
Moreover, as it has already been pointed out in Chapter 4, the ICJ in the Tehran 
Hostages Case expressly proposed that the rules of diplomatic law constitutes a ‘self-
contained regime’, and the VCDR has provided within its scheme the ‘entirely 
efficacious’ remedy to counter the abuse of the diplomatic agents.152 Even though in the 
same paragraph the Court acknowledged the possibility of the ‘brief arrest’ of the 
diplomatic agent who is committing a violent offence, it can be asserted that the spirit of 
the judgement definitely emphasized the significance of the long-established principle 
of diplomatic inviolability. In short, it seems that the jurisprudence of the ICJ in the 
Tehran Hostages Cases discourages the authorities of the receiving State from 
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breaching the principle of diplomatic inviolability so as to deal with the abuse of the 
inviolability of the diplomatic mission, the diplomatic agents, and the diplomatic bags. 
Last but not least, the effect of the principle of reciprocity should not be overlooked. In 
fact, reciprocity has always been regarded as an important factor for diplomatic 
decision-making. Just as Simma asserts,  
In some areas of international law, dependence of law observance on strict 
reciprocity of self-restraint is particularly strong, and it is in these areas that 
reciprocity consequently finds its most direct expression in legal form … The law 
of diplomatic privileges and immunities ... furnish many other examples of 
reciprocity as an indispensable condition for the smooth operation of the law.
153
 
To be specific, in the context of the dilemma faced by the authorities of the receiving 
State, the principle of reciprocity and the possible consequences of their actions may 
constrain the authorities from overriding the principle of diplomatic inviolability. As 
Higgins incisively points out,  
Virtually every State that is host to a foreign diplomatic mission will have its own 
diplomats operating abroad, and its own diplomatic bags, embassies and archives, 
to receive those protections that are provided by international law. Honoring those 
same obligations vis-a-vis the diplomatic community in one’s own country is 
widely perceived as a major factor in ensuring that there is no erosion of the 
international law requirements on diplomatic privileges and immunities.
154
 
Thus, as it has been commented in the Report from the UK Foreign Affairs Committee,  
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In all these matters, of course, considerations of reciprocity will be important. … 
[R]eciprocal action may be taken against our diplomats overseas. … [T]he fear of 
reciprocal action … must always weigh in consideration.155 
Obviously, the ‘deterrent effect of reciprocity’ usually makes the authorities of the 
receiving State refrain from disregarding the principle of diplomatic inviolability in the 
dilemma of deciding whether the protection of national security, public safety and 
human life shall prevail over the principle of diplomatic inviolability.
156
 
To sum up, considering the aforementioned factors, it can be concluded that when 
facing the dilemma of judging whether the protection of national security, public safety 
and human life shall prevail over the principle of diplomatic inviolability, the authorities 
of the receiving State may not easily find a straightforward solution. After analysing of 
the controversy arising from the protection aspect of the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability in the next chapter, detailed discussion of the possible solutions to the 
controversies and dilemma faced by the receiving State will be presented in Chapter 7. 
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Chapter 6    Controversies Involve the Principle 
of Diplomatic Inviolability (II): The 
Responsibility to Respect Human Rights 
Whereas the previous chapter dealt with controversies arising from the first aspect of 
inviolability, that is, the immunity from any kind of interference and enforcement from 
the authorities of the receiving State, the primary task of the current chapter is to focus 
on the controversies arising from second aspect of inviolability, that is, the special duty 
of protection incumbent on the receiving State. Similar to the discussion in the former 
chapter, the controversy to be examined in this chapter reflects the conflict between the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability and other norms of international law. In this case, it 
is the responsibility to respect essential human rights that brings about the conflict and 
leads the authorities of the receiving State to another dilemma. The two specific forms 
of human rights to be discussed in this chapter are the right to demonstrate and the right 
of expression,
1
 thanks to the fact that these forms of human rights are particularly 
relevant to the protection aspect of the principle of diplomatic inviolability. 
Given that the necessity and significance of the protection elements of the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability were noted in Chapters 1 and 3,
2
 the present chapter will 
proceed to the examination of two particular scenarios where the protection of 
diplomatic premises or diplomatic agents conflicts with the respect of essential human 
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rights. To be specific, the first scenario is when the protection of mission premises 
conflicts with the respect of the right to demonstrate, and the second scenario arises 
when the protection of the diplomatic agent conflicts with the respect of the right of 
expression. This chapter will focus on the first scenario and address the following issues 
in particular: What are the limits to the right to demonstrate? How should we construe 
the term ‘peace and dignity of the diplomatic mission’ as stipulated in Article 22.2 of 
the VCDR accurately? How should we understand the phrase ‘all appropriate steps’ as 
stipulated in Articles 22.2 and 29?  
6.1 Controversies between the Protection of Mission Premises and the 
Respect of the Right to Demonstrate 
As a preliminary consideration, it will be appropriate to briefly examine the regime 
protecting the right to demonstrate in contemporary international law. The right to 
demonstrate can be properly regarded as one specific form of the right to assembly. 
According to one authoritative English dictionary, the word ‘assembly’ means ‘a group 
of people who have gathered together for a particular purpose’.3 Accordingly, the right 
of assembly has been defined by some scholars as ‘[the right] of persons to gather 
intentionally and temporarily for a specific purpose’. 4  According to the dictionary 
definition, the word ‘demonstrate’ means ‘to march through the streets with a large 
group of people in order to publically protest about something’, 5  and so, through 
analogy, the right to demonstrate may be properly defined as ‘the right that a large 
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group of people gather together intentionally and temporarily to march through the 
streets in order to protest’.  
Based on the two sets of definitions mentioned above, it is apparent that an organised 
demonstration can be regarded as a particular form of assembly, though an assembly 
may also include other outdoor activities such as public meeting, sit-in, picketing, as 
well as indoor activities.
6
 It can be revealed that the intentional expression of a specific 
purpose is the key element that distinguishes a demonstration from accidental or 
disorganised activities by randomly gathered people. In this chapter, the discussion of 
the right of assembly (referred to as the freedom of assembly in international human 
rights treaties and some textbooks) only focuses on demonstrations, hence excluding 
other forms of assembly. 
6.1.1 Respect for the right to demonstrate as stipulated in contemporary 
international law 
It is recognised by international law scholars that the right to demonstrate as one 
specific form of the right to assembly originated during the American and French 
Revolution in the later eighteenth century.
7
 Nevertheless, it was the establishment of the 
UN in the 20th century that proved to be a watershed event in the promotion of the right 
of assembly, along with the emergence development and of other aspects of essential 
human rights. The first significant international human rights document under the 
auspice of the UN was the Universal Declaration on Human Rights 1948
8
 which 
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expressly mentions that ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly.’9 In 
the following decades, several international and regional human rights treaties reiterated 
similar words to those in the UDHR. For example, Article 21 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966
10
 provides that ‘The right of peaceful 
assembly shall be recognised’; the European Convention on Human Rights 195011, the 
American Convention on Human Rights 1969
12
, the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights 1986 13  and the Arab Charter on Human Rights 2004 14  all contain 
similar provisions. These stipulations form the source of the right to demonstrate in 
contemporary international law, as well as setting the international legal obligations of 
respecting the right to demonstrate on the States parties to these treaties. Whenever a 
State party to one of these treaties fails to respect the right to demonstrate of its citizens, 
it will be liable for the breach of its obligations under that treaty.
15
 
6.1.2 The limits to the right to demonstrate 
Arguably, one of the primary tasks of the law of human rights is to balance rights and 
duties between individuals and between individuals and States. Thus, in principle, no 
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human rights can be enjoyed without a proper limit. This applies in relation to the right 
of assembly.
16
 Since the right to demonstrate can be regarded as a specific form of the 
right of assembly, the limits to the right of assembly are also naturally applied to the 
right to demonstrate. Theory and practice reveal that the right to demonstrate is 
subjected to the certain limits. Such limits may be traced back to historical documents 
where the right of assembly first appeared during the late 18th century. For instance, in 
the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen 1789, it was declared 
that the manifestation of opinion should not ‘disturb the public order established by 
law’.17 In the modern international human rights treaties, similar provisions are also 
expressly stipulated. A typical example can be seen in Article 21 of the ICCPR which 
provides that: 
[t]he right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized. No restrictions may be placed 
on the exercise of this right other than those imposed in conformity with the law 
and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security 
or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or 
moral or the protection of the rights of and freedoms of others. 
Similar provisions also appear in Article 11.2 of the ECHR, Article 15 of the ACHR, 
Article 11 of the ACPHR and Article 24.7 of the Arab Charter. These stipulations 
provide a direct reference to the limits imposed on the right of assembly, and 
accordingly, they also point out the limits on the right to demonstrate. 
Several points are worth noting from these provisions. First of all, it should be noted 
that the prerequisite for the exercise of the right of assembly (as well as the right to 
demonstrate) is that such an activity must not violate any conditions imposed by 
relevant laws and regulations. This restriction is exemplified by Article 21 of the 
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ICCPR as mentioned above. With regard to the right to demonstrate, it is not unusual 
that laws and regulations on public assembly require the organisers of a planned 
demonstration to notify the authorities in advance. In the decision of the case of 
Kivenmaa v Finland, the UN Human Rights Committee pointed out that a prior 
notification requirement which has been expressly stipulated by law and regulation is 
considered compatible with the right of assembly.
18
 It is obvious that such requirement 
is essential to ‘ensuring public order and safety and preventing abuse of the right of 
assembly’.19 Secondly, it can be seen directly from the text of Article 21 of the ICCPR 
that the assembly must be ‘peaceful’. The word ‘peaceful’ here should be construed 
using its ordinary meaning, which suggest that the assembly should not be violent.
20
 
Though it may be difficult precisely to determine the meaning of the word ‘peaceful’ in 
theory, it may not be too difficult for authorities such as the police to determine the 
situation practically, based on common sense and previous experience. For instance, 
when a demonstration turns into mob violence, such as attacking the police by throwing 
stones, there is no doubt that such a demonstration can no longer be considered by 
authorities as ‘peaceful’. Thirdly, it can be seen from Article 21 of the ICCPR that in 
addition to the relevant laws and regulations which impose preconditions on the right of 
assembly, certain factors can also be invoked as exceptions to the free exercise of the 
right of assembly. These factors are the necessity to protect national security, public 
safety, public order, public health or morals, and the rights and freedom of others. As 
was pointed out in Chapter 5, there are no single definitions of the terms ‘national 
security’ and ‘public safety’ in international law. This is the same in relation to ‘public 
order, public health or morals’. What is clear is that the phrase ‘rights and freedom of 
others’ includes all other lawful rights and freedom as enumerated in the ICCPR and 
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other human rights documents. The lack of precise definitions of the aforementioned 
words and phrases inevitably causes controversies under certain scenarios. The scenario 
of a demonstration held outside a diplomatic mission is one of the most troublesome 
examples and will be discussed in the following section. 
Last, but not least, it is worth pointing out that the significance of the limits to the right 
to demonstrate is that such limits may provide valid reason for the authorities to 
suspend an ongoing demonstration without being held responsible for breaching its 
international obligation of respecting the right of assembly (to be specific, the right to 
demonstrate) required by international human rights treaties. As will be analysed in the 
next section, in the specific scenario where a demonstration takes place outside a 
diplomatic mission, the authorities of the receiving State may be exempted from the 
responsibility for suspending the right to demonstrate if the ongoing demonstration fails 
to comply with the conditions mentioned above.  
6.1.3 Demonstrations outside diplomatic premises: the difficulties to determine 
key terms and the dilemma to balance two different norms 
The above section briefly summarises the legal regime of the right to demonstrate as 
one form of the right of assembly in contemporary international human rights law. It is 
beyond serious argument that a State has the responsibility to respect the right to 
demonstrate under international human rights treaties. However, a State as a receiving 
State also has the responsibility to protect mission premises under the regime of 
diplomatic law. As was noted in Chapter 3, Article 22.2 of the VCDR stipulates the 
special duty of the receiving State to provide positive protection of the mission 
premises.
21
 It was also noted in Chapter 4 that Article 22.2 provides one of the sources 
of the international obligation of the principle of diplomatic inviolability.
22
 It is worth 
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reiterating that failure to observe Article 22.2 without any valid reason would lead to 
responsibility on the part of the receiving State.  As the ICJ asserted in the Tehran 
Hostages Case: 
The Iranian Government failed altogether to take any ‘appropriate steps’ to protect 
the premises...of the United States’ mission against attack by the militants, and to 
take any steps either to prevent this attack or to stop it before it reached its 
completion ... For these reasons, the Court ... [d]ecides that the violations of these 
obligations engage the responsibility of the Islamic Republic of Iran towards the 
United States of America under international law.
23
 
Thus, a receiving State may have a dual responsibility simultaneously when a 
demonstration takes place outside a diplomatic mission. It is in this specific scenario 
that the regime of international human rights law and diplomatic law conflicts and leads 
the receiving State to face the dilemma of how to balance the responsibility to respect 
the right to demonstrate with the responsibility to protect mission premises. 
Unsurprisingly, the theoretical and practical difficulties faced by the receiving State 
have attracted scholarly attention. For example, Denza notes that: 
Politically motivated demonstrations in front of foreign embassies have become a 
highly favoured method of public protest at the policies of the sending State, and 
with the increasing emphasis in many States on freedom of speech and freedom of 
assembly they often give rise to difficult decisions as to how the balance between 
the constitutional rights of citizens of the receiving State and the duty to prevent 
disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity should be 
struck by the police or other authorities controlling the demonstration.
24
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 Case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v 
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It is not difficult to identify from Denza’s comments that the crux of the issue lies in 
how properly to balance between the right to demonstrate on one hand, and the 
protection of the mission premises on the other. This is probably the key issue leading 
to the dilemma faced by the receiving State. It can also be identified that the primary 
role of the authorities of the receiving State in this scenario includes performing two 
distinct tasks: preventing any disturbance of the peace of the mission and/or impairing 
the dignity of the mission, and controlling the demonstration.  
Not all political motivated demonstration outside a foreign diplomatic mission will give 
rise to a dilemma for the authorities of the receiving State. As has been discussed in the 
above section, the two preliminary limits to the right to demonstrate are that the 
demonstration should be peaceful and comply with relevant laws and regulations. If an 
ongoing demonstration is apparently violent, it will not be difficult for the authorities to 
take actions to suspend it, for the reason that a violent demonstration is not protected by 
international human rights law. In this situation, it is obvious that the authorities of the 
receiving State should consider the inviolability of the mission premises as a priority, to 
ensure the special duty of the protection of the mission premises is fulfilled and to 
prevent the mission premises from intrusion. This situation occurred at the initial stage 
of the Tehran Hostages Case which serves as an example to illustrate what can be 
deemed as an ‘apparently violent’ demonstration outside a diplomatic mission. The 
recent notorious siege of the British embassy in Tehran November 2011
25
 and the mob 
attack outside the British embassy in Buenos Aires in April 2012
26
 are just two other 
vivid illustrations. In contrast to violent demonstrations, ordinary demonstrations which 
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do not involve any violence or insulting activities will not give rise to a dilemma, either. 
The authorities of the receiving State should respect the right to demonstrate as long as 
the demonstrators comply with the laws and regulations and do not breach the 
inviolability of the mission premises. 
Thus, apart from the above two ‘easy to determine’ situations, it can be recognised that 
a politically motivated demonstration will give rise to a dilemma for the authorities of 
the receiving State if the demonstrators act peacefully but target the ‘peace and dignity’ 
of the diplomatic mission. Should the authorities of the receiving State suspend a 
demonstration in favour of the protection of the mission premises, or let the 
demonstration continue so that the right to demonstrate is exercised?
27
 Here, two major 
issues are worth discussing. 
First of all, an obvious difficulty concerning a peaceful demonstration outside a 
diplomatic mission which is targeting the ‘peace and dignity’ of the mission involves 
making a correct interpretation of the term ‘peace and dignity’ as stipulated in Article 
22.2 of the VCDR. As has been pointed out in Chapter 3, neither the text of the VCDR 
nor the Commentary on the ILC’s Draft Articles 1958 provided any specific reference 
to the meaning of the term ‘peace and dignity’. The other important terms in the same 
provision, ‘disturbance’ and ‘impairment’ also lack exact meanings. Dilemmas will 
arise when demonstrators are waving placards and slogan strips with provocative or 
even insulting words on them. It is not unusual that demonstrators display flags or 
posters with anti-foreign head of State text or caricatures on them.
28
 On some occasions, 
foreign national flags are burnt overtly in front of the gates of the diplomatic mission.
29
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With regard to the disturbance of peace of the diplomatic mission, in many cases 
demonstrators deliberately cause noise outside the mission premises.
30
 It is worth 
emphasizing that on many occasions the demonstrators do not behave violently even 
when they are burning foreign national flags outside the mission premises.
31
 
Nevertheless, such peaceful demonstrations may be challenged and protested by the 
sending State, as they are usually considered as ‘impairment of the dignity’ of the 
diplomatic mission.
32
 
To further examine the issue of determining the ‘peace and dignity’ of the diplomatic 
mission, State practice and notable cases are worth mentioning. The US Congress 
adopted a resolution as early as 1938 to make unlawful certain activities during a 
demonstration within five hundred feet of any buildings or premises in its capital 
without a prior permit by the authorities. These activities include: 
[T]o display any flag, banner or placard, or device designed or adapted to 
intimidate, coerce, or bring into public odium any foreign government, party or 
organization, or to bring into public disrepute political, social, or economic acts, 
views, or purposes of any foreign government, party or organization, or to 
intimidate, coerce, harass, or bring into public disrepute any officer or officers or 
diplomatic or consular representatives of any foreign government, or to interfere 
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with the free and safe pursuit of the duties of any diplomatic or consular 
representatives of any foreign government.
33
 
The resolution was later incorporated into a statute of the District of Columbia
34
 and 
became legally binding thereafter. A series of US cases involving the interpretation of 
the above resolution clearly reveals that the key to determine the ‘disturbance of the 
peace of the diplomatic mission’ lies in whether there is any act or attempt to 
‘intimidate, coerce, threaten, or harass’ members of foreign missions, and whether 
‘normal embassy activities have been or are about to be disrupted’.35  
Similarly, in the UK Foreign Affairs Committee’s Report on the Abuse of Diplomatic 
Immunities and Privileges, it was pointed out that: 
Provided always that work at the mission can continue normally, that there is 
untrammelled access and egress, and that those within the mission are never in fear 
that the mission might be damaged or its staff injured, the requirement of Article 
22 [of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961] are met.
36
 
With regard to the ‘dignity’ of the diplomatic mission, it has been commented in the UK 
case of R v Roques that ‘impairment of dignity required abusive or insulting behaviour’ 
which ‘could only be deduced from specific circumstances’.37 In the Australian case of 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Trade and others v Magno and another,
38
 Judge 
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French elaborated what activities may be deemed as ‘impairment of the dignity’ of the 
diplomatic mission: 
The burning of the flag of the sending State or the mock execution of its leader in 
effigy if committed in the immediate vicinity of the mission could well be 
construed as attacks on its dignity. So too might the depositing of some offensive 
substances and perhaps also the dumping of farm commodities outside mission 
premises.
39
 
Judge French further commented that ‘the notions of peace and dignity in this context 
involve evaluative judgments and are not amenable to clear rules of definition’.40 Thus, 
it may be concluded that, even though the authorities of the receiving State may decide 
whether to suspend a demonstration based on their own judgment, the ultimate 
judgment of whether a demonstration disturbs the peace or impairs the dignity of the 
diplomatic mission rests in the discretion of the sending State. It can be argued that, a 
sending State is able to raise a protest if it considers that the authorities of the receiving 
State did not fulfil the duty of protection under Article 22.2 of the VCDR, even if the 
authorities of the receiving State did not consider that a demonstration ‘disturbed the 
peace or impaired the dignity’ of the diplomatic mission of the sending State. 
In addition to the obvious difficulty of determining the ‘peace and dignity’ of the 
diplomatic mission, a second important issue is how to construe the phrase ‘all 
appropriate steps’?  
As has been pointed out earlier in this chapter, a lawful demonstration which is under 
the protection of international human rights law requires that the demonstration should 
comply with laws and regulations stipulated by the State. These laws and regulations 
generally aim to protect national security, public order and morals and other similar 
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interests. It has already been pointed out that the term ‘public order and morals’ and 
similar terms lack accurate definition and thus it is not easy to determine to what extent 
these terms can practically be applied in various situations. Inevitably, it is the duty of 
the authorities of the receiving State to undertake the difficult task of determining the 
limit of the demonstration. Even if the authorities make a judgement, their decision may 
still be challenged by the sending State who may complain that their mission premises 
are not sufficiently protected. This difficulty faced by the authorities of the receiving 
State give rises to two straightforward options which are relevant to the elaboration of 
the phrase ‘all appropriate steps’. Firstly, since all appropriate steps can be taken to 
protect the mission, why not make laws and regulations tailored to the specific situation 
of demonstrations outside foreign diplomatic missions? For instance, to set a cordon 
outside the mission premises where no demonstration can be held without prior 
authorisation? Secondly, why not dispatch as many policemen as requested by the 
diplomatic mission so that the diplomatic mission will not complain? However, two 
questions are worth considering. First, on must consider whether the abovementioned 
measures, even the laws and regulations themselves, are acceptable in international 
human rights law such as Article 21 of the ICCPR? Secondly, should the authorities of 
the receiving State submit to all the requests from the diplomatic mission of the sending 
State? 
With regard to the first question, it may be argued that not all measures or the laws and 
regulations can be deemed as immune from challenge on the grounds of international 
human rights law. Several cases are worth mentioning. In the aforementioned case of 
Kivenmaa v Finland, the actual application of the Finnish Act on Public Meetings was 
challenged by the Human Rights Committee, even though the Act itself (which has 
express restrictions on the demonstration and a requirement of prior authorisation) was 
not deemed as a breach of Article 21 of the ICCPR.
41
 In the US case of Finzer v Barry, 
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the US Court of Appeals confirmed that the statutory prohibition on the display of signs 
hostile to the foreign diplomatic mission can be deemed as appropriate, and does not 
involve a breach of the right to demonstrate. 
42
 In the Australian case of Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs and Trade and others v Magno and another, Judge Einfield asserted 
that relevant regulations concerning the restriction on demonstrations outside foreign 
diplomatic missions authorised ‘such an interference with basic rights as to balance the 
scales too far against protesters’ rights and in favour of the rights of those against whom 
such protests are directed’.43 In the UK case of R v Commissioner of Police for the 
Metropolis, the UK High Court held that it was unlawful for police officers to put police 
vans in front of protesters as a method to suppress free speech.
44
  On the other hand, in 
Australia in 2002, the police were authorised to prohibit demonstrations outside a 
diplomatic mission on the grounds that the demonstrators tried to use instruments used 
to amplify noise, which may disturb the peace of the diplomatic mission.
45
 From the 
above cases it can be revealed that there are no uniform criteria to determine what 
constitutes ‘appropriate steps’. Laws, regulations and measures taken by authorities 
must be examined in specific cases, and even so, contradictory results are inevitable. 
With regard to the second question, it has been already been pointed out in Chapter 3 
that the term ‘all appropriate steps’ does not necessarily suggest that the receiving State 
should submit to all request from the diplomatic mission. Admittedly, if the authorities 
of the receiving State do submit to all requests from the diplomatic mission, they may 
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not receive further complaint from the mission. However, it is obviously unreasonable 
to dispatch a battalion of armed police to protect mission premises when there are only 
fifty demonstrators waving placards outside the mission premises. It is equally 
unreasonable to set a cordon five hundred metres away from the mission premises to 
prevent demonstrators coming close to the mission. If the diplomatic mission makes 
requests like these two examples, the authorities are not obligation under Article 22.3 of 
the VCDR to fulfil this kind of request. In essence, it can be concluded that the term ‘all 
appropriate steps’ requires an obligation on the authorities of the receiving State to 
make correct judgment in different situations. It does not mean that the authorities of the 
receiving State should always make legislation or take measures to sacrifice the right to 
demonstrate in favour of the protection of the mission premises. 
Based on the above analysis of the difficulties in determining the meaning of the terms 
‘peace and dignity’ and ‘all appropriate steps’, it can be concluded that in the scenario 
of a demonstration taking place outside a foreign diplomatic mission, the authorities of 
the receiving State will face the dilemma to balance the responsibility to respect the 
right to demonstrate and the responsibility to protect mission premises from intrusion 
and the disturbance of peace or the impairment of the dignity of the mission. The 
dilemma reflects the conflicts between two different norms of international law: the 
right to demonstrate under international human rights law, and the inviolability of 
mission premises under diplomatic law. As with the controversies and dilemmas arising 
in the conflicts discussed in Chapter 5, it is not convincing to argue that one norm is 
more important than the other. The protection of mission premises, a core rule of the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability does not always prevail over the respect of the right 
to demonstrate, an important rule under international human rights law. Neither does 
respect for the right to demonstrate always prevail over the protection of mission 
premises. That said, it is for the receiving State to bear responsibility if it fails to fulfil 
either of the norms: if it fails to respect the right to demonstrate (as in the case of 
Kivenmaa v Finland), it will be held responsible for the breach of its international 
obligation under international human rights law; if it fails to protect the mission 
premises, it will be held responsible for the breach of its international obligation under 
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diplomatic law (as in the Tehran Hostages Case). Although it can be argued that the 
authorities of the receiving State should make their own judgment correctly in this kind 
of dilemma (which varies from case to case), an important point that arises here is that it 
is not always easy to identify whether in a specific situation the right to demonstrate or 
the protection of mission premises should be deemed as a priority. Thus, in the next 
chapter, various solutions will be discussed so as to try to lessen the difficulties faced by 
the receiving State, if not totally settle the dilemma. 
6.2 Controversies Arising from the Protection of Diplomatic Agents 
and the Respect of the Right of Expression 
Apart from the controversies that arise in relation to the protection of the diplomatic 
mission, the controversies that arise from the protection of diplomatic agents should not 
be overlooked. With regard to the protection of the diplomatic agents, it is the respect of 
the right of expression that mainly causes conflict and dilemma. In this section, the 
controversies arising from the protection of diplomatic agents and the respect of the 
right of expression will be examined. Thanks to the similarity between the controversies 
arising in this scenario and the scenario discussed in the above section, this section will 
focus on the distinct issues arising in this scenario.  
6.2.1 The respect of the right of expression in contemporary international law 
Before the examination of the controversies, it is necessary briefly to summarise the 
regime governing the right of expression in contemporary international law.
46
 Like the 
right to demonstrate (as a specific form of the right of assembly), respect for right of 
expression originated in later eighteenth century.
47
 Since then, it has always been 
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regarded as one of the most significant human rights.
48
 Like the respect of the right to 
demonstrate, in contemporary international law the respect of the right of expression has 
been stipulated in various international and regional human rights documents. On the 
international level, the respect of the right of expression appears in Article 19 of the 
UDHR and Article 19 of the ICCPR. On the regional level, similar provisions appear in 
Article 10 of the ECHR, Article 13 of the ACHR, Article 9 of the ACPHR and Article 
32 of the Arab Charter. 
Also as with the right of assembly, there are certain limits to the exercise of the right of 
expression. The oldest example can be seen in Article 11 of the French Declaration of 
the Rights of Man and of the Citizen 1789 where it is expressly mentioned that the 
person who enjoys this right ‘shall be responsible for such abuses of this freedom as 
shall be defined by law’. In the ECHR, the proviso is further elaborated: 
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, 
may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of 
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder 
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation 
or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in 
confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
49
 
A similar but simplified version appears later in Article 19.3 of the ICCPR, which states: 
The exercise of the rights [of expression] carries with it special duties and 
responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall 
only be such as are provided by law and necessary: 
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; 
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(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of 
public health or morals. 
Both provisions emphasize the limits of the exercise of the right of expression, in 
particular, by providing for the respect or protection of the rights or reputation of others. 
It can be inferred that the abuse of the right of expression, for instance, when an 
individual insults another individual, that that individual’s right of expression will no 
longer be protected by the relevant provision in an international human rights treaty. 
This is similar to a demonstration which is not ‘peaceful’. 
It is also not difficult to identify other similarities between the limits to the right of 
expression and the right to demonstrate discussed earlier in this chapter. For instance, 
both enumerate the requirement for compliance with laws and regulations in order to 
protect other important interests (national security, public other, public health or morals, 
etc). 
6.2.2 Balancing the right of expression and the protection of the dignity of the 
diplomatic agent: a dilemma faced by the authorities of the receiving State 
As was examined in Chapter 3, the receiving State has a special duty of protecting the 
diplomatic agent, both in terms of his personal safety and his dignity, from any form of 
attack.
50
 Failing to provide such protection will give rise to State responsibility as 
discussed in Chapter 4. Since the receiving State also has its international obligation of 
respecting the right of expression, it will face a dilemma when there is conflict between 
the respect of the right of expression and the protection of the diplomatic agent, in 
which case they have to decide which norm should prevail. With regard to the dilemma, 
three issues are worth considering. 
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First, it is worth pointing out that when an individual or a group of people breach the 
basic rule governing the right of expression, such as attacking the person of the 
diplomatic agent or insulting the diplomatic agent in public, there is no doubt that the 
authorities of the receiving State should consider the inviolability of the diplomatic 
agent as a priority. As stipulated in Article 19.3 of the ICCPR, the person who exercises 
the right of expression also bears the responsibility and special duty not to abuse the 
right. Actions such as attacking another person’s body or insulting another person 
definitely breach the limits of the right of expression. In that case, his exercise of the 
right of expression is no longer protected by international human rights law, and 
consequently, he must be responsible for his action and will probably be arrested and 
even prosecuted by the receiving State, as stipulated and required in Articles 2 and 3 of 
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally 
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents 1973.
51
 A recent case is worth 
mentioning. On 27 August 2012, the car of the Japanese ambassador to China was 
intercepted in Beijing by two private Chinese individuals. The national flag of Japan 
was torn from the ambassador’s vehicle during the incident.52 In this case, though the 
ambassador was physically unhurt, it is beyond serious doubt that his personal dignity 
was impaired by the attacker. China, the receiving State in this case, took action to 
punish the attackers. It was reported that the two attackers were arrested and sentenced 
to five days’ detention.53 
Secondly, the same difficulty in determining the impairment of the dignity of the 
diplomatic mission also appears in the case of the dignity of the diplomatic agent. In the 
                                                 
 
51
 Hereafter referred to as the IPP Convention. 
52
 ‘Vehicle Carrying Japan's Ambassador to China Attacked in Beijing’ (The Diplomat, 27 August 2012) 
<http://thediplomat.com/2012/08/vehicle-carrying-japans-ambassador-to-china-attacked-in-beijing/> 
accessed 27 June 2014.  
53
 ‘Two Held in China over Attack on Japanese Envoy's Car’ (BBC News, 2 September 2012) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-19473048> accessed 24 June 2014. 
 236 
 
above case, the car of the Japanese ambassador was intercepted and the national flag of 
Japan was torn in front of the ambassador. Such actions are an obvious impairment to 
the dignity of the ambassador. However, it is well recognised that not all incidents 
involving the possible impairment of the dignity of the diplomatic agent are as easy to 
determine as the aforementioned incident, and so, each incident has to be reviewed 
individually. Here the famous early case of Respublica v De Longchamps
54
 which 
involved the impairment of the dignity of a consul is worth mentioning. On 17 May 
1784, De Longchamps ‘was heard to exclaim in a loud and menacing tone’, saying ‘I 
will dishonour you!’ to the French consul general Francis Barbé-Marbois.55 Two days 
later, on the 19 May 1784, Longchamps met the French consul in the street and ‘struck 
the cane’ of the consul. Here two controversies arise. First, whether the slight oral 
offence (that is, the specific sentence of ‘I will dishonour you!’) amounts to the 
impairment of the dignity of the consul? Second, whether the action of striking the cane 
of the consul amount to the impairment of the dignity of the consul? In the judgment of 
the case, Chief Justice M’Kean of the Court of Oyer and Terminer pointed out that:  
As to the assault, this is, perhaps, one of that kind, in which the insult is more to be 
considered, than the actual damage; for, though no great bodily pain is suffered by 
a blow on the palm of the hand, or the skirt of the coat, yet these are clearly within 
the legal definition of Assault and Battery, and among gentlemen, too often induce 
duelling, and terminate in murder. As, therefore, anything attached to the person, 
partakes of its inviolability; De Longchamps' striking Monsieur Marbois' cane, is a 
sufficient justification of that gentleman's subsequent conduct.
56
 
It can be seen from the above comment that even slight oral offence and slight impolite 
action would be considered as the impairment of the dignity of the diplomatic agent 
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(though in this case the victim is a consul, not a diplomatic agent). Probably, the reason 
why the slight offence in the above case can be justly considered as attack on the dignity 
of the diplomatic agent can be best explained by the classic text of Vattel: 
 It is true that the sovereign should protect every man who happens to be in his 
States, whether citizen or alien, and keep him secure from all violence; but this care 
is due in a higher degree to a foreign minister. An act of violence towards an 
individual is an ordinary crime which a prince may pardon according to 
circumstances; but if it is committed against a public minister it becomes a crime of 
State and an offence against the Law of Nations...
57
  
Though the case of Respublica v De Longchamps can serve as an example of how to 
determine the impairment of the dignity of the diplomatic agent, it is worth emphasizing 
that the case happened in late eighteenth century, over two hundred years ago. At that 
time the law of international human rights had yet to develop. Even the right of 
expression was a newly developed concept. Thus, whether the judgment in that case can 
serve as a precedent for recent cases is questionable, especially in countries where 
constitutional right of expression are strongly protected.
58
 It should be reiterated that the 
wording of ‘treat him with due respect and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any 
attack on his dignity’ in Article 29 of the VCDR does not denote that the receiving State 
has to suppress the right of expression as a necessary measure to protect the dignity of 
the diplomatic agent. Therefore, it may be difficult to determine whether a spat 
involving a diplomatic agent with an ironic comic published in a newspaper insinuating 
about a diplomatic agent can really be deemed as ‘impairment to the dignity’ of the 
diplomatic agent and that the related author should be punished. Evidently, when the 
authorities of the receiving State face a complaint from a diplomatic agent, they have to 
make their own judgment carefully, otherwise they may either be accused of failing to 
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carry out their duty under Article 22.2 of the VCDR by the sending State, or be accused 
of failing to respect the right of expression by their own citizens. 
Last but not least, there is one final thorny issue which cannot be overlooked. All the 
above sections deal with the inviolability of the diplomatic agent. However, it should be 
noted that according to Articles 37.1 and 37.2 of the VCDR, the protection of the 
dignity of a diplomatic agent also applies to the family members of the diplomatic agent, 
as well as the administrative and technical staff of the mission and their family members 
as long as they are not nationals or permanent residents of the receiving State. In 
addition, according to Article 38 of the VCDR, a diplomatic agent who is a national of 
or permanent resident of the receiving State enjoys inviolability in respect of official 
acts performed in the exercise of his functions, which suggests that his dignity should be 
protected. With regard to the family members, the possible impairment of their dignity 
is even more difficult to determine as they rarely get involved in diplomatic functions. 
Moreover, they are more easily accessible by members of the general public. It is 
doubtful whether the authorities of the receiving State will be able to deal with all 
complaints from the diplomatic agents about the impairment of the dignity of the wife 
or children of that diplomatic agent. For instance, if a teacher scolds the son of an 
ambassador in the class in a primary school, should the teacher be investigated and 
prosecuted for the possible impairment of the dignity of the son of the ambassador? Or 
if the wife of an ambassador has a quarrel with another woman due to some personal 
affairs between the ambassador and that woman, should the authorities punish that 
woman for verbal abuse? In these situations it is well beyond the ‘appropriate steps’ 
requirement for the receiving State to take actions against the other parties. This might 
be even more problematic in relation to the protection of the dignity of the family 
members of the administrative and technical staff of the mission. All of these situations 
reflect the dilemma of the authorities of the receiving State, and obviously, it is not 
correct and appropriate to disregard the right of expression of the general public or a 
private individual so as to favour the dignity of the family members of the diplomatic 
personnel. 
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To sum up, the aforementioned three issues reflect the controversies arising from the 
protection of the dignity of the diplomatic agent and the respect of the right of 
expression, which gives rise to the dilemma faced by the authorities of the receiving 
State. Like the controversy and dilemma concerning the protection of the diplomatic 
mission, it is not easy to determine whether the protection of the diplomatic agent 
should always be prior to the respect of the right of expression. In the next chapter, 
several solutions which aim at settling the related issues will be proposed. 
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Chapter 7    Settling the Controversies and 
Dilemmas: Traditional and Alternative Solutions 
The previous two chapters focused on the controversies arising from conflicts between 
the principle of the diplomatic inviolability and other norms of international law. The 
conflicts, as noted at the beginning of the thesis, reflect one remarkable theoretical issue 
in contemporary international law, that is, the fragmentation of international law.
1
 
Accordingly, the crux of the issue lies in how to find solutions that effectively mitigate 
the conflicts between diplomatic law and other norms of international law, and at the 
same time, not radically change the contemporary regime of diplomatic law or 
undermine the basis of public international law. Since the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability is closely associated with State practice, it is essential to examine solutions 
from the perspectives of both theory and practice of not only diplomatic law but also of 
public international law in general. Moreover, the feasibility of certain solutions must 
be considered.  
This chapter has two sections. In the first section, various traditional solutions proposed 
by international law scholars will be examined. These solutions exemplify some of the 
most influential and representative solutions proposed by well-known international law 
scholars. In the second section, several alternative solutions which may be regarded as 
suggestions and recommendations to the authorities of the receiving State will also be 
proposed.  
                                                 
 
1
 See the Introduction section of the thesis. 
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7.1 Traditional Solutions to the Controversies 
As was noted in previous chapters, the controversies arising from conflicts between the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability and other norms of international law are by no 
means a recent development in the evolution of the principle of the diplomatic 
inviolability. Some controversies, such as the application of the right of self-defence 
against the personal inviolability of the diplomatic agent, had been discussed in classic 
treatises of international law as early as the Classical Period of the seventeenth and 
eighteen century.
2
 It is of less doubt that, since the adoption and entry into force of the 
VCDR, international law scholars keep providing their considerations on contemporary 
issues such as the conflict between the inviolability of mission premises and the right to 
demonstrate — a ‘new’ issue which was not possibly analysed by scholars in the 
Classical Periods, as well as reviewing their predecessors’ insightful comments on the 
‘classic’ issues such as the applicability of the right of self-defence in extreme situations. 
Meanwhile, State practice since the adoption and entry into force of the VCDR also 
reveals the consideration of State parties to the VCDR on both the classic and new 
issues. It is these very facts that form the traditional solutions discussed here in this 
section. 
7.1.1 Traditional solutions proposed by scholars 
Four traditional solutions are of particular importance and will be discussed in the 
following paragraphs. 
a) The strict application of the principle of diplomatic inviolability 
The very first solution to the controversies arising from the conflict between the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability and other norms of international law is actually a 
simple and straightforward one. It requires the strict application of the principle of 
                                                 
 
2
 See the discussion by Grotius, Wicquefort, Bynkershoek and Vattel on the applicability of the right of 
self-defence in Chapter 5, section 5.2.2 (b). 
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diplomatic inviolability by the authorities of the receiving State in all circumstances. 
This requires that Articles 22, 27 and 29 of the VCDR must be strictly construed and 
observed in all cases. Accordingly, such application means an absolute and unqualified 
inviolability. Tunkin, Hardy and Nahlik are three of many proponents of this solution. 
They all recalled the discussion over the absolute nature of the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability during the drafting process in the ILC and concluded that the strict 
application of the principle of diplomatic inviolability is the correct interpretation of 
relevant provisions in the VCDR. According to Tunkin: 
International relations would be seriously impaired, it said, if the authorities of the 
country of residence were given the right to enter the premises of missions in 
exceptional cases, without the consent of the head of the mission.
3
 
Similarly, with regard to the absolute inviolability of the diplomatic bag, Tunkin 
commented: 
[I]f the country of residence were given the right to refuse passage to diplomatic 
mails on the suspicion that they contained objects barred from import and export, 
there was the possibility that this channel of communications would be closed 
altogether.
4
 
Hardy also provides a very similar argument: 
If a unilateral power of determination were given to the receiving State in one 
context, for example, with respect to the outbreak of fire, by parity of reasoning the 
power should extend, or might in practice be extended, to acts based on other 
paramount necessities, such as those of state security—and this no sending State 
wished to see. Thus, even if a mission fails to use its premises in accordance with 
legitimate purposes, its inviolability must still be respected by the receiving State.
5
 
                                                 
 
3
 G Tunkin, ‘Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations’ (1961) 6 International Affairs 51, 54. 
4
 Ibid. 
5
 M Hardy, Modern Diplomatic Law (Manchester 1968) 44. 
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With regard to the personal inviolability of diplomatic agents, Hardy follows the same 
logic: 
[I]f, for example, the diplomatic is endangering the immediate physical safety of 
members of the public...In extreme cases of this kind the receiving State may be 
expected to take steps necessary to prevent the diplomat from committing crimes or 
offences. Neither the International Law Commission nor the Vienna Conference 
wished, however, to introduce any express exceptions to the general principle of 
inviolability of members of mission staff from arrest or detention, thus following 
the same attitude as was adopted in the case of inviolability of premises and 
property.
6
 
Nahlik also commented on the absolute inviolability of the mission premises stipulated 
in Article 22 of the VCDR by stating that: 
The question was discussed and the opinion prevailed that providing for the 
possibility of a presumed consent, even in exceptional cases only, could be 
construed in a way encouraging the authorities of the receiving State to presume 
the occurrence of such an exceptional situation. Therefore, no such possibility was 
mentioned and the noun ‘consent’ is not accompanied by any adjective.7 
The reason that these three scholars felt worried about any exception to the absolute 
inviolability is clear: the exception to the general rule of absolute inviolability would 
inevitably lead to the abuse of the unilateral power of determining ‘extreme situations’ 
by the authorities of the receiving State, and so, the security of the mission premises, 
and possibly the security of the confidential mission archives will be compromised. 
Even the personal freedom of diplomatic agents may be manipulated by the authorities 
of the receiving State. In fact, the infamous fire incident in which KGB agents posed as 
firefighters
8
 provides a vivid illustration of how vulnerable the mission archives will be 
                                                 
 
6
 Ibid 51. 
7
 SE Nahlik, ‘Development of Diplomatic Law: Selected Problems’ (1990) 222 Recueil Des Cours 187, 
275. 
8 ‘KGB Snooped During Embassy Fire’ (Los Angeles Times, 1 May 1991) 
<http://articles.latimes.com/1991-05-01/news/mn-1029_1_classified-operations> accessed 26 June 2014, 
also cited in Chapter 5, section 5.2.2 (a) (i).  
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if the authorities of the receiving State are entitled to enter the mission premises without 
the consent of the head of the mission, in the situation of a fire or similar scenarios. 
Moreover, if the authorities of the receiving State were given the unilateral power to 
determine an ‘extreme’ situation, they may be tempted themselves to set a fire around 
the mission premises and then enter the mission premises on their own initiative. Just as 
Sen commented on the discussion during the drafting discussion in the ILC: 
Such a power in the hands of the receiving State may well lead to abuse as 
situations could be created as a pretext to enable the local officials to enter the 
premises, such as by throwing an incendiary bomb.
9
 
Such serious consequence may not be imaginary, if the absolute inviolability of mission 
premises was defeated by certain exceptions. Based on the deduction above, similar 
conclusions can be formed with regard to the absolute inviolability of diplomatic agents 
and diplomatic property. 
This traditional and straightforward solution obviously has its merit. Indeed, this 
solution is based on the authentic ‘black-letter’ interpretation of the original provisions 
providing for the principle of diplomatic inviolability in the VCDR. It also reflects the 
deep misgivings expressed by scholars and by commissioners and delegates during the 
drafting discussions in the ILC and the Vienna Conference.
10
 Thus, this solution 
represents the orthodox theory and practice of the principle of diplomatic inviolability 
that has generally been observed by States. 
On the other hand, the major shortcoming of this solution is also conspicuous. The 
‘Achilles’ heel’ of this solution is that it fails to take into account the recent 
development of other branches of international law, especially international human 
rights law. As can be seen above, most proponents of this solution based their 
                                                 
 
9
 B Sen, A Diplomat’s Handbook of International Law and Practice (3rd edn, Martinus Nijhoff 1988) 
113. 
10
 EL Kerley, ‘Some Aspects of the Vienna Conference on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities’ 
(1962) 56 AJIL 88, 102-103, 116-118. 
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arguments on the discussion in the ILC and at the Vienna Conference, which took place 
well over fifty years ago. The proponents themselves are scholars of the 1960s when the 
Cold War was at its height. International relations during that time had mostly negative 
influence on diplomatic contact, and so, the absolute inviolability of mission premises, 
diplomatic agents and diplomatic property (especially the diplomatic bag) was justly 
regarded as the most essential way to protect the diplomatic activity of the sending State. 
However, with the progressive development of international human rights law as well as 
other branches of international law, absolute inviolability has been facing more and 
more challenges. As analysed in the previous two chapters, the necessity of protecting 
national security, public safety and human life and the development of international 
human rights law frequently requires the authorities of the receiving State to reconsider 
the ‘black and white’ stipulation of the principle of diplomatic inviolability in the 
VCDR. Finally, the jurisprudence of the ICJ—one source of the  principle of diplomatic 
inviolability, expressly points out that the inviolability of diplomatic agents is by no 
means absolute if there is a necessity to forestall an ongoing crime.
11
 To sum up, it can 
be argued that the traditional solution of sticking to the strict application of the principle 
of diplomatic inviolability has already faced the problem of how to follow up the recent 
development of international law. 
b) Overriding the principle of diplomatic inviolability when there are ‘serious 
reasons’ 
The second traditional solution to the controversy is perhaps of equal importance to the 
first one, except for the very fact that this solution adopts the opposite method. While 
the first solution requires the strict application of the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability, the second solution calls for the flexible interpretation and application of 
Articles 22, 27 and 29 of the VCDR. In fact, the most radical proponents of this solution 
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 Case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v 
Iran) [1980] ICJ Rep 3, para 86. 
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argue that whenever there appears to be a necessity to protect other vital interests, or 
whenever there are ‘serious reasons’ to challenge the inviolability of diplomatic 
premises, diplomatic agents or diplomatic property, the inviolability should be 
overridden so as to protect other interests, including specifically the security of the State, 
public safety, or human life. Mann is one of the proponents of this solution. According 
to Mann:  
[I]t is suggested that the inviolability of a mission’s premises is by no means 
absolute, but must give way if the mission has allowed such dangers to arise in its 
premises as to provoke the receiving State and take measures reasonably necessary 
to protect the security of the life and property of the inhabitants.
12
 
Mann’s argument is supported by a group of other scholars who provide similar 
comments. Beaumont, for instance, thoroughly reviewed the argument presented during 
the discussion in the UK Foreign Affairs Committee following the notorious shooting of 
policewoman Fletcher in April 1984, concluded that the doctrine of self-defence 
‘remains, in the proper context, a legitimate exception to the general principle of 
diplomatic inviolability.’13 By asserting the possibility of invoking the right of self-
defence against the principle of diplomatic inviolability, Beaumont obviously supports 
what Mann had contended.  
In addition to those who ardently advocate the natural priority of protecting national 
security, public safety and human life, there are some other scholars who adopt a similar 
but more moderate solution. Although these scholars admit the possibility and 
legitimacy of overriding the principle of diplomatic inviolability under extreme 
situations, they emphasize the need for caution if overriding the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability. They typically argue that such solution can only be used as a last result—
                                                 
 
12
 FA Mann, ‘“Inviolability” and other Problems of the VCDR’ in FA Mann, Further Studies in 
International Law (OUP 1990) 336. 
13
 JS Beaumont, ‘Self-Defence as a Justification for Disregarding Diplomatic Immunity’ (1991) 29 
Canadian Yearbook of International Law 393- 398. 
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truly this condition is what the right of self-defence under customary international law 
required. For instance, Denza holds the opinion that: 
In the last resort, however, it cannot be excluded that entry without the consent of 
the sending State may be justified in international law by the need to protect human 
life.
14
  
Sir Ivor Roberts in the latest edition of Satow’s Diplomatic Practice provides a similar 
comment, though he refers to the situation of protecting national security instead of the 
protection of human life: 
Entry in such circumstances of threat to national security can only be justified, if at 
all, as a measure of self-defence.
15
 
Similar assertions are also presented by McClanahan
16
 and Wilson.
17
  
The merit of this solution lies in that it provides enough flexibility for the receiving 
State to apply the principle of diplomatic inviolability, in response to various dilemmas 
faced by their authorities. By permitting its authorities to override the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability, the receiving State may effectively forestall subversive 
activities which will otherwise threaten its national security, or in other scenarios, stop 
an ongoing crime committed by a diplomatic agent, or save a victim who had been 
abducted and put in a crate labelled as a diplomatic bag as happened in the Dikko 
incident. By way of adopting this solution, vital interests (the national security of 
receiving State, public safety and human life) can be effectively protected. 
However, the shortcomings of this solution are also obvious.  First of all, there is a 
practical difficulty. To what extent can the authorities of the receiving State determine a 
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so-called ‘extreme situation’ or prove that there exist ‘serious reasons’ to override 
diplomatic inviolability? Especially with regard to the inviolability of diplomatic bags, 
it is extremely difficult for authorities to prove ‘serious reasons’ to challenge the content 
of the diplomatic bag, without adopting some method that itself amounts to a virtual 
breach of inviolability.
 18
 Even the use of sniffer dogs may be considered as an insult to 
the dignity of the sending State. Furthermore, for scholars who propose the adoption of 
this solution only as a last result to protect national security or human life, there is the 
added difficulty of how to define the concept of ‘last result’? In fact, in many situations, 
there may have other feasible methods to bring certain threats to an end. Contacting the 
head of the mission, or even the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the sending State, is 
always better than directly overriding the inviolability of diplomatic premises, 
diplomatic agents and diplomatic bags. 
Secondly, there is also a theoretical difficulty. As the judgement of the ICJ in the 
Tehran Hostages Case points out: 
The rules of diplomatic law, in short, constitute a self-contained regime which, on 
the one hand, lays down the receiving State’s obligations regarding the facilities, 
privileges and immunities to be accorded to diplomatic missions and, on the other, 
foresees their possible abuse by members of the mission and specifies the means at 
the disposal of the receiving States to counter such abuse.
 19
 
This assertion suggests that generally the principle of diplomatic inviolability shall not 
be overridden by rules outside the regime of diplomatic law. Moreover, with regard to 
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the development of international human rights law, the ILC’s Conclusion of the Work 
of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law suggests that:  
In case of conflicts or overlaps between treaties in different regimes, the question 
of which of them is later in time would not necessarily express any presumption of 
priority between them. Instead, States bound by the treaty obligations should try to 
implement them as far as possible with the view of mutual accommodation and in 
accordance with the principle of harmonization.
20
 
Furthermore, as was noted in Chapter 5, apparently the theoretical method of 
determining the hierarchy of norms in international law cannot provide a satisfactory 
answer to the conflict.
21
 Contrary to the assertion of some scholars, even the protection 
of human life is not generally recognised as a rule of jus cogens or one of the 
peremptory norms of international law.
22
 Therefore, on what theoretical grounds can 
scholars who support the solution of overriding diplomatic inviolability to protect other 
interests validate their assertions? Even considering the existence of customary 
international law norm of protecting these interests, it is not particularly convincing to 
argue that the protection of specific human rights, for instance, the right of demonstrate, 
shall be a priority over the dignity of the diplomatic agent. It is absolutely true that 
certain interests are protected both under treaty law and customary international law.
23
 
However, it is also true that the principle of diplomatic inviolability is also well 
established both in treaty law and customary international law, and undoubtedly, the 
inviolability of diplomatic agents has a much longer history than any human rights 
norms.
24
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Therefore, the assertion provided by those scholars that argue that the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability should be overridden by the necessity to protect national 
security, public safety, human life and other human rights norms is far from perfectly 
settling the controversy. 
c) Amending the VCDR or drafting a new multilateral convention 
In addition to the above two major solutions which reflects the different interpretation 
of the original provisions in the VCDR, there are two other solutions which call for 
change in the current legal regime of the principle of diplomatic inviolability. One 
solution requires the necessary amendment to the absolute inviolability stipulated in the 
VCDR. The major argument is that by amending the original provisions in the VCDR to 
bring them in line with the similar provisions in the VCCR, most of the controversy will 
be solved. As noted in Chapter 5, the VCCR stipulates that the consent from the head of 
the mission can be ‘assumed in case of fire or other disaster requiring prompt protective 
action’.25 It is also worth noting that the personal inviolability of consular officers is not 
absolute. According to Article 41.1 of the VCCR: 
Consular officers shall not be liable to arrest or detention pending trial, 
except in the case of a grave crime and pursuant to a decision by the 
competent judicial authority. 
Moreover, the consular bag is also subjected to the ‘challenge and return’ option which 
is evidently accepted in customary international law.
26
  All of these provisions in the 
VCCR provide an attractive and seemingly effective solution to the conflicts between 
the application of the principle of diplomatic inviolability and other norms and vital 
interests. However, such a solution itself faces both theoretical and practical difficulties. 
Theoretically, the distinction between diplomatic inviolability and consular inviolability 
should not be blurred, especially with regard to the distinction between the diplomatic 
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premises and consular premises.  One authority of consular law incisively points out 
three reason that distinguish the absolute inviolability of diplomatic premises and the 
conditional inviolability of consular premises: 
First, embassies, though no longer regarded as ‘exterritorial’ in the sense of 
being territory of the sending State, symbolise its sovereignty, which would 
be denigrated by entry without permission. Second, embassies typically 
house more politically sensitive documents, thus requiring greater 
safeguards against intrusion. Third, embassies are typically housed in 
detached buildings, so that a fire hazard is contained, whereas consulates are 
often located in parts of downtown office buildings.
27
 
Evidently, such distinction also exists with regard to the inviolability of diplomatic 
agents and diplomatic bags, due to the very different nature of diplomatic agents and 
diplomatic bags. 
Practically, amending the original provisions in the VCDR to reflect the similar 
provision in the VCCR is by no means an easy task. In the first place, the VCDR does 
not include provisions on how to amend it. Thus, according to the general rule of 
multilateral treaty amendment, the possible amendment of the VCDR may require all 
the 190 State parties to agree on the amendment, or at least require a vote of two-thirds 
of the State parties to adopt the amendment.
28 
Whatever the procedure is adopted, it is 
obvious that ‘the mechanism for securing amendment is cumbersome and uncertain, and 
the prospects for securing agreement to amendment are poor’, as commented in the UK 
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Foreign Affairs Committee’s Report on the Abuse of Diplomatic Immunities and 
Privileges.
29
 
There is another solution that requires change of the current legal regime of the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability, though it does not call for amendment of the 
VCDR. Instead, it requires the draft of a brand new multilateral convention on relevant 
topics. Based on the principle of ‘lex specialis derogat generali’ and ‘lex posterior 
derogat priori’, were this new convention to enter into force, its rules would supersede 
the old rules in the VCDR, and therefore, solve the controversial issues. However, the 
very fact that the Draft Articles on the Status of the Diplomatic Courier and the 
Diplomatic Bag not Accompanied by Diplomatic Courier 1989 failed to become a 
multilateral convention vividly illustrate how much divergence among States on various 
issues regarding the inviolability of diplomatic bags, not to mention the other 
divergence on the inviolability of diplomatic premises and diplomatic agents.
 
 Overall, it 
can be concluded that both the proposed solution of amending the VCDR and the draft 
of a brand new convention are not feasible. 
7.1.2 Reflections on the traditional solutions  
The above four traditional solutions to the controversy arising from the conflicts 
between the principle of diplomatic inviolability and other norms of international law 
are not perfect. In fact, none of the four solutions is able to perfectly tackle the dilemma 
faced by the authorities of the receiving State. The first solution obviously reflects a 
much conventional application of the principle of diplomatic inviolability. Admittedly, 
the strict application of the principle of diplomatic inviolability is indeed consist with 
the intention of the drafters of the VCDR. However, it should be admitted that the 
drafters of the Convention in the 1960s were not able to envisage the negative 
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consequence of abuse of the diplomatic inviolability. Neither could they predict the 
rapid development of international human rights law and the jurisprudence of the ICJ. 
Although this solution is probably still the default choice adopted by most receiving 
States when they faced the dilemma whether the principle of diplomatic inviolability or 
other norms and interests shall prevail, its applicability has been challenged frequently. 
To ignore the protection of other vital interests, especially the necessity to protect 
human life in emergency, will receive more criticism than the observing diplomatic law 
will be praised.  
The second solution, though it provides an attractive solution to the controversy, cannot 
be free from both theoretical and practical difficulties. Theoretically this solution fails to 
address the issue of balancing and harmonizing different norms in international law. As 
has been noted, the Conclusion of the Work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of 
International Law calls for the observation of different treaty norms, and the State 
should endeavour to harmonize them. This solution actually advocates the opposite 
method and may inevitably intensify the conflict between diplomatic law and other 
norms. Practically, the authorities of the receiving State face the difficulty of 
determining what constitutes ‘serious reasons’ and ‘extreme situations’. Without the 
determination of these two terms, it would be untenable for them to challenge the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability. The paradox is that in certain situations, they are 
unable to identify an abuse of inviolability without themselves effectively breaching the 
relevant inviolability, particularly in the case of the inviolability of the diplomatic bag. 
The third and fourth solutions, though avoiding the theoretical controversy unsolved by 
the former two solutions, are unfeasible. The fact is that most State parties to the VCDR 
are reluctant to make any radical change to the contemporary regime of diplomatic law, 
reflecting their misgivings to concede the principle of diplomatic inviolability to other 
norms of international law. After all, the change from absolute inviolability to 
conditional inviolability will ultimately affect the inviolability of their missions, 
diplomatic agents and diplomatic bags. To conclude, it can be asserted that the 
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aforementioned four traditional solutions fail to settle the controversy perfectly. 
Therefore, some alternative solutions need to be considered. 
7.2 Alternative Solutions to the Controversies 
As was noted above, one of the major shortcomings of the traditional solutions is that in 
theory, neither diplomatic law nor international human rights law can secure a higher 
position in the hierarchy of norms in international law. This applies equally to the 
protection of human life and State security or other similar norms. The traditional 
solutions proposed by international law scholars cannot overcome the difficulties of 
determining which norm shall prevail over other norms. Scholarly debates on whether 
the protection of State security or human life shall override the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability inevitably end in deadlock. Neither diplomatic law scholars nor human 
rights law scholars can persuade the other side to admit the superior position of their 
law. Even though it can be envisaged that in the near future, the traditional solutions 
may still dominate the mainstream discussion on the controversy arising from the 
conflicts between the principle of diplomatic inviolability and other norms of 
international law, some alternative solutions are worth noting. After all, issues of 
diplomatic inviolability are not purely academic concerns. They are of great importance 
to the diplomatic relations of States and the conduct of international affairs. Therefore, 
the identification of feasible solutions is critical.  In general, the four alternative 
solutions to be discussed in the following sections avoid the traditional approach of 
determining which norms shall prevail or whether the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability stipulated in the VCDR should be changed or superseded. Instead, these 
solutions propose practical recommendations to the receiving State and may help the 
authorities to tackle the dilemma with which they are faced in certain scenarios. 
7.2.1 Alternative solutions to the controversies 
a) Permitting the breach of inviolability without alternating the existing law: the 
‘hard case’ solution 
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The first alternative solution is proposed in more general terms by one reputable scholar 
of international law and now judge of the ICJ. In his article ‘NATO, the UN and the Use 
of Force: Legal Aspects’, Simma points out that: 
[T]here are ‘hard cases’ involving terrible dilemmas in which imperative political 
and moral considerations leave no choice but to act outside the law. The more 
isolated these instances remain, the less is their potential to erode the rules of 
international law. The possible boomerang effect of such breaches can never be 
excluded, but the danger can be reduced by spelling out the factors that make an ad 
hoc decision distinctive and minimize its precedential significance.
30
 
Based on Simma’s opinion, it can be argued that the dilemmas faced by the authorities 
of the receiving State may bring out ‘hard cases’ in which there seems no choice but to 
breach the international obligation. Some notorious incidents as mentioned in previous 
chapters can be regarded as ‘hard cases’. For instance, if the crate carrying Dikko was 
indeed correctly labelled as a diplomatic bag and it had the official seal on it, the UK 
official at the airport faced a ‘terrible dilemma’ of whether they should open the crate 
regardless of the actual breach of the inviolability of the diplomatic bag. According to 
Simma, the answer would be clear: undoubtedly, in this scenario, the diplomatic bag 
can be opened, for there were ‘imperative moral considerations’ and ‘no choice’ were 
left, apart from breaching the inviolability of the diplomatic bag. Moreover, Simma 
would emphasize that such a breach of the inviolability of the diplomatic bag does not 
mean the inviolability under Article 27.3 became conditional. He would argue that the 
breach of the inviolability of the diplomatic bag in the Dikko incident merely reflects 
how the authorities of the receiving State should act in such a ‘hard case’, and that 
breach of the obligation of the principle of diplomatic inviolability should not give rise 
to any precedent that negates absolute inviolability when there is a necessity to protect 
human life. Similarly, if in the Fletcher incident the Libyan embassy had become a 
fortress with individuals shooting continuously at the street, as Sir Francis Vallet 
                                                 
 
30
 B Simma, ‘NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects’ (1999) 10 EJIL 1, 22. 
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imagined, the UK police could enter the mission premises and do what was necessary to 
stop the shooting. Again, according to Simma’s theory, such an obvious breach of the 
inviolability of mission premises would not be treated as a precedent to the unqualified 
inviolability of mission premises under Article 22.1 of the VCDR.  
Simma’s ‘hard case’ solution definitely has its merit. Indeed, it provides a real practical 
solution for the authorities of the receiving State when they face the dilemma of 
determining whether they can ever override the principle of diplomatic inviolability in 
certain cases. Even though they will still be challenged by the sending State for their 
breach of the inviolability, their act can be at least justified if they can prove that they 
had no choice but to override the inviolability in certain situations.
31
 The essential point 
is that the ‘hard case’ solution will not change the principle of diplomatic inviolability, 
nor will it ever intend actually to exempt the authorities of the receiving State from their 
international obligations under the VCDR. The essence of this solution lies in the fact 
that the authorities of the receiving State are entitled to breach diplomatic law 
occasionally if circumstances so required. The breach of diplomatic law in these 
circumstances reflects a temporary necessity, an expedient, so as to save human life or 
protect public safety, State security and essential human rights. Thus, the legal 
framework of the VCDR is retained and no amendment is needed, and there is no 
further necessity to draft a brand new multilateral convention. Because this is only an 
expedient, no serious academic debate is necessary. No arguments that ‘diplomatic 
inviolability should prevail over human rights’ nor that ‘the protection of human life 
should override diplomatic inviolability’ would be worth arguing before adopting the 
decision whether or not diplomatic inviolability should be overridden in situations when 
‘imperative political and moral considerations’ so required. 
                                                 
 
31
 Though, as Simma contended, ‘[A]ny attempt at legal justification will ultimately remain 
unsatisfactory’. See ibid 14. 
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The key shortcoming of this solution is also obvious. As the term ‘hard case’ suggests, 
it reflects a relatively rare case, and so this solution should not be used frequently. 
Perhaps it coincides with what Denza suggests, as ‘the last resort’. 32  Thus, the 
application of this solution is limited to extreme, rare situations where no other feasible 
choices are available, and the situation must be extremely urgent, as can be seen in the 
Dikko incident (had the crate be a diplomatic bag) or the Fletcher incident (had the 
shooting continued and more people were dead or wounded). Such a limit means that 
the ‘hard case’ solution cannot be applied in less urgent situations. For instance, if the 
authorities of the receiving State suspect that a diplomatic bag contains items that might 
threaten the national security of the receiving State, they can demand the bag to be 
returned, but not to open the bag. Likewise, when a fire breaks out in the embassy 
premises, the firefighters of the receiving State should not enter the premises using their 
own initiative without first obtaining consent from the head of the mission, for they 
have other choices available such as to keep waiting until the head of mission felt that 
they really needed the firefighters’ aid. In short, as long as there are other available 
choices, this solution cannot be used. Another conspicuous shortcoming of this ‘hard 
case’ solution is actually envisaged by its very proposer, Simma. He admits that ‘the 
boomerang effect of such breaches can never be excluded’, which suggests that there is 
potential danger that even sporadic use of the ‘hard case’ solution may lead to further 
erosion of the existing legal framework. It is just like opening the Pandora’s Box: even 
if the receiving State does not intend to change the contemporary regime of the principle 
of diplomatic inviolability under the VCDR, nor does it pursue the exemption from its 
international obligations under the VCDR, potentially the resulting breaches of the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability may be regarded as precedents by other receiving 
States. And so, it may be inevitably that other receiving States follow the same solution 
and gradually the regime of the principle of diplomatic inviolability will be undermined. 
                                                 
 
32
 Denza (n 14) 150. 
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This may be very relevant if these States believe that the contemporary regime needs to 
be changed (opinio juris). As a result, it may ultimately lead to the formation of new 
customary international law governing the principle of diplomatic inviolability. Such a 
result may be too radical to be true. However, the potential danger should not be 
overlooked by diplomatic law scholars. 
b) Adopting administrative measures: improving coordination and cooperation 
Various administrative measures can also be adopted by the receiving State to tackle 
dilemmas. To be specific, if the receiving State can build up effective communication 
channels between its local authorities and the diplomatic mission of the sending State as 
well as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of the sending State, some practical 
difficulties may be solved. It is admitted that normally, foreign diplomatic mission will 
contact the MFA for important issues. However, it is also true that usually, contacts 
between embassies and the MFA of the receiving State are less efficient if some 
extraordinary situation happens. If there happens to be an earthquake or other natural 
disasters, the head of mission may not be able to contact the MFA of the receiving State 
if the ambassador himself is seriously wounded. In such scenarios the local authorities 
may be in confusion and face the dilemma of whether they should come to the rescue 
immediately, without obtaining the consent from the head of the mission. If there is an 
effective communication channel between them and the MFA of the sending State, such 
difficulties can be greatly reduced, and the dilemma arising from the conflict of the 
inviolability of mission premises and the necessity to protect human life may be solved. 
In such cases when the protection of human life is a great priority, it is better for them to 
obtain consent from the MFA of the sending State, and this is definitely more efficient 
than waiting for the MFA of the receiving State to contact the MFA of the sending State. 
In the situation where there is a planned demonstration outside the foreign embassy, if 
the local authorities can notify the foreign diplomatic mission in advance, they can help 
the diplomatic mission assess the possible danger and therefore, decide whether the 
embassy need extra protection by the local police. If such coordination and cooperation 
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are made in time, the dilemma arising from the conflict between the inviolability of 
mission premises and the respect of the right to demonstrate may not arise.  
This proposed solution requires much better coordination and cooperation between the 
local authorities (police, firefighters, etc) and foreign diplomatic mission. This can be 
achieved by setting up a direct hotline between the police bureau, the fire department 
and the foreign diplomatic mission, as well as the MFA of the sending State. As has 
been noted above, direct communication between the local authorities and the foreign 
diplomatic mission and the MFA of the sending State is evidently more effective than 
communication between the MFA of the receiving State and the foreign diplomatic 
mission, or between the MFA of the receiving State and the MFA of the sending State. 
As a result, the improvement of direct communication can greatly solve the dilemma 
faced by the authorities of the receiving State in certain scenarios. 
In addition to improvement in coordination and cooperation between the local 
authorities and the foreign diplomatic mission and the MFA of the sending State, the 
coordination and cooperation between the local authorities and the MFA of the 
receiving State also needs also to be improved. This is especially significant to help 
solving the dilemma arising from the conflict between the inviolability of mission 
premises and respect of the right to demonstrate. As suggested in the First Report from 
the UK Foreign Affairs Committee, the liaison between local police and the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office should be improved so that enough consultation will be received 
in time by the local police, so as to determine the nature of a planned demonstration.
33
 
Obviously, international lawyers in the MFA are far more familiar with diplomatic law 
than local police officers. And so, their advice may provide useful guidance for the local 
police to solve dilemma arising from the conflict between the inviolability of mission 
premises and the respect of the right to demonstrate.  
                                                 
 
33
 See UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, ‘The Abuse of Diplomatic Immunities and 
Privileges’ (1984/85 HC 127), para 125-126. 
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c) Making specific legislation 
With regard to the dilemma arising from conflict between the inviolability of mission 
premises and the right to demonstrate, there is another effective solution: making 
specific legislation to regulate demonstrations outside foreign diplomatic missions. As 
was noted in Chapter 6, the US government has its Statute of the District of Columbia to 
regulate the specific situation of demonstrations outside foreign diplomatic missions.
34
 
In Japan, the government has its Law on the Maintenance of Peace and Order of 
Surrounding Areas of the National Congress and Foreign Embassies 1988, in which 
Articles 5.1, 6 and 7 not only provide the regulation of the use of microphone speakers 
outside foreign embassy premises but also stipulates the relevant enforcement and 
punishment procedure if a violation of such regulation occurs.
35
 Specific legislation on 
demonstrations outside foreign diplomatic missions is much more effective in tackling 
dilemmas faced by the authorities of the receiving State than is legislation on 
demonstrations in general. Indeed, in the First Report from the UK Foreign Affairs 
Committee, Draper criticised the fact that neither the UK Metropolitan Police Act 1839 
nor the Public Order Act 1934 are effective to tackle with demonstrations outside 
foreign diplomatic missions.
36
 The Finnish Act on Public Meetings 1907, as noted in 
Chapter 6, also fails to address various practical difficulties.  
Compared with the legislation on demonstrations in general, the specific legislation on 
demonstrations outside foreign diplomatic missions has several advantages. First and 
foremost, such specific legislation can provide more practical regulations on the limits 
of a planned demonstration. For instance, it can expressly stipulate what a demonstrator 
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 See Chapter 6, section 6.1.3. 
35
 Japanese Research Institute of International Cases (ed), Diplomatic and Consular Relations (Keio 
University Press 1996) 72-73. Original text is  in Japanese. 
36
 ‘The Abuse of Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges’ (n 33) para 46. 
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can do and what he cannot do. This will probably reduce the potential threat of a 
demonstration to the mission premises. As the aforementioned Japanese legislation 
illustrates, the prohibition on using microphone speakers in the area surrounding a 
foreign embassy
37
 may greatly reduce the possibility of the intentional playing of loud 
noise by demonstrators, and accordingly, will reduce the possibility of raising the 
dilemma faced by the authorities of the receiving State. Similarly, the legislation can set 
a minimum safety distance between the mission premises and the demonstrators. 
Secondly, such specific legislation can also provide local authorities with practical 
guidance on how to control an ongoing demonstration. In essence, it will turn the rather 
subjective discretion into much more objective determination, to help the local police 
officers determine in which case they can take actions against the demonstrators, 
without violating their right to demonstrate. Thirdly, such legislation will also provide 
the legal basis for the determination of whether a demonstration meets its legal limits, 
since the right to demonstrate is only protected if it is in conformity with the stated law 
and regulations. In a word, enacting specific legislation on demonstrations outside 
foreign diplomatic missions can greatly facilitate the authorities of the receiving State in 
tackling the dilemmas arising from the conflict between the inviolability of mission 
premises and the respect of the right to demonstrate. Though this solution only applies 
to one specific dilemma, it is obviously a good alterative solution than those traditional 
solutions discussed in the former sections.  
d) Educating the general public about diplomatic law 
Last, but not least, it is worth proposing that educating the general public about 
diplomatic law may help in solving the dilemma faced by the authorities of the 
receiving State in several scenarios. Diplomatic law itself is not among everyman’s 
knowledge and the general public usually has prejudice toward diplomatic 
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 See Article 5.1 of the Law on the Maintenance of Peace and Order of Surrounding Areas of the 
National Congress and Foreign Embassies 1988. 
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inviolability.
38
 The prejudice may well lead to demonstration targeted at the foreign 
diplomatic missions, as well as encouraging attacks against the dignity of foreign 
diplomatic agents. The interception of the car of the Japanese ambassador in Beijing in 
August 2012 is a vivid example of such an incident.
39
 If the government of the receiving 
State can effectively educate its citizens about the core rules of the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability, such as not to attack diplomatic agents, similar incidents may 
be avoided. Accordingly, the authorities of the receiving State may face fewer dilemmas.  
7.2.2 Reflections on the alternative solutions 
The four alternative solutions discussed above can be distinguished from the traditional 
solutions in several aspects. First of all, these solutions avoid the traditional theoretical 
debates on whether the principle of diplomatic inviolability should be treated as 
absolute, and whether other norms of international law, especially the protection of 
human life and other essential human rights, should prevail over diplomatic inviolability 
in certain scenarios. Secondly, these solutions provide the authorities of the receiving 
Sate with practical guidance to settle the controversy, and effectively tackle with the 
dilemma to some extent. Thirdly, these solutions avoid impractical change of the 
current regime of diplomatic law under the VCDR, thus keeping the regime of 
diplomatic law relatively immune from the fragmentation of international law. They 
enhance the regime of diplomatic law as a self-contained regime. By focusing on 
administrative measures rather than pure theoretical debates, these solutions indeed 
provide more helpful guidance for the authorities of the receiving State to tackle with 
the dilemmas they may confront. 
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 GV McClanahan, Diplomatic Immunity: Principles, Practices, Problems (Hurst & Company 1989) 1. 
See also G Kaufman, ‘Is Diplomatic Immunity Necessary?’ in C Ashman and P Trescott, Outrage: An 
Investigation into the Abuse of Diplomatic Immunity (WH Allen 1986) 1-4. 
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 See the incident cited in Chapter 6, section 6.2.2. 
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Admittedly, it must be emphasized that these alternative solutions still have their limits. 
The above analysis reveals that some solutions can only be adopted with regard to 
specific scenarios, and not universally applied to all other dilemmas. These solutions are 
not the panacea to the controversy arising from the conflicts between the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability and other norms of international law. They cannot solve all the 
dilemmas faced by the authorities of the receiving State. That being said, these 
alternative solutions still provide their distinctive value for the authorities of the 
receiving State. As has been analysed above, by adopting these solutions, the authorities 
of the receiving State will be able to tackle the dilemmas they face more smoothly and 
more effectively and probably overcome the dilemmas. It is this merit that makes these 
solutions a valuable alternative to the traditional solutions to the controversies and 
dilemmas.  
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Conclusions 
The previous seven chapters deliver a comprehensive examination of the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability. In this final part of the thesis, a general summary of the thesis 
will be provided, which will be followed by an assessment of the future of the principle 
of diplomatic inviolability.  
General summary of the thesis 
Based on the analysis in these chapters, the following major points can be summarised: 
First, based on the examination of the historical evolution of the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability, it can be revealed that the old principle has successfully adapted itself to 
the vicissitude of diplomatic methods, diplomatic law and in particular, international 
law. The historical evolution vividly illustrates how the rudimentary customary rules of 
the principle of diplomatic inviolability of ancient times progressively evolved into a 
complicated system of treaty rules, now embracing not only one of the oldest rules of 
international law—the personal inviolability of diplomats, but also the inviolability of 
diplomatic premises and diplomatic property in which the hot-debated inviolability of 
the diplomatic bag is of particular importance. This evolution process reveals a 
significant fact that the principle of diplomatic inviolability has distinct relevance to the 
development of international law. It is due to this very fact that the significant 
development of the principle of diplomatic inviolability achieved in the Classical Period 
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It is also due to this fact that the recent 
remarkable development of international law brings new challenges to the old principle 
of diplomatic inviolability. Evidently, the emergence and development of new trends 
and phenomena in international law, such as international human rights law; the ever-
growing emphasis on the protection of national security and human life; the debate over 
the applicability of the right of self-defence; and the suggested fragmentation of 
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international law, all affect the continued application and significance of the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability. Indeed, the controversies revealed in Chapters 5 and 6 
illustrates the remarkable impact of other norms of international law have had on the 
established rules of the principle of diplomatic inviolability. 
Secondly, based on the examination of the core rules of the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability in the VCDR, it can be concluded that the contemporary regime of the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability under the VCDR successfully crystallises all the 
essential rules of the principle of diplomatic inviolability. In the first place, both of the 
two distinct aspects of the concept of diplomatic inviolability—the immunity from any 
interference and enforcement from the authorities of the receiving State and the positive 
protection by the receiving State, can be found expressly elaborated in various 
provisions in the VCDR, especially in Article 22 (the inviolability of mission premises) 
and Article 29 (the personal inviolability of diplomatic agents). Secondly, the modern 
theoretical basis of the principle of diplomatic inviolability is expressly mentioned in 
the preamble to the VCDR, which serves as a guideline principle to the application and 
interpretation of various provisions of the principle of diplomatic inviolability. There is 
no doubt that the theory of ‘extraterritoriality’ has been discarded, and the theory of 
‘functional necessity’ becomes the essential theoretical basis, which is supplemented by 
the theory of ‘representative character’. Thirdly, compared with former attempts at 
codification of diplomatic privileges and immunities by various institutions and private 
individuals in which the principle of diplomatic inviolability was only summarily 
mentioned,
1
 the VCDR provides a more comprehensive codification of all essential 
aspects of this cornerstone principle of international law. Indeed, the VCDR constitutes 
the first time in the thousand years’ evolution of the principle of diplomatic inviolability 
that all essential aspects of the principle—not only the oldest rule of personal 
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 See Chapter 2, section 2.2.4. The only documents which did provide a systematic codification of the 
rules of principle of diplomatic inviolability is the Harvard Draft. Nevertheless, important aspects such as 
the inviolability of diplomatic bags and the inviolability of diplomatic couriers were not mentioned.  
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inviolability of diplomatic agents, and the most important rule of the inviolability of 
diplomatic premises, but also miscellaneous rules such as the inviolability of diplomatic 
archives, diplomatic correspondence, diplomatic couriers and bags, and the inviolability 
of minor mission staff and family members – have been systematically stipulated. It can 
therefore be asserted that the VCDR contains the quintessence of the contemporary 
regime of the principle of diplomatic inviolability. 
Thirdly, based on the examination of the controversy over the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability in various scenarios, it can be emphasized that the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability — undoubtedly one of the oldest established principles of international law, 
being stipulated in one of the most acclaimed and widely ratified multilateral 
convention in contemporary international law — is nevertheless not free from 
controversies. As was discussed in Chapter 4, failure to observe the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability without a valid excuse constitutes a breach of the international 
obligation of the receiving State under the VCDR, which will ultimately give rise to 
State responsibility. On the other hand, ignoring the protection of other vital interests 
may bring about other issues, such as the potential threat to the national security of the 
receiving State, the threat to public safety and human life as well as to the potential 
breach of international obligations under international human rights treaties and 
domestic law. As was analysed in Chapters 5 and 6, the controversies arising from the 
conflicts between the principle of diplomatic inviolability as expressly elaborated in 
provisions such as Articles 22, 27 and 29 of the VCDR and other norms of international 
law such as the protection of national security, the protection of public safety and 
human life and respect for the right to demonstrate and freedom of expression as 
embodied in various international conventions as well as customary international law, 
reveal the extraordinary theoretical and practical difficulties in the actual State practice 
of the principle. These difficulties are represented by the dilemmas faced by the 
authorities of the receiving State in certain scenarios, from the necessity to forestall an 
imminent threat to the national security of the receiving State to the necessity to save 
human life from abusive shooting from a window inside mission premises; from the 
urgent rescue of wounded diplomatic personnel to granting permission for an organised 
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demonstration outside a foreign embassy. As was discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, these 
scenarios are not based on textbook style of pure academic discussions of this old 
principle of international law, but are truly relevant to real incidents that have occurred 
and continuing to occur almost every year if not every month or every day in 
international affairs.
2
 These controversies represent great challenges to the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability. Even though some of the controversies can be traced back to 
the classical period, they have become extraordinarily conspicuous in contemporary 
State practice. As a result, these controversies give rise to dilemmas in which the 
authorities of the receiving State have to determine whether they should override the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability so as to protect other vital interests derived from 
norms of international law. 
Fourthly, based on the examination of the proposed solutions to these dilemmas, it can 
be admitted that there is no single straightforward solution to settle all the controversies 
and dilemmas arising from the conflicts between the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability and other norms of international law. Scholars of past generations have 
dedicated some of their work to finding out various solutions to settle the controversy 
and dilemma. Four traditional solutions have been proposed, namely the strict 
application of the principle of diplomatic inviolability, overriding the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability in certain situations, amending the contemporary regime of the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability under the VCDR and the drafting of a brand new 
multilateral convention on the principle of diplomatic inviolability. All have their merits 
and shortcomings. Unfortunately, these traditional solutions are by no means perfect, 
and they either lack practicability or flexibility, and most of them fail to solve 
theoretical issues arising from the controversy. On the other hand, there are four 
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 For instance, a recent incident in March 2014 in which three Rwanda diplomats were expelled by the 
South African government for their involvement in an attack on a Rwandan general. See ‘South Africa, 
Rwanda Expel Diplomats over Attack on Dissident Rwandan General’ (Reuters, 7 March 2014) 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/07/us-safrica-rwanda-idUSBREA2613L20140307>accessed 27 
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alternative solutions which try to avoid the theoretical debates. These alternative 
solutions, namely the ‘hard case’ solution—permitting the breach of inviolability 
without changing the existing law, adopting administrative measures, making specific 
legislation and educating the general public, provide some practical ways to settle the 
controversies and dilemmas. However, some of these alternative solutions can only be 
adopted in response to specific situations and cannot be universally applied to all other 
dilemmas. These alternative solutions are, accordingly not the panacea to the 
controversy arising from the conflicts between the principle of diplomatic inviolability 
and other norms of international law. 
The future of the principle of diplomatic inviolability 
The above four general conclusions may well give rise to a fundamental question 
concerning the future of the principle of diplomatic inviolability. Given that the old 
principle of diplomatic inviolability is now facing new challenges and it seems that no 
satisfactory solution is available to perfectly settle the controversy, is it possible for the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability to survive the impact from the controversy and 
continue to serve as one of the cornerstone principles of international law? The answer 
is undoubtedly a ‘Yes’. 
First and foremost, recent incidents of attack on diplomatic premises and diplomatic 
agents
3
prove that in contemporary international affairs, the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability is still indispensable. Without the continuing emphasis on the protection of 
diplomatic premises, diplomatic agents and diplomatic property, it can be foreseen that 
the conduct of international diplomacy will be at stake. After all, it is the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability that essentially provides diplomats with safety, security and 
immunity from unnecessary harassment from the authorities of the receiving State. The 
reality that the principle of diplomatic inviolability served as a safeguard of diplomatic 
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 See various incidents happened in 2012 and 2013, cited in Chapters 5 and 6. 
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functions will not be radically changed, hence the continuing relevance of the principle 
of diplomatic inviolability to daily diplomatic activities. 
Secondly, compared with the numerous publications of academic treatises on diplomatic 
law up until the 1980s, in more recent decades there has relatively small number of 
academic treatises published on the theme of diplomatic law. The only notable 
monograph specifically dealing with the principle of diplomatic inviolability is Barker’s 
The Protection of Diplomatic Personnel.
4
 In addition, there are the new edition of 
Denza’s authoritative Diplomatic Law 5  and a newly updated Satow’s Diplomatic 
Practice
6
 edited by Sir Ivor Roberts that discussed the principle of diplomatic 
inviolability. This fact does not mean that the principle of diplomatic inviolability has 
lost scholars’ attention and favour. In fact, it suggests that the time-tested principle of 
diplomatic inviolability has been generally observed by State parties to the VCDR. With 
the gradual theoretical progress and increase in the cooperation between States, it is of 
less doubt that the current trend in the State practice will continue. 
Thirdly, the old principle has proved itself capable of adapting to the changing theory 
and practice of diplomatic method, diplomatic law and international law. Surly it will be 
able to stand the impact from the new challenges it faces and overcome both theoretical 
and practical difficulties of its application, perhaps through the efforts from legal 
authorities of diplomatic law. Indeed, during the classical period of seventeenth and 
eighteenth century it was scholars such as Grotius, Bynkershoek, Wicquefort and Vattel 
that greatly boosted the theoretical breakthrough in the evolution of the principle of 
diplomatic inviolability. Nowadays, diplomatic law authorities like Denza and Barker 
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 JC Barker, The Protection of Diplomatic Personnel (Ashgate 2006). 
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 E Denza, Diplomatic Law: Commentary on the Vienna Convention on the Diplomatic Relations (3rd 
edn, OUP 2008). 
6
 I Roberts (ed), Satow’s Diplomatic Practice (6th edn, OUP 2009). 
 270 
 
endeavour to provide their insightful thoughts on the theme of diplomatic inviolability. 
With the efforts and dedication of generations of diplomatic law scholars, it is not 
unrealistic to predict that in the future, the controversies discussed in previous chapters 
can finally be settled, and the dilemma faced by the authorities of the receiving State 
will also be solved. 
Therefore, it can optimistically be predicted that, despite the controversy and 
unsatisfactory solutions to the controversy, the principle of diplomatic inviolability will 
continue to play an essential role in the progressive development of diplomatic law. It 
will be, as it has always been, one of the cornerstone principles of international law, and 
will continue to be observed by all States intending to develop friendly relations with 
one another, ‘irrespective of their differing constitutional and social systems’.7 
                                                 
 
7
 Preamble to the VCDR. 
271 
 
Bibliography 
 
Adair ER, The Exterritoriality of Ambassadors in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth 
Centuries (Longmans 1929) 
Adcock F and Mosley DJ, Diplomacy in Ancient Greece (Thames and Hudson 1975) 
Akinsanya A, ‘The Dikko Affair and Anglo-Nigerian Relations’ (1985) 34 ICLQ 609 
Anderson MS, The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450-1919 (Routledge 1993) 
Akehurst, ‘The Hierarchy of the Sources of International Law’ (1975) BYIL 273 
Alexandrov S, ‘New Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Law’ (1975) 20 International 
Affairs 79 
Asher DB, ‘Human Rights Meet Diplomatic Immunities: Problems and Possible 
Solutions’ [2000] Harvard Law School Academic Year 2000-2001 Paper No.2 
Aust A, Handbook of International Law (2nd edn, CUP 2010) 
——, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (3rd edn, CUP 2013) 
Barker JC, ‘The Theory and Practice of Diplomatic Law in the Renaissance and 
Classical Periods’ (1995) 3 Diplomatic & Statecraft 593 
——, The Abuse of Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities: A Necessary Evil? 
(Dartmouth 1996) 
——, The Protection of Diplomatic Personnel (Ashgate 2006) 
——, ‘The Function of Diplomatic Missions in Times of Armed Conflict or Foreign 
Armed Intervention’ (2012) 81 Nordic Journal of International Law 1 
Barnhoorn LANM, ‘Diplomatic Law and the Unilateral Remedies’ (1994) 25 
Netherland Yearbook of International Law 39 
272 
 
Barston RP, Modern Diplomacy (4th edn, Routledge 2013) 
Bassiouni MC, ‘Protection of Diplomats under Islamic Law’ (1980) 74 AJIL 609 
Beaumont JS, ‘Self-Defence as a Justification for Disregarding Diplomatic Immunity’ 
(1991) 29 Canadian Yearbook of International Law 391 
Bederman DJ, International Law in Antiquity (CUP 2001) 
——, ‘International Law in the Ancient World’ in D Armstrong (ed), Routledge 
Handbook of International Law (Routledge 2009) 
Behrens B, ‘Treatises on the Ambassador Written in the Fifteenth and Early Sixteenth 
Centuries’ (1936) 51 The English Historical Review 616 
Behrens P, ‘The Law of Diplomatic Asylum: A Contextual Approach’ (2014) 35 
Michigan Journal of International Law 319 
Berridge GR, Diplomatic Classics: Selected texts from Commynes to Vattel (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2004) 
——, Diplomacy: Theory and Practice (4th edn, Palgrave Macmillan 2010) 
——, Embassies in Armed Conflict (Continuum 2012) 
Berridge GR and Lloyd L, A Dictionary of Diplomacy (3rd edn, Palgrave Macmillan 
2012) 
Black J, A History of Diplomacy (Rektion Books 2010) 
Blix H, ‘The Rights of Diplomatic Missions and Consulates to Communicate with 
Authorities of the Host State’ (1964) 8 Scandinavian Studies in Law 9 
Boas G, Public International Law: Contemporary Principles and Perspectives (Edward 
Elgar 2012) 
Bolewski W, ‘Diplomatic Privileges in Practice’ (2004) 78 Australian Law Journal 788 
Bowett DW, Self-Defense in International Law (Manchester University Press 1958) 
273 
 
Brandon M, ‘Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities as A Priority Topic for 
Codification by the International Law Commission’ (1953) 2 ICLQ 258 
Britton RS, ‘Chinese Interstate Intercourse before 700 BC’ (1935) 29 AJIL 616 
Brookfield SH, ‘Immunity of the Subordinate Personnel of a Diplomatic Mission’ (1938) 
19 BYIL 151 
Brown J, ‘Diplomatic Immunity: State Practice under the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations’ (1988) 37 ICLQ 53 
Brownlie I, ‘The Use of Force in Self-Defence’ (1961) 37 BYIL 183 
Brownlie I, International Law and the Use of Force by States (OUP 1963) 
Bruns K, A Cornerstone of Modern Diplomacy: Britain and the Negotiation of the 1961 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Bloomsbury 2014) 
Bryce J, Studies in History and Jurisprudence (OUP 1901) 
Buffard I and Wittich S, ‘United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran Case 
(United States of America v Iran)’ in R Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2012) vol X, 543 
Cahier P, ‘Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations’ (1969) 37 International 
Conciliation 5 
Cameron I, ‘First Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons’ 
(1985) 34 ICLQ 610 
Chatterjee C, International Law and Diplomacy (Routledge 2010) 191 
Cheng B, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals 
(CUP 1987) 
Chesterman S, Franck TM and Malone DM, Law and Practice of the United Nations: 
Documents and Commentary (OUP 2008) 
274 
 
Clapham A (ed), Brierly’s Law of Nations: An Introduction to the Role of International 
Law in International Relations (7th edn, OUP 2012) 
Cohen R, ‘On Diplomacy in the Ancient Near East: The Amarna Letters’ (1996) 7 
Diplomacy & Statecraft 245 
Cohen R and Westbrook R (eds), Amarna Diplomacy, the Beginnings of International 
Relations (Johns Hopkins University Press 2000) 
Cohn EJ, ‘Waiver of Immunity’ (1958) 34 BYIL 260 
Colket MB, ‘The Inviolability of Diplomatic Archives’ (1945) 8 The American 
Archivist 26. 
Conforti B, The Law and Practice of the United Nations (3rd edn, Martinus Nijhoff 
2005) 
Crawford J, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: 
Introduction, Text and Commentaries (CUP 2001) 
——, ‘The ILC’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts: 
A Retrospect’ (2002) 96 AJIL 874 
—— (ed), Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th edn, OUP 2012) 
——, State Responsibility: The General Part (CUP 2013) 
D’Aspremont J, ‘Diplomatic Courier and Bag’ in R Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (OUP 2012) vol III, 110 
——, ‘Premises of Diplomatic Missions’ in R Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2012) vol VIII, 413 
Dembinski L, The Modern Law of Diplomacy (Martinus Nijhoff 1988) 
De Vattel E, The Law of Nations (CG Fenwick tr, first published 1758, Oceana 1964) 
275 
 
De Wicquefort A, The Embassador and His Functions (first published 1681, J Digby tr, 
University of Leicester Press 1997) 
De Wet E and Vidmar J, Hierarchy in International Law (OUP 2012) 
Den Heijer M, ‘Diplomatic Asylum and the Assange Case’ (2013) 26 Leiden Journal of 
International Law 399 
Denza E, Diplomatic Law: Commentary on the Vienna Convention on the Diplomatic 
Relations (1st edn, Oceana 1976) 
——, ‘Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities’ in JC Barker and JP Grant (eds), The 
Harvard Research in International Law: Contemporary Analysis and Appraisal 
(Fred B Rothman & Co 2007) 
——, Diplomatic Law: Commentary on the Vienna Convention on the Diplomatic 
Relations (3rd edn, OUP 2008) 
——, ‘Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations’ (United Nations Audiovisual 
Library of International Law) < http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/vcdr/vcdr_e.pdf> 
Dickstein HL, ‘Territorial Status of Consular and Diplomatic Premises’ (1973) 32 The 
Cambridge Law Journal 46 
Dixon M, Textbook on International Law (7th edn, OUP 2013) 
Elagab OY, The Legality of Non-Forcible Counter-Measures in International Law 
(OUP 1988) 
Elgavish D, ‘Did Diplomatic Immunity Exist in Ancient Near East?’ (2000) 2 Journal of 
the History of International Law 73 
Evans MD (ed), Blackstone’s International Law Documents  (10th edn, OUP 2011) 
Evans G and Newnham J, The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations (Penguin 
1998) 
276 
 
Eyffinger A, ‘Diplomacy’ in B Fassbender and A Peters (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
the History of International Law (OUP 2012) 
Fasoli E, ‘Distress’ in R Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2012) vol III, 168 
Feltham RG, Diplomatic Handbook (8th edn, Martinus Nijhoff 2004) 
Fitschen T, ‘Archives’ in R Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (OUP 2012) vol I, 560 
Foakes J, The Position of Heads of State and Senior Officials in International Law 
(OUP 2014) 
Frey LS and Frey ML, The History of Diplomatic Immunity (Ohio State University 
Press 1998) 
Friuville OD, ‘Attribution of Conduct to the State: Private Individuals’ in J Crawford, A 
Pellet and S Olleson (eds), The Law of International Responsibility (OUP 2010) 
Gardner RN, ‘Commentary on the Law of Self-Defense’ in LF Damrosch and DJ 
Scheffer (eds), Law and Force in the New International Order (Westview Press 
1991) 
Gentili A, De Legationibus Libri Tres (GJ Laing tr, first published 1594, Oceana 1964) 
Ghouri AA, ‘Determining Hierarchy Between Conflicting Treaties’ (2012) 2 Asian 
Journal of International Law 235 
Goodman DH, ‘Reciprocation as a Means of Curtailing Diplomatic Immunity Abuse in 
the United States: The United States Need to Play Hard Ball’ (1988) 11 Houston 
Journal of International Law 393 
Gore-Booth P (ed), Satow’s Guide to Diplomatic Practice (5th edn, Longman 1979) 
Grant JP and Barker JC (eds), Harvard Research in International Law, Contemporary 
Analysis and Appraisal (William S Hein & Co 2007) 
277 
 
—— (eds), Parry & Grant’s Encyclopaedic Dictionary of International Law (3rd edn, 
OUP 2009) 
Gray C, ‘The Principle of Non-Use of Force’ in V Lowe and C Warbrick (eds), The 
United Nations and the Principles of International Law (Routledge 1994) 
——, International Law and the Use of Force (3rd edn, OUP 2008) 
Greenwood C, ‘The ICJ and the Use of Force’ in V Lowe and M Fitzmaurice (eds), 
Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice (CUP 1996) 
——, ‘Caroline, The’ in R Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2012) vol I, 1141 
——, ‘Self-Defence’ in R Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2012) vol IX, 103 
Gries PH, ‘Tears of Rage: Chinese Nationalist Reactions to the Belgrade Embassy 
Bombing’ (2001) 46 The China Journal 25 
Grotius H, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (FW Kelsey tr, first published 1625, Oceana 1964) 
Grzybowski K, Soviet Public International Law: Doctrines and Diplomatic Practice 
(AW Sijthoff 1970) 
Gutteridge JAC, ‘Immunities of the Subordinate Diplomatic Staff’ (1947) 24 BYIL 148 
Hamilton K and Langhorne R, The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory and 
Administration (2nd edn, Routledge 2011) 
Hardy M, Modern Diplomatic Law (Manchester University Press 1968) 
Hatano R, ‘Traffic Accidents and Diplomatic Immunity’ (1968) 12 Japanese Annual of 
International Law 20 
Hentrei S and Soley X, ‘Force Majeure’ in R Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2012) vol IV, 151 
278 
 
Herdegen M, ‘The Abuse of Diplomatic Privileges and Countermeasures not Covered 
by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations: Some Observations in the 
Light of Recent British Experience’ (1986) 46 ZaoRV 734 
Hevener NK (ed), Diplomacy in a Dangerous World: Protection for Diplomats Under 
International Law (Westview Press 1986) 
Higgins R, ‘The Abuse of Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities: Recent United 
Kingdom Experience’ (1985) 79 AJIL 641 
Hutchinson T, ‘Doctrinal Research’ in D Watkins and M Burton (eds), Research 
Methods in Law (Routledge 2013) 
Japanese Research Institute of International Cases (ed), Diplomatic and Consular 
Relations (Keio University Press 1996) 
Jeffery AJ, ‘Diplomatic Asylum: Its Problems and Potential as a Means of Protecting 
Human Rights’ (1985) 1 South African Journal on Human Rights 10 
Johnson DHN, ‘The United Nations Conference on Diplomatic Intercourse and 
Immunities’ (1961) 10 ICLQ 597 
Joseph S, Shultz J and Castan M, The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights: Cases, Materials and Commentary (2nd edn, OUP 2004) 
Jennings R and Watts A (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law (9th edn Longman 1996) 
vol I 
Kaufman G, ‘Is Diplomatic Immunity Necessary?’ in C Ashman and P Trescott, 
Outrage: An Investigation into the Abuse of Diplomatic Immunity (WH Allen 1986) 
Kerley EL, ‘Some Aspects of the Vienna Conference on Diplomatic Intercourse and 
Immunities’ (1962) 56 AJIL 88 
Koskenniemi M, ‘Hierarchy in International Law- A Sketch’ (1997) 8 EJIL 566 
279 
 
Lake DA, ‘The State and International Relations’ in C Reus-Smit and D Snidal (eds), 
The Oxford Handbook of International Relations (OUP 2010) 
Langhorne R, ‘The Regulation of Diplomatic Practice: the Beginnings to the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961’ (1992) 18 Review of International 
Studies 3 
Lee LT and Quigley J, Consular Law and Practice (3rd edn, OUP 2008) 
Lewis CJ, State and Diplomatic Immunity (3rd edn, Lloyd’s of London Press Ltd 1990) 
Li HP, ‘Jus Cogens in International Law’ in S Yee and TY Wang (eds), International 
Law in the Post-Cold War World (Routledge 2001) 
Liang YL, ‘Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities as A Subject for Codification’ (1953) 
47 AJIL 439 
MacDonald A and Brollowski H, ‘Security’ in R Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2012) vol IX, 72 
Maginnis VL, ‘Limiting Diplomatic Immunity: Lessons Learned from the 1946 
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations’ (2003) 28 
Brooklyn Journal of International Law 989 
Mann FA, ‘”Inviolability” and Other Problems of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations’ in FA Mann, Further Studies in International Law (OUP 1990) 
Mattingly G, Renaissance Diplomacy (Jonathan Cape 1955) 
McClanahan GV, Diplomatic Immunity: Principles, Practices, Problems (Hurst & 
Company 1989) 
McDonough MB, ‘Privileged Outlaws: Diplomats, Crime and Immunity’ (1996) 20 
Suffolk Transnational Law Review 475 
Mingst KA, Essentials of International Relations (4th edn, Norton 2008) 
Moran WL, The Amarna Letters (Harvard University Press 1992) 
280 
 
Mullerson R, ‘Self-Defense in the Contemporary World’ in LF Damrosch and DJ 
Scheffer (eds), Law and Force in the New International Order (Westview Press 
1991) 
Nahlik SE, ‘Development of Diplomatic Law: Selected Problems’, (1990) 222 Recueil 
Des Cours 187 
Nawaz MK, ‘Is A Diplomatic Bag Open to Electronic Examination?’ (1994) 34 Indian 
Journal of International Law 57 
Neff SC, ‘A Short History of International Law’ in MD Evans (ed), International Law 
(3rd edn, OUP 2010) 
Nelson CM, ‘“Opening” Pandora’s Box: The Status of the Diplomatic Bag in 
International Relations’ (1989) 12 Fordham International Law Journal 494 
Nicolson H, The Evolution of Diplomatic Method (Constable 1954) 
Noll G, ‘Seeking Asylum at Embassies: A Right to Entry in International Law?’ (2005) 
17 International Journal of Refugee Law 542 
Nowak M, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (NP Engel 
1993) 
Numelin R, The Beginnings of Diplomacy: A Sociological Study of Intertribal and 
International Relations (OUP 1950) 
Nussbaum A, A Concise History of the Law of Nations (2nd edn 1954) 
O’Keefe PJ, ‘Privileges and Immunities of the Diplomatic Family’ (1976) 25 ICLQ 329 
Ogdon M, Bases of Diplomatic Immunity (John Byrne & Company 1936) 
Orakhelashvili A, Peremptory Norms in International Law (OUP 2006) 
Parker K, ‘Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human Rights’, (1988) 12 Hastings 
International and Comparative Law Review 411 
281 
 
Paulus AJ and Simma B, ‘The Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights Abuses 
in Internal Conflicts – A Positivist View’ (1999) 93 AJIL 302 
Pauwelyn J, ‘Fragmentation of International Law’ in R Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2012) vol IV, 219 
Preuss L, ‘Capacity for Legation and the Theoretical Basis of Diplomatic Immunities’ 
(1932) 10 New York University Law Quarterly Review 170 
——, ‘Protection of Foreign Diplomatic and Consular Premises Against Picketing’ 
(1937) 31 AJIL 705 
Pronto A and Wood M (eds), The International Law Commission 1999-2009 (OUP 
2010) vol IV 
Przetacznik F, ‘Reaffirmation of Basic Principles of Diplomatic and Consular Law by 
the International Court of Justice in the American Diplomatic Case in Iran’ (1991) 
3 Sri Lanka Journal of International Law 119 
Queller DE, The Office of Ambassador in the Middle Ages (Princeton University Press 
1967) 
Rafat A, ‘The Iran Hostage Crisis and the International Court of Justice- Aspects of the 
Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran’ (1980) 
10 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 425 
Ratner SA and Slaughter AM, ‘Appraising the Methods of International Law: A 
Prospectus for Readers’ (1999) 93 AJIL 291 
Rehman J, International Human Rights Law (2nd edn, Longman 2010) 
Reisman WM, ‘The Regime of Straits and National Security: An Appraisal of 
International Law Making’ (1980) 74 AJIL 48 
Roberts I (ed), Satow’s Diplomatic Practice (6th edn, OUP 2009) 
Romahi SE, Studies in International Law and Diplomatic Practice (Data Labo Inc 1980) 
282 
 
Ronning CN, Diplomatic Asylum: Legal Norms and Political Reality in Latin American 
Relations (Martinus Nijhoff 1965) 
Rubin AP, ‘Diplomatic Asylum and Fang Lizhi’ (1990) 1 Diplomacy and Statecraft 84 
Ruddy FS, ‘International Law and the Enlightenment: Vattel and the 18th Century’ 
(1968) 3 International Lawyer 839 
——, International Law in the Enlightenment: The Background of Emmerich de 
Vattel’s Le Droit Des Gens (Oceana 1975) 
Salmon J, ‘Members of the Staff of  Diplomatic Missions’ in R Wolfrum (ed), The Max 
Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (OUP 2012) vol VII, 75 
Schachter O, International Law in Theory and Practice (Martinus Nijhoff 1991) 
Sen B, A Diplomat’s Handbook of International Law and Practice (3rd edn, Martinus 
Nijhoff 1988) 
Shah P, ‘Asylum, Diplomatic’ in R Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2012) vol I, 713 
Shaw MN, International Law (6th edn, CUP 2008) 
Shearer IA (ed), Starke’s International Law (11th edn 1994) 
Shelton D, ‘Normative Hierarchy in International Law’ (2006) 100 AJIL 291 
Silva GEDNE, Diplomacy in International Law (Sijthoff 1972) 
Simma B, ‘NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects’ (1999) 10 EJIL 1 
——, ‘Universality of International Law from the Perspective of a Practitioner’ (2009) 
20 EJIL 265 
——, ‘Reciprocity’ in R Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2012) vol VIII, 651 
283 
 
Simma B and Pulkowski D, ‘Leges Speciales and Self-Contained Regimes’ in J 
Crawford, A Pellet and S Olleson (eds), The Law of International Responsibility 
(OUP 2010) 
Simpson G, ‘International Law in Diplomatic History’ in J Crawford and M 
Koskenniemi (eds), The Cambridge Companion to International Law (CUP 2012) 
Stowell EC, ‘The Joint Resolution of Prohibiting the Picketing of Diplomatic and 
Consular Premises in the District of Columbia’ (1938) 32 AJIL 344 
Surette EC, ‘Applicability of Diplomatic Immunity Under Vienna Convention and 
Diplomatic Relations Act’ (2005) 1 ALR Fed 2d 351 
Tanzi A, ‘Necessity’ in R Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2012) vol VII, 583 
——, ‘Restitution’ in R Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2012) vol VIII, 972 
Thirlway H, ‘The Sources of International Law’ in MD Evans (ed), International Law 
(3rd edn, OUP 2010) 
——, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: Fifty Years of 
Jurisprudence (OUP 2013) 
Tunkin G, ‘Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations’ (1961) 6 International Affairs 
51 
Van Alebeek R, ‘Immunity, Diplomatic’ in R Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (OUP 2012) vol V, 98 
Van Bynkershoek C, De Foro Legatorum (GJ Laing tr, first published 1946, Oceana 
1964) 
Vicuna FO, ‘Diplomatic and Consular Immunities and Human Rights’ (1991) 40 ICLQ 
34 
284 
 
Walker TA, A History of the Law of Nations (first published CUP 1899, Adamant 
Media Corporation 2006) 
Ward NP, ‘Espionage and the Forfeiture of Diplomatic Immunity’ (1977) 11 
International Lawyer 657 
Watts A, The International Law Commission 1949-1998 (OUP 1999) vol I 
Weil P, ‘Towards Relative Normativity in International Law’ (1983) 77 AJIL 413 
Weiß N, ‘Assembly, Freedom of, International Protection’ in R Wolfrum (ed), The Max 
Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2012) vol I, 678 
Wilson CE, ‘Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities: The Retinue and Families of the 
Diplomatic Staff’ (1965) 14 ICLQ 1265 
——, Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities (The University of Arizona Press 1967) 
Wittich S, ‘Compensation’ in R Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2012) vol II, 499 
Wittzack RU, ‘Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo Cases’ in R Wolfrum 
(ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2nd edn, OUP 
2012) vol I, 587 
Wolfrum R, ‘General International Law (Principles, Rules and Standards)’ in R 
Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (OUP 
2012) vol IV, 344 
——, ‘Sources of International Law’ in R Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia 
of Public International Law (OUP 2012) vol IX, 299 
Young E, ‘The Development of the Law of Diplomatic Relations’ (1964) 40 BYIL 141 
Zaid MS, ‘Diplomatic Immunity: To Have or Not to Have, That Is the Question’ (1998) 
4 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law 623 
285 
 
Zeidman A, ‘Abuse of the Diplomatic Bag: A Proposed Solution’ (1989) 11 Cardozo 
Law Review 427 
  
286 
 
 
Documents 
 
‘Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence Taken before the Foreign Affairs Committee’ 
(1984/85 HC 127) 
‘Codification of the International Law Relating to Diplomatic Intercourse and 
Immunities, Memorandum prepared by the Secretariat’, YILC [1956] vol II, 129 
‘Conclusions of the work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law: 
Difficulties arising from the diversification and expansion of international law’ (18 
July 2006) UN Doc A/CN.4/L.702. 
‘Draft Articles on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities, Text and Commentary’, 
YILC [1957] vol II, 132 
‘Draft Articles on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities, Text and Commentary’, 
YILC [1958] vol II, 89 
‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with 
Commentaries’, YILC [2001] vol II, 31 
‘Draft Articles on the Status of the Diplomatic Courier and the Diplomatic Bag not 
Accompanied by Diplomatic Courier and Draft Optional Protocols thereto with 
Commentaries’, YILC [1989] vol II, 14 
‘Government Report on Review of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and 
Reply to “The Abuse of Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges”’ (1985 Cmnd 9497) 
‘Guidance for Law Enforcement Officers with Regard to Personal Rights and 
Immunities of Foreign Diplomatic and Consular Personnel’ (1988) 27 ILM 1619 
‘Harvard Research Draft Convention on Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities’ (1932) 
26 AJIL Sup 15 
287 
 
‘Introductory Comment of the Harvard Research Draft Convention on Diplomatic 
Privileges and Immunities’ (1932) 26 AJIL Sup 26 
‘Minutes of Evidence Taken before the Foreign Affairs Committee’ (1984/85 HC 127) 
‘Observations of Governments on the Draft Articles concerning Diplomatic Intercourse 
and Immunities adopted by the International law Commission at its Ninth Session in 
1957’ YILC [1958] vol II, 111 
‘Report of the Sub-Committee’ (1926) 20 AJIL Spec Sup 151 
‘Summary Records of the Ninth Session’ YILC [1957] vol I 
‘Summary Records of the Tenth Session’ YILC [1958] vol I 
‘The Abuse of Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges’ (1984/85 HC 127) 
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (The White House 2002) 
United Nations Conference on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities: Official Records 
(United Nations 1962) vol I, II 
